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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the long-term post-issue performance using a sample of 1,953 
UK non-financial IPOs for the period of 1982-2004. Data is obtained from the LSPD. 
The main measure of performance includes buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
cumulative abnormal returns, and calendar time regression intercepts. 
Our results indicate the mixed evidence on the long-term post-IPO stock performance. 
Event time analysis produce significant underperformance at five-year horizon while 
calendar time regression results show that IPOs perform as good as benchmarks. In 
conclusion, the relative long-term performance depends on the method and 
benchmark of examining performance. For example, most results based on BHAR 
measure suggest that the sample underperforms. 
Additionally, we assess the choice of data set on the conclusion of long-term post-IPO 
performance. We find that Datastream (DS) produces similar results as London Share 
Price Database (LSPD) if equal weight scheme is adopted. Additionally, there is 
insignificant discrepancy for the value weighted returns. 
Finally, the thesis reveals that two-stage IPOs do not underperform the benchmarks. 
Furthermore, two-stage IPOs have similar long-term performance compared to that of 
regular IPOs listed in AIM. Also, the underpricing for two-stage IPOs is less severe 
than regular IPOs. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the past decade, the topic of initial public offering (IPO) has been of great interest 
to investors and academics. Investors are interested at the tremendous profit that IPOs 
often offer to them. In academia, studies find significant underpricing in the primary 
market and consequently substantial initial returns in the secondary market. Most 
IPOs left money on the table.1 However, after short-run outperformance of IPOs, 
there is on average breathtaking underperformance over longer period. 
Although the poor long-run post-IPO performance is well documented, the 
determinant of this phenomenon is not well sustained. From market efficiency 
hypothesis, there should be no abnormal returns as long as the event fully completed. 
Therefore, another relevant research area considers the metric to measure firms’ 
long-term performance. Recent studies provide through evidence about various 
methods of measuring abnormal performance2. The conclusion is that none of extant 
methods is always preferred. 
Nonetheless, due to availability of data and size of the market, most studies tend to 
focus on US market and few researches are on UK IPOs. In spite of small coverage of 
IPOs in UK, IPO market in UK has grown rapidly over the past decade at a quicker 
pace than the counterparts in continental European markets. In 1995, Gajewski and 
Gresse (2006, table 1) report 285 IPOs in UK market and this number increases to 413 
                                                 
1 Ritter (1991) defines money left on the table in an IPO as the number of shares offered multiplied by 
the first day capital gain, measured from the offer price to the closing price. 
2 See Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000 
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until 2004. The capital raised during that period even tripled. Other European 
countries have less IPOs in 2004 compared to that in 1995. The buoyant UK IPO 
market is related to the success of Alternative Investment Market (AIM). There is no 
requirement on size, floating capitalization, age, sector, growth if private firm choose 
to goes public through AIM. Admission is only subject to the approval of the 
nominated adviser in charge of the IPO. Therefore, we need updated empirical 
evidence about long-term post-issue stock performance of UK IPOs. 
Furthermore, nearly all previous UK studies (Levis, 1993; Espenlaub et al., 2000; 
Gregory et al., 2010) use London Share Price Data (LSPD) as data source. However, 
the return and market value information could also be found from DataStream (DS) 
and there’s no assessment between two databases concerning the impact on 
conclusions caused by data source.  
Additionally, even the long-term post-issue poor performance from UK IPOs is well 
documented in previous literature, the determinant is not been found yet. One purpose 
of the study is to shed some light on the potential determinants of long-term IPOs 
performance. 
Last but not least, UK IPO market displays some different characteristics which 
cannot be shared by US market. For instance, firms are permitted to be listed first in 
the secondary market and then issue new equity sometime after the listing. The IPOs 
adopting two-stage strategy potentially have different underpricing and long-term 
post-offering performance pattern from regular IPOs. 
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Our thesis aims to address the problems mentioned above. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on theoretical determinants of long-term IPO stock performance and 
associated empirical work. We also survey some econometric issues that likely 
contribute to the mixed empirical results.  
Our first empirical study covers Chapter 3, examines the long-term post-issue UK 
IPO performance using two datasets. We assess the impact of using different data 
sources on conclusion, which is never performed in prior studies. In this chapter, we 
also try to test the hot market hypothesis by dividing the sample into several groups 
based on annual IPO activity. 
Our second empirical study re-examines the long-term post-issue performance using 
an updated and more comprehensive sample. Consistent with prior UK studies, we 
focus our study on non-financial firms. Our major measure of performance includes 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. We conduct 
robustness check using calendar time portfolio approach. The intercepts of each time 
series OLS regression is indicator of average abnormal returns. We also use GLS to 
control for the well-known problem of heteroscedasticity (Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000). For finding the determinants of long-term performance, we focus whether 
there is difference if IPO is listed in different market or using different listing method. 
Our last empirical study (chapter 5) investigates the underpricing and long-term 
post-offering stock performance for two-stage firms. We are not aware of any UK 
study that analyzes the long-run performance for this special group of IPOs. We first 
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compare the initial returns of two-stage firms with that from regular IPOs. We also 
apply the standard methodology in our analysis and demonstrate how benchmarks are 
chosen to make sure the validity of the conclusion.  
This research contributes to the extant literature on long-term IPO post-issue 
performance in the following ways. Firstly, this research provides additional UK 
evidence on the long-term post-issue stock performance with a more recent and 
carefully constructed dataset. Additionally, prior UK studies either use BHAR or 
CAR to measure the performance. We demonstrate the both two measures have 
exclusive advantages and can supplement each other. In terms of benchmark, we 
apply Carhart (1997) four-factor model to the expected return, which has not been 
conducted before. Secondly, our research provides valuable insight about impact of 
data set choice on conclusion. Most previous UK studies only collect first trading day 
close price from DS as underpricing dataset, while we collect monthly stock price and 
market value from DS. Thirdly, we conduct an experimental study using a sub-group 
of IPOs to investigate the effect of two-stage strategy on long-term post-offering stock 
performance. Besides, we test and confirm the notion of Derrien and Kecskes (2007) 
that two-stage strategy will reduce underpricing relative to regular IPOs. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a review of 
theoretical and empirical literature on long-term post-issue IPO performance. Chapter 
3 documents the long-term UK IPOs performance using two datasets. Chapter 4 
re-examine the post-issue performance of UK IPOs with an extended sample period 
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and size. Chapter 5 investigates the underpricing and post-offering stock performance 
in the long-run for two-stage firms. Chapter 6 concludes, summarizing the major 
empirical findings, limitations, and further research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Long-run underperformance international evidence 
2.1.1 US evidence on IPO long-term performance 
There is ongoing debate on whether the IPOs firms underperform in the long-run. 
Ritter (1991) documents that initial public offerings underperform significantly 
relative to comparable firms in terms of size and industry. With a sample of 1526 US 
IPOs from 1975 to 1984, he finds sample firms significantly underperform the 
benchmark about 34.47 percent in the post-issue three year period.  
Work earlier conducted by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) yield underperformance based 
on post issue 250 trading days (one year) period as well. Although one year cannot be 
defined as a long-term basis now, it is comparatively long for studies before 1990 
which usually target on price behavior of days and weeks after IPO. Their sample 
includes 1598 offerings over the years 1977-1987. They find that adjusted return 
compared to NASDAQ index is -13.73 percent during one year post-issue horizon. 
This underperformance is highly significant. Furthermore, the conclusion is 
conservative for two reasons. First, the adjusted returns present a positive skewed 
distribution, with median much lower than mean. Second, because the IPOs have 
higher systematic risk, the adjusted return based on risk would have been more 
negative.  
The two papers above are the most influential in the early research stage of long-term 
performance of IPOs. The underperformance conclusion is backed by more papers 
7 
 
with increasingly focus on this topic. Loughran and Ritter (1995) analyze post-issue 
five year stock performance of issuing firms during 1970 and 1990, and find IPOs are 
poor long-term investments for investors. 4753 stocks on average show significant 
underperformances relative to non-issuing firms. The magnitude of underperformance 
is huge, with 44 percent more money being invested in issuers than in non-issuers to 
reach same wealth relative five years later. The conclusion is more persuasive than 
previous studies because they adopt different benchmarks including matching firms 
and five market indices3. Loughran and Ritter (2000) re-examine the new issues 
puzzle using three-factor regressions with factors purged of new issues, and find new 
issuers reliably underperform. Brav and Gompers (1997) use a sample of 934 
venture-backed IPOs from 1972-92 and 3407 non-venture IPOs from 1975-92 and 
analyze their stock behavior in the long run. Their result is that nonventure-backed 
small IPOs perform worst. The underperformance of IPOs substantially reduces when 
the weight scheme is switched from equal to value.  
In Ritter and Welch (2002), they review stock price performance of IPOs in the three 
years after the offering. They find that over three years, an average IPO 
underperforms market-adjusted (CRSP value weighted index) by 23.4 percent, 
underperforms style-adjusted companies (non-IPO matching firms with closest market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratio) only by 5.1 percent. Seasoned firms matched 
by market capitalization and book-to-market ratio fare as bad as IPOs do. Their results 
                                                 
3 Nasdaq equally weighted index, Nasdaq value weighted index, Amex-NYSE value weighted index, 
Amex-NYSE equally weighted index, and S&P 500 index 
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support the implication from Brav and Gompers (1997) that underperformance is not 
due to the IPO status but possibly subject to certain firm characteristics. Brav and 
Gompers (1997) suggest that we should look more broadly at the types of firms that 
underperform and not consider IPO firms as a distinct group. Brav et al. (2000) also 
examine whether a distinct equity issuer underperformance anomaly exists. In a 
sample including IPOs from 1975 to 1992, they find underperformance concentrated 
among small issuing firms with low book-to-market ratio. They indicate the poor 
long-term performance is not exclusive to firms as IPOs but also shared by other 
non-issuing firms with similar firm characteristics. Gompers and Learner (2003) 
participate in the debate of whether a distinct IPO underperformance exists by testing 
out-of-sample data. They collect information of firm-commitment IPOs in the US 
from 1935 to 1972 before the formation of Nasdaq and measure their returns for up to 
five years after listing. The failure to detect a consistent price pattern put more doubts 
on whether a unique IPO effect exists.  
In summary, the empirical evidence of long-term underperformance of IPO in U.S. 
reaches a consensus. However, it is still not sure whether IPOs long-term 
underperformance is one market anomaly against market efficiency hypothesis or a 
phenomenon shared by some other non-issuing firms.  
2.1.2 International evidence on IPO long-term stock performance 
The international evidence on the long-run performance of IPOs is less conclusive 
compared to those found in US. At least, the consistent finding in US IPOs is that they 
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fare poorly, regardless of the different explanations. IPOs in some countries other than 
US cannot find evidence of long-term underperformance. Sometimes, even the 
conclusions for the same country but in different papers are opposite. In the following, 
I will demonstrate the empirical evidence of underperformance first and then some 
refuting this statement.  
Leleux and Muzyka (1997) investigate the post-issue performance of IPOs issued in 
Belgium and France from 1988-1992. They find negative cumulative abnormal 
returns for the French IPOs, but not for the Belgian ones. For German capital market, 
Uhlir (1989) shows that IPOs underperform the market by 7.41 percent (excluding 
first day returns). Stehle et al. (2000) find that the German IPOs from 1960 to 1992 on 
average will produce -6 percent adjusted returns relative to matching portfolio with 
similar market capitalization by three years after listing which is much smaller than 
the counterparts in US. Furthermore, Finnish IPO research by Keloharju (1993) 
proves -26.4 percent long-run cumulative market-adjusted returns for 79 new 
offerings from 1984 to 1989. In Jakobsen and Sorensen’s (2001) study on Danish 
IPOs from 1984 to 1992, it also finds the underperformance of IPOs compared to the 
market (Danish Total Stock Index) by -30.4 percent, and by -13.1 percent compared 
to matching firms after 5 years. Studies have also been conducted for other European 
countries, such as Italy and Spain. Arosi et al. (2000) report adjusted return of -11.53 
percent for 108 Italian IPOs during 1985-1997. Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005) find that 
the Spanish IPOs after five years of listing underperform by -37.05 percent.  
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Kooli and Suret (2004) fulfill the gap of evidence on Canadian market by examining 
the performance of over 445 Canadian IPOs from 1991 to 1998 up to five years. They 
find long-term underperformance, however not always statistically significant, is 
contingent on methodology and weighting scheme. In Australia, Mustow (1992) 
document significant long-run underperformance and 36-month post-listing adjusted 
returns of -112.8 percent is reported. In addition, results from Lee et al. (1996) show 
that Australian IPOs significantly underperform market in the three-year period 
subsequent to listing. Another study on Australia by Allen and Patrick (1996) also 
proves significant aftermarket underperformance of -25.38 percent. 
Emerging capital markets also provide some evidence of poor long-run post-issue 
stock performance. Aggarwal et al. (1993) conduct analysis on three Latin America 
stock markets. 62 Brazilian IPOs are found to underperform -47 percent; 6 Chilean 
IPOs at three-year horizon underperform by -23.7 percent; 44 Mexican IPOs at 
one-year horizon underperform by -19.6 percent. Chan et al. (2004) explore the 
long-run stock performance of IPOs in China allowing for specific characteristics (A 
and B shares). They find A-share IPOs underperform their non-IPO benchmarks while 
B-share IPOs outperform the similar non-IPO firms in terms of size and/or 
book-to-market ratio. Cheng and Shiu (2005) demonstrate that IPOs in Taiwan during 
1988-2002 underperform the market by -22.73 percent, contradicting results presented 
by Chen (2001) who conclude that Taiwanese IPOs do not underperform in the 
long-run. 
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We also find some evidence that IPOs do not perform poorly or even outperform the 
benchmark. For example, Brounen and Eichlolz (2002) find that IPOs in Sweden have 
long-run outperformance by 18.89 percent. Similarly, study by Drobetz et al. (2005) 
indicates that Swiss IPOs listed from 1983 to 2000 don’t demonstrate evidence of 
long-run underperformance if small capitalization index as a benchmark is applied. 
Schuster (2003) focuses the returns of all IPOs in the six largest continental European 
markets and Sweden as a whole during the period 1988-1998. He finds evidence of 
short-term outperformance and no long-term underperformance.  
Paudyal et al. (1998) report that no performance difference could be detected between 
Malaysia IPOs and market portfolio. Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) even find that IPOs 
listed on the KLSE (Kuala-Lumpur Stock Exchange) during the period 1990 to 2000 
outperform their market benchmarks by 32.63 percent in the post-issue three years. 
The Thai IPOs listed during 1985-92, undertaken by Allen et al. (1999), show 
insignificant underperformance during two years after going public. Kim et al. (1995) 
find that Korean IPOs outperform seasoned firms with similar characteristics. Kiymaz 
(2000) find outperformance (44.1 percent at the end of 36 months) of Turkish IPOs 
for the period 1990-1995.  
2.1.3 UK evidence on IPO long-term performance 
The research for UK is tilted towards finding underperformance. Levis (1993) adopts 
methods similar to Ritter’s (1991) and finds that 712 UK floated during 1980-88 
underperform the HGSC index (Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index) over a three 
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year period by 8.31 percent. Using data of UK firms that go public during 1985-92, 
another influential paper by Espenlaub et al. (2000) find in event-time framework, 
there is a substantial amount of negative abnormal returns after the first 3 years 
compared to different benchmarks. However, over further two years, IPOs on average 
exhibit less dramatic underperformance, and the conclusion depends on the 
benchmark used. In calendar time framework, the statistical significance of 
underperformance is even less marked. Goergen et al. (2007) also confirm the 
statically and economically significant underperformance. Gregory et al. (2010) 
provide the UK evidence using 2499 non-financial firms spanning from 1975 to 2004. 
They find underperformance of -12.6 percent after three years and -31.6 by 5th 
anniversary. The conclusion holds for various benchmarks. 
In short, there is still international variation in observed performances and thus further 
research warranted. Most evidence in developed markets indicate negative long run 
IPO performance, although notable exceptions are also observed. The researches on 
emerging markets are even less conclusive compared to ones found in emerged 
markets. It is more likely to observe outperformance in emerging capital markets. 
2.2 Determinants of long-run underperformance 
2.2.1 Windows of opportunity 
The windows opportunity hypothesis indicates that firms take advantage of time when 
stock prices are overpriced to sell newly listed stocks to overly optimistic investors. 
These are periods of market buoyancy during which companies have an incentive to 
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issue new shares in that they have an over-valuation compared to other companies in 
their industry. These IPOs have the worst post-issue performance among all IPOs, 
which contribute to long-term underperformance of IPOs. This hypothesis is 
supported by Ritter (1991), Lerner (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Baker and 
Wurgler (2000). Ritter (1991) finds that volume of IPO activity is associated with 
taking advantage of “windows of opportunity”. Lerner (1994) confirms finding by 
Ritter (1991). He suggests that in IPO peak periods, investors are willing to pay 
higher price for issuers. Loughran and Ritter (1995) have the evidence consistent with 
theory above. The substantial overvalued issuers are followed by a poor market 
performance could be justified. Results from Hoechle and Schmid (2009) also 
indicate IPOs with optimistic growth prospects and going public in hot issue period 
tend to underperform over the long-run. Baker and Wurgler (2000) suggest that 
windows opportunity is evidence of market inefficiency. Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
imply the irrelevance of financing policy in efficient market. However, the financing 
decision does matter in inefficient market. If that’s the case, firms will issue equity 
when equity prices are higher which will benefit the existing shareholders.  
More firms will choose to be public listed when the market price is high if windows 
opportunity hypothesis holds. The market could be divided into hot and cold 
depending on the volume of public offering in a certain period. However, conclusion 
about the quality of IPOs issuing in hot market is mixed. Hot market is a good chance 
to take advantage of window opportunity to undertake an IPO. Loughran and Ritter 
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(1995) suggest firms issuing stocks in hot markets to be lower quality compared to 
those in cold markets because they tend to experience worse long-run stock returns. 
However, Helwege and Liang (2004) show that there is no difference in quality 
between firms going public in hot or cold markets. Hot market (high volume) IPOs 
have higher market-to-book ratios, are smaller, and have lower earnings than cold 
market IPOs, but as long as these characteristics are adjusted for macroeconomic and 
industry conditions, these differences vanish.  
2.2.2 Earnings management  
Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998a), and Teoh et al. (1998b) document that issuers 
with high discretionary accruals before they go public experience significantly 
negative long-run abnormal returns and poor earnings in the post-issue period. 4 The 
proponent of market efficiency illustrates that benchmarks have specification error 
which is related to past accruals. Earnings management hypothesis tries to interpret by 
exploring whether high accruals is associated with biases in expectation, as reflected 
in analyst forecasts. It avoids concerns about appropriate expected returns benchmark, 
and focuses on the problem that whether adjustment of accounting information is 
efficient. Because the timing of cash transaction sometimes cannot match with 
economic transactions, the stated regulatory purpose for accruals is to make reported 
earnings more accurately reflect the economic performance of the firm. Accruals 
contain important information for the future earnings of the firm. Firms are allowed 
boost their earnings relative to actual cash flow by making accounting adjustments 
                                                 
4 See also Dechow and Sloan (1997) and Chan et al. (2001) 
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(accrual) before they go public, allowed by financial reporting rules. Also, 
entrepreneurs have motivations and opportunities to manage earnings. There is high 
information asymmetry between investors and issuers at the time of the offering. Rao 
(1993) reports that there is almost no news coverage of firm in the years before the 
IPO. High reported earnings would increase the probability of successful IPOs and the 
likelihood of higher offer proceeds. While entrepreneurs have discretion over accrual 
adjustments to make the firms look better before public offering, it is difficult for 
investors to assess the appropriate extent to the adjustments given the relatively 
limited amount of information about issuing firms prior to going public. Therefore, an 
important role for analysts is to evaluate whether high reported net income caused by 
large positive accruals or by earnings management by the firm. Teoh and Wong (2002) 
demonstrate that probably because of agency incentives to bias forecasts in favor of 
the firms, analysts do not discount adequately for firms with high discretionary 
accruals in their forecasts of subsequent earnings. Investors who rely on analysts’ 
forecast will overvalue the new issue firms with high accruals. When they are 
surprised at the actual reported earnings after issue and overvaluation is corrected, 
they will find poor abnormal returns of the issuing firms. In other words, analysts 
systematically misuse the accounting information and contribute to long-term event 
abnormal returns. The information asymmetry can keep the new issue stock price 
relatively high, even extending to 3 to 6 months after IPO. All parties involved are 
under pressure to justify the high stock prices to preclude unpleasant results from 
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taking place, such as lawsuits, loss of reputation, loss of goodwill of investors etc. 
However, the issuers with aggressive discretionary accruals should pay the price 
during long post-IPO period. This result is robust with respect to different 
benchmarks, abnormal performance measurement and test specifications. That’s why 
greater earnings management in IPOs is associated with more optimistic errors in 
analyst earnings forecast, and with more adverse subsequent long-run abnormal stock 
returns.5 Besides the financial analyst’s role in earnings forecasting, Lee and Masulis 
(2008) investigate the role of financial institutions that are involved in the IPO 
process. They provide additional evidence that more reputable underwriter less likely 
support earnings management. The earnings management explanation has a bearing 
on the windows opportunity explanation of the new issues puzzle by Loughran and 
Ritter (1995). According to windows opportunity hypothesis, firms will conduct new 
issues when firms are overvalued. The market fails to discount fully for this timing, 
and therefore continues to overvalue new issue firms in the short run until it is 
eventually revised. Either timing or manipulation alone can explain the puzzle. In 
reality, it is likely that their effects are both present. 
2.2.3 Pseudo market timing 
Schultz (2003) use pseudo market timing hypothesis to explain poor performance of 
firms issuing equity (IPOs and SEOs). It’s a complete different explanation from 
those either based on mis-measurement of risk and statistical significance or 
methodological concerns raised by Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon 
                                                 
5 See Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b), and Teoh and Wong (2002) 
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(1997), and Lyon et al. (1999). “The pseudo market timing hypothesis says that, 
ex-post, the poor performance of equity issuers is real and significant. That is, IPOs 
have underperformed relative to their ex-ante expected return.” (Schultz, 2003, p 490) 
The pseudo market timing relies on two assumptions. First, more firms issue equity as 
stock prices increase. Manager’s decision when to go public is justified by this 
rationale. Secondly, abnormal returns are cross-sectional positively correlated. 
Nevertheless, those are not contradictory to an efficient market. Since even if ex-ante 
expected abnormal return is zero, the positive covariance between abnormal returns 
and the number of future offerings will cause probability to find negative abnormal 
return exceeding fifty percent. Schultz emphasize that managers have no timing 
ability which is opposite to opinion in windows opportunity hypothesis. Via a 
simulation, long-run event returns are downward biased when returns predict events. 
To mitigate the effects of cross-section in event-time excess returns, he recommends 
benchmarks that are “as highly correlated with the firms being studied as possible”. 
(Schultz, 2003, p 515) The limitation of pseudo market timing is that negative 
expected abnormal returns only could be realized in in event-period which weights 
each issuer equally. The calendar-time abnormal returns are not affected.  
Viswanathan and Wei (2008) reexamine the conclusion from Schultz (2003) and find 
their negative expected long-term event abnormal is caused by small-sample bias. The 
traditional assumption (see Campbell et al., 1997, p157) about event studies is that 
“the event is exogenous with respect to the change in the market value of the security.” 
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Both Schultz (2003) and Viswanathan and Wei (2008) consider event-generating 
process depends on past returns and thus the events are endogenous. They justify the 
event endogeneity assumption with some theoretical models in corporate finance. For 
example, Pastor and Veronesi (2005) predict that managers will time IPOs when the 
stock market is doing well. Lucas and McDonald (1990) show that seasoned equity 
issues are more likely to be preceded by stock price increase. All those models show 
that events occur more often when event returns are higher. Their small-sample theory 
shows that when returns predict events, the long-run abnormal returns will be 
negative, which is consistent with findings in Schultz (2003). However, Schultz’s 
results are from simulation and the condition under which the results could be 
obtained is unclear. Viswanathan and Wei fill in the gap by illustrating post event 
returns converge to zero under the condition that the process of number of events is 
stationary. The negative expected long-term event abnormal return is a small-sample 
problem. In a large sample, long-run average number of events is not affected by the 
shocks to the number of events today. In fixed samples, expected abnormal returns are 
negative and become more negative when holding period longer. Asymptotically, the 
bias will disappear when the process of number of events is stationary. 
2.2.4 Firm characteristics 
In this section, three various interpretations concerning long-term post-issue IPO 
underperformance are provided. They are all relevant to firm characteristics. First 
explanation (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Brav et al., 2000) argues that long-term 
underperformance is not an IPO effect, and is shared by some other non-issuing firms. 
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When issuing firms are matched to size and book-to-market portfolios excluding 
recent issuing firms, IPOs do not underperform. Second explanation (Eckbo and Norli, 
2005) states IPOs have higher turnover and lower leverage. Those stocks are exposed 
to smaller risk related to those factors and have smaller expected return. Third 
interpretation points out none of single firm characteristic can explain the long poor 
performance of IPO. A set of firm characteristics including IPO market environment, 
leverage and liquidity, firm valuation, corporate diversification strategies, and 
investments are control variables that make stock performance no different between 
IPOs and non-issuing companies.  
Brav and Gompers (1997), Brav et al. (2000), and Ritter and Welch (2002) show that 
long-term IPO underperformance is not unique to firms issuing equity. Similar size 
and book-to-market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs. 
Furthermore, both papers find that small growth companies perform worst, regardless 
of IPOs or non-issuing firms. Brav and Gompers (1997) propose various explanations 
for concentration of underperformance among small, low book-to-market companies. 
First, unexpected shocks may have hit small growth companies in the early and 
middle 1980s. Fama and French (1995) show that earnings of small firms decline in 
the early 1980s and have not recovered when those of large firms do. Secondly, 
institutional investors prevent from investing in small growth firms for regulatory 
reasons. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) restricts trading if shareholding 
exceeds 5 percent, and institutions may want to avoid this level of ownership. 
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Therefore, these firms are held primarily by individuals. Field (1997) documents that 
long-run IPO performance is positively related to institutional holdings. Field’s 
effects may similarly extend to non-issuing small growth companies. Furthermore, 
information asymmetry and investor sentiment is likely to be more prevalent for small 
growth firms because individuals spend considerably less time tracking information 
regarding returns than institutional investors do and they are less rational in decision 
making. Finally, individuals might derive utility from buying the shares of small, low 
book-to-market firms because they value them like a lottery ticket. Black (1986) 
argues that many finance anomalies may only be explained by this type of 
utility-based theory. In a nutshell, long-term underperformance is not due the IPOs 
status. 
Eckbo and Norli (2005) present new evidence on potential risk-based explanations for 
poor IPO stock performance. The new discovery that IPOs exhibit relatively higher 
stock turnover and lower leverage, compared to non-issuing firms matched on stock 
exchange, equity size and book-to-market ratio indicates lower risk exposure to 
factors which have links to stock liquidity and leverage. The resulting hypothesis is 
that IPOs have lower expected return due to lower exposure to these and other risk 
factors. They explore this possibility by adding liquidity factor into Fama-French 
(1993) model. Liquidity factor is a portfolio that is long in low-turnover stocks and 
short in high-turnover stocks. When applied to IPO portfolios, the liquidity reduces 
expected portfolio return. The liquidity-based factor model prices IPO portfolios more 
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comprehensively in that the intercept terms become smaller. Switching to leverage 
characteristic, declining leverage will reduce the exposure to leverage-related risk 
factors. In a factor model with macroeconomic risks, lower leverage-related factor 
betas for IPO portfolios also imply a lower expected return. They conclude that higher 
liquidity and lower leverage both contribute to lower expected return on IPO shares. 
Therefore, the negative abnormal returns of IPOs relative to seasoned firms matched 
on size and book-to-market could be justified since their risks are lower than their 
counterparts. 
Hoechle and Schmid (2009) find size and book-to-market ratio are not able to fully 
explain IPO underperformance because a standard Carhart (1997) model cannot 
explain a significant part of IPO underperformance. They use the multivariate 
BHAR-analysis to explore which of the firm characteristics known by the time of IPO 
are good predictors for new offerings’ subsequent performance. The key results are 
that controlling for single firm characteristic such as issue period, leverage, cannot 
find performance difference between IPOs and non-issuing firms. Only by controlling 
for a sufficient number of firms characteristics, can they explain why IPO firms 
underperform. Specifically, controlling for IPO market environment, leverage and 
liquidity, firm valuation, corporate diversification strategies, and investments, no 
differences can be found between IPO firms with non-issuing firms sharing same firm 
fundamentals. Therefore, Hoechle and Schmid (2009) conclude that differences in 
firm characteristics between IPO and more seasoned non-issuing firms result in IPO 
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underperformance. With IPO firms’ characteristics converging to those of more 
seasoned companies, apparent underperformance of IPO firms will vanish. 
2.2.5 Venture capitalists 
The involvement of venture capital will make a difference to the long-term IPO stock 
performance. If the market underestimates the importance of venture capitalists in the 
pricing of new issues, the long-term performance will differ for two groups. The IPOs 
backed by venture capital tend to perform better than their counterparts without 
venture capital support. Paper by Brav and Gompers (1997) examines whether 
difference exists between venture-backed IPOs and nonventure-backed IPOs. They 
find the underperformance comes mainly from small, non-venture backed IPOs. 
Venture-backed IPOs are found indeed to outperform nonventure-backed IPOs over a 
five-year period, but only on an equally weighted basis. There are two possible 
reasons for this finding posited by Brav and Gompers (1997). Gompers (1996) shows 
that venture capital firms specialize in collecting and evaluating information on 
startup and growth companies. The involvement of venture capitalists will partly 
overcome the information asymmetry and capital constraints suffered mostly by these 
types of companies. Venture capitalists may have an impact on the compositions of 
shareholders of new offerings. Participation of venture capitalists attracts more 
analysts to follow the firm which in turn reduce the problem of information 
asymmetries because venture capitalists have more contacts with top-tier investment 
banks. Similarly, institutional investors are main capital source of venture fund and 
therefore more willing to take part in IPOs holding. The availability of information 
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and higher institutional ownership constitutes the first reason for better long-term 
performance for venture-backed IPOs. Furthermore, Gompers (1996) demonstrates 
that reputational concerns affect the decisions venture capitalist made to bring the 
firms public. If venture capitalists are associated with underperformance of newly 
issued firms, their reputations will be effected and consequently less willing to 
overprice IPOs. Brav and Gompers (1997) confirm that underperformance of IPO is 
concentrated among ones without venture capital backing. The results shed some 
doubt on whether long-horizon poor performance is due to the status as issuance using 
calendar time. 
2.3 Methodology Literature on long-run IPO performance analysis 
Two main changes take place in methodology about event studies. First, use of daily 
stock return rather than monthly stock return becomes more prevalent. It allows more 
precise measure of abnormal return and more informative studies of announcement 
effects. Second, the methods to calculate abnormal returns and calibrate their 
statistical significance become more sophisticated. The second change is more 
important for long-horizon event studies. The change in measurement and statistics 
reflects the new findings in the statistical properties of long-horizon security returns. 
(Kothari and Warner, 2007) 
While long-horizon methods improve, serious limitations and problems still remain. 
Kothari and Warner (2007) indicate that “horizon length has a big impact on event 
study test properties.” Short-horizon event study methods are well-specified and 
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powerful, while it’s different for long-horizon event study. In fact, long-term tests are 
much more troublesome due to uncertainty and accumulation effect. Although much 
has been done to improve power and reduce misspecification, none of existing 
procedures can completely eliminate these inherent drawbacks. 
In the event study tests for long-horizon performance of IPOs, economic 
interpretation is more changeling than statistical specification, because performance 
tests are joint tests of whether abnormal returns are zero, of whether the assumed 
model of expected return is correct. The explicit and implicit assumptions made in 
long-horizon stock performance should be understood before interpretation. For 
example, the use of normative capital asset pricing model such as CAPM indicates 
that security returns is normally distributed. The validity of these assumptions is 
questioned in small samples. However, in large samples, we can rely on asymptotic 
results or central limit theorem to overcome this problem.  
2.3.1 Expected return 
2.3.1.1 Characteristic-based matching approach 
Numerous literatures6 use market index as benchmark for calculating abnormal 
returns of firms undergoing corporate event. It is most straightforward since it 
assumes that sample firms have same systematic risk with market portfolio. However, 
in most cases, the composition of market portfolio is different from that of sample 
firms. Therefore, some papers 7  adopt matching non-issuing firms with similar 
                                                 
6 See Ritter, 1991 
7 See Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Eckbo and Norli, 2005;  
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characteristics as alternative benchmarks. Their matching is based on firm 
characteristics which are related to expected return of stocks. These firm 
characteristics include firm size and book-to-market ratio. The use of this approach is 
based on two assumptions. First, the characteristics-based matching approach assumes 
that equity risk is captured by an observable set of firm-specific characteristics such 
as size, book-to-market, and stock price momentum. Second, IPOs differ from other 
similar matching firms only in that they experience IPO. The researches implicitly 
assume that matching firms perfectly proxy for the expected return on an offering. 
However, IPOs are unlikely to be random event, there is possibility that IPO and 
non-issuing firms differ systematically in their expected return despite of the 
matching on certain firm characteristics. This makes matching on expected returns 
susceptible to joint test problem. Even if abnormal returns are found, we cannot make 
sure the source is from the status as IPOs. 
2.3.1.2 Multi-factor model 
Capital Asset pricing model (CAPM) is widely used as a typical benchmarki to argue 
against market efficiency in many empirical studies. It is developed by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). CAPM shows a linear relation between systematic 
risk and expected return. The compensation over risk-free return is only from extra 
systematic risk, expressed by beta:  
ptftmtftpt errbarr +−+=− )(                                   (Equation 2.1) 
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Nevertheless, normative asset pricing models such as CAPM suffer from 
incompetence in little ability to explain the cross-section of stock returns. The 
deficiency of this problem is confirmed by Brav et al. (2000) in tests of long-run 
performance of equity issuers. The search for a better model is always under the way 
and culminates in Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, further modified by 
Carhart (1997) to incorporate the momentum factor. Recent work by Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1995, and 1996) indicates that a three-factor model may explain 
the time series of stock returns. Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is a 
parsimonious model for sock returns taking the form 
ptttftmtftpt edHMLcSMBrrbarr +++−+=− )(                    (Equation 2.2) 
where (rmt-rft) is the market factor, constructed by subtracting the T-bill return from 
the value-weighted market return. SMB (small minus big) is the size factor, the return 
on a zero investment portfolio formed by subtracting the return on a large firm 
portfolio from the return on a small firm portfolio. HML (value minus growth) is the 
book-to-market factor, the return on a zero investment portfolio calculated as the 
return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a portfolio of 
low book-to-market stocks. Intercept a is indicator of average monthly adjusted 
performance of IPOs. The intercepts in these regressions have an interpretation 
analogous to Jensen’s alpha in the CAPM framework. Chan et al. (1996) suggest 
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momentum anomaly8 is market efficiency due to slow reaction to information and 
this effect is robust to time-periods and countries. Corresponding to the argument, 
Carhart (1997) add the momentum factor which is supposed to be related to expected 
return of firms.  
pttttftmtftpt emUMDhHMLsSMBrrbarr ++++−+=− )(            (Equation 2.3) 
where UMD is momentum factor, constructed as equal weight average of firms with 
the highest thirty percent eleven-month returns lagged one month minus the equal 
weight average of firms with the lowest thirty percent eleven-month returns lagged 
one month. However, since asset pricing theory provides little guidance on how to 
construct factors that price the systematic risk, model misspecification problem 
remains. Model misspecification refers to the problem that measured 
underperformance is likely driven by benchmark models that misprice certain classes 
of stocks including IPOs. Fama (1998) states that all models of expected returns are 
incomplete descriptions of systematic variations of expected returns across firms. For 
example, CAPM is incompetent in capturing the expected return for small stocks 
(Banz, 1981). If the IPO firms are titled towards small size, it is more likely to 
produce spurious abnormal returns. Brav et al. (2000) provide the new evidence on 
model misspecification. They take the alternative approach that examines robustness 
of IPO underperformance, permitting directly showing the existence of model 
                                                 
8 Refer to the finding that persistence in mutual fund performance over short-term horizons of one to 
three years 
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misspecification. Specifically, they replace the book-to-market mimicking portfolio 
HML with an alternative zero investment portfolio HML*. The construction of HML* 
guarantees a focus on book-to-market effect while excluding any other exposure by 
subtracting the average return from two tails of the book-to-market distribution of 
stocks in Amex and Nasdaq. Although same factor regression analyses are conducted 
as previous one with original HML, the intercept for IPO portfolios becomes 
insignificant economically and statistically. In other words, alternative model to 
Fama-French’s (1993) three factor model substantially increases the pricing ability 
and eliminate underperformance to some extent. The new factor model supports the 
hypothesis that model misspecification causes measured underperformance. The 
knotty aspect of model misspecification is that it cannot be rejected unless a clear 
alternative hypothesis is available. Hence, our ability to detect true underlying pricing 
errors is limited.  
One approach to limit model misspecification is to adopt firm-specific models for 
expected return instead of formal asset pricing models. Market model used by Fama et 
al. (1969) and Masulis’s (1980) comparison period approach are such examples of 
which expected return is estimated without constraining the cross-section of expected 
return. 
In the analysis of long-term performance of IPOs, an appropriate risk adjustment is 
critical for calculating accurate abnormal return. Unlike short-horizon tests, in which 
risk adjustment is straightforward and unimportant, small errors in risk adjustment can 
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result in a different picture within long-horizon. IPO tends to be found smaller and 
lower book-to-market compared to average firms in stock exchange. Furthermore, it is 
found that the event sample firms with extreme characteristics (e.g., small market 
capitalization stocks, or low book-to-market stocks) suffer more from the risk 
adjustment errors in long horizon study. The historical risk estimate is severally 
biased and therefore risk should be estimated in post-event period (Ball and Kothari, 
1989; Chan, 1988; Ball et al., 1995; Chopra et al., 1992). “However, how the 
post-event risk should be estimated is itself a subject of considerable debate …” 
(Kothari and Warner, 2007)  
Brav et al. (2000) state post issue long-run poor stock returns are not unique. 
Non-issuing firms with similar size and book-to-market ratio share similar returns. 
The general solution researchers take in is to adopt various benchmarks with respect 
to the robustness of IPOs long-term performance. However, Hirshleifer (2001) 
document that the argument that post-IPO underperformance is eliminated by an 
appropriate benchmark is counterintuitive, because it emerges that IPO firms have 
usually low risk. 
2.3.1.3 Propensity score matching approach 
The standard approach to construct a model of benchmark return is to match offering 
firms with a non-offering firm several characteristics including size, book-to-market, 
past returns, and perhaps industry. Nevertheless, issuing stocks is an endogenous 
choice for the firm. There are important factors, other than the factors mentioned 
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above. This will fall into difficulties when we find more dimensions that are 
concerned with expected return of firms. Propensity score (PS) based matching 
methods are potentially useful alternatives in this scenario. Firms are matched based 
on the probability of issuing stocks. Two recent papers, Cheng (2003) and Li and 
Zhao (2006), use PS methods to reexamine the long-term performance of SEOs. Both 
papers find that while characteristic-based matching yield significant long-term 
abnormal returns after SEOs, abnormal returns are insignificant if propensity score 
based matching method is adopted.  
Cheng (2003) investigates US SEOs offered between 1970 and 1997 for which 
necessary COMPUSTAT data are available on firm characteristics. She finds 
significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns ranging from -6 percent to -14 percent over 
three to five years in full sample and sub-samples when matches are based on size, 
industry and book-to-market. She then uses three logit models, one for each decade, to 
predict the probability of issuance. Several firm characteristics such as size, 
book-to-market, industry, R&D, exchange, and 11-month past returns are used to 
predict the issuance decision. Cheng matches each issuer with a non-issuer in the SEO 
year with the closest propensity score (i.e., predicted probability). She finds little 
evidence of significant abnormal returns expect for one sub-sample in the 1970s and 
conclude that sufficient matching can explain away the underperformance of equity 
issuers.  
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Li and Zhao (2006) undertake a research similar to that in Cheng (2003) for issuers 
from 1986 to 1997. They show that characteristic-based matching is inadequate match 
between issuers and non-issuers in terms of average size. They estimate propensity 
scores with size, book-to-market, and past returns in three quarters prior to issuance, 
one model per year, and add interaction terms for better predictions and delete firms 
as necessary to have a common support. In their final sample, conventional matching 
results in average three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns of -16 percent, but this 
drops to an insignificant -4 percent with PS matching.  
Cheng (2003) and Li and Zhao (2006) emphasize that PS methods are merely 
substitutes for characteristic-based approach. The main issue of PS application is the 
data driven nature of the confirmation in fitting probit models. Characteristics and 
interaction terms are added to achieve balance in characteristics and propensity scores. 
While we recognize that a reasonable probit model seems necessary to place faith in 
treatment effect estimates, the search required to achieve balance, however 
transparent, nevertheless raises data dredging concerns and even inconsistency of 
estimates (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). The general use of PS methods in 
studies of long-term stock return as an alternative to methods studies in Barber and 
Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999), and Kothari and Warner (1997) remains an open 
question. 
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2.3.2 Abnormal performance measurement  
Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999), and Kothari and Warner (1997) provide 
comprehensive evidence on various methods of measuring abnormal returns. There is 
no consensus on which method is always preferred. Measurements could be divided 
into two groups based on event-time framework or calendar-time framework (Fama, 
1998; Eckbo, Masulio, and Norli, 2000; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The two most 
frequently used measurements in event-time framework are buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns. In calendar time framework, the intercepts 
of the benchmark model is indictor of average abnormal returns. 
2.3.2.1 Buy-and-hold average abnormal returns (BHARs) 
Beginning with Ritter (1991), the most popular estimator of long-term abnormal 
performance is the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return, BHAR. Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000, p 296) describe BHAR returns as “the average multiyear return from a strategy 
of investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a 
pre-specified holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar 
nonevent firms”. There are two methods to estimate the buy-and-hold returns for 
benchmark (matching firms, reference portfolio, or market index). First, in each 
month we can calculate the mean return for each portfolio and then compound this 
mean return over t month, which could be expressed as follows: 
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where s is the beginning period, T is the holding period, Rit is the return of stock i in 
month t, and nt is the number of observations in month t. 
The second method of calculating buy-and-hold returns involves first compounding 
the returns on individual stocks constituting the portfolio and then summing across 
securities: 
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                                  (Equation 2.5) 
where ns is the number of observations in month s, the beginning month for return 
calculation. Lyon et al. (1999) prefer the second method. First method changes 
portfolio composition each month. The rebalancing could lead to upward biased 
long-run returns 9 . Additionally, if first method is used on benchmark returns, 
benchmark will include firms that being listed after the portfolio formation. Since 
Brav and Gompers (1997) document the poor performance mainly comes from small 
and high-growth firms and IPOs are found to have these characteristics compared to 
average stocks, inclusion of IPOs in the benchmark returns will lead to downward 
biased estimate of long-term returns. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) support for BHAR in that it preciously measures investor 
experience. However, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) also 
show that commonly used methods of calculating long-run abnormal return are 
                                                 
9 See Blume and Stambaugh, 1983; Roll, 1983; Conrad and Kaul, 1993; and Ball et al., 1995 
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subject to misspecified test statistics. These biases mainly arise from new listing, 
rebalancing of benchmark portfolios, and skewness of multiyear abnormal returns. 
The solutions include carefully constructing reference portfolio so as to make sure 
population mean abnormal return zero and conducting inference via either a 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic or the empirically generated distribution of 
mean long-run abnormal stock returns from pseudo-portfolios (Lyon et al., 1999). 
Nevertheless, BHAR is unable to control for cross-section among sample firms and 
poorly specified asset pricing model. Furthermore, because of its compounding effect 
for return error in shorter time intervals, it is more sensitive to model misspecification 
problem. Fama (1998) argue against the BHAR methodology partly because of that. 
He also points out methodology that neglects the cross-sectional dependence of 
abnormal returns that has overlapping in time series is likely to overestimate test 
statistics. Based on this, he strongly advocates a monthly calendar time portfolio 
approach for measuring long-term abnormal returns.  
2.3.2.2 Cumulative average abnormal return (CAARs) 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are included if researchers’ interest is on whether 
sample firms earn an abnormal return over the concerned horizon. But when the 
question comes to whether sample firms persistently earn abnormal monthly returns, 
we use cumulative abnormal returns. The T month cumulative abnormal return from 
firm i beginning in period s is calculated as:  
∑
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where Rit is the simple monthly return for sample firm i, RBt is the monthly return of 
benchmark. Cumulative monthly abnormal returns are less skewed and therefore less 
problematic statistically. A greater knowledge of the distribution properties and 
statistical tests are known for this metric. Unlike buy and hold abnormal returns, 
cumulative abnormal returns have well specified conventional t-statistics as long as 
reference portfolios are free of new listing and survivor bias since cumulative 
abnormal returns are less skewed. Fama (1998) recommends using cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) as well since it less likely rejects the hypothesis of market 
efficient compared to BHAR. A criticism of the AAR or CAR approach is that an 
average monthly return does not accurately measure the return to an investor holding 
a security for a long post-IPO period. Long-term investor experience is better 
captured by compounding short-term returns.  
2.3.2.3 Calendar time portfolio approach 
To address the problem of cross-sectional correlation suffered by BHAR and CAR in 
event time framework, calendar time portfolio approach is examined. Average 
abnormal return of an event portfolio calculated each calendar month tracks the 
performance relative to an explicit asset pricing model or benchmark portfolio. The 
event portfolio is updated each period to include all companies that have completed 
the event within the prior n periods. Fama (1998) recommends using calendar-time 
portfolio techniques initiated by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) and developed by 
Fama and French (1993). Firstly, shorter intervals return is less vulnerable to model 
misspecification problem, imperfect expected return proxies. Secondly, cross-section 
36 
 
among sample firms can be accounted for in the portfolio variance. Thirdly, the 
distribution of this estimator is better approximated by the normal distribution, 
allowing for classical statistical inference. Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) also provide the argument that measures of abnormal performance such as 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and intercepts of time-series regressions are less 
likely to get spurious abnormal return than measures by buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) because they eliminate the compounding effect of a single month’s 
poor performance. However, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue against using the 
calendar-time portfolio approach because they allege it might be biased toward 
finding results consistent with market efficiency and lacked power to detect abnormal 
performance. Loughran and Ritter (2000, p 362) dictate: “If there are time-varying 
misevaluations that firms capitalize on by taking some action (a supply response), 
there will be more events involving larger misevaluations in some periods than in 
others… In general, test that weighs firms equally should have more power than tests 
that weigh each time period equally”. Intercept is the indicator of abnormal return in 
calendar time portfolio approach which weighs each time period equally and is hard 
to notice abnormal returns when heavy IPO activities occurred in certain period. 
Lyon et al. (1999) adopt and suggest using both approaches (BHAR and calendar time 
portfolio) in analyzing long-term abnormal returns because both offer advantages and 
disadvantages that supplement each other. The innovation in buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns approach lays in the new test statistics which can eliminate skewness bias in 
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random samples. Through careful constructing reference portfolio, the new listing and 
rebalancing biases can also be expunged. Furthermore, abnormal return measure 
accurately captures experience of investors. However, they don’t work well in 
non-random samples and cannot address cross-sectional dependence and bad model 
problem. The calendar time portfolio approach controls well for the cross-sectional 
dependence but is still sensitive to the bad model problem. Their drawback is that it 
cannot precisely measure investor experience. Their main conclusion is that “analysis 
of long-run abnormal returns is treacherous”. 
The traditional calendar time portfolio approach constitutes two-step procedure. The 
first step is to calculate the average return for the cross-section of firms and the 
second step then measures the risk-adjusted performance by estimating a multi-factor 
time series regression model. Because the traditional calendar time portfolio approach 
cannot capture the continuous and multi-factor firm characteristics, researches have 
been improved to switch to cross-section regressions on the firm level. The ordering 
of this alternative approach is reversed. Thus, the first step involves the estimating a 
Fama and French (1993) type multifactor model for each single firm and second step 
then decomposes the risk-adjusted performance of each IPO by regressing alphas 
from the parameters obtained from the first step. However, the second procedure of 
the cross-sectional regression approach implicitly assumes that individual firms are 
cross-sectionally uncorrelated. This assumption cannot be validated given the hot 
market hypothesis. There is a danger of producing severely biased statistical results 
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because of ignoring cross-sectional dependence in the data. The alternative model can 
substitute the dichotomous variable for a continuous variable and also possibly add 
control variables to the regression and to perform robustness checks. Under the 
theoretical framework, Hoechle et al. (2009) propose Generalization Calendar Time 
(GCT) regression model which condenses two steps into one. They rely on a linear 
regression model with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. Although 
coefficient estimates of cross regression methodology is identical to that of 
GCT-regression model, the standard errors and t-statistics of the cross regression 
methodology cannot be adjusted such that they are robust to cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. The standard errors and t-statistics of the cross regression 
approach are different from those of the GCT-regression model. By separating 
estimating procedure into two steps, the cross regression approach abandons valuable 
information which guarantees the validity of statistical results. To the country, the 
information advantage enables the GCT-regression model to produce standard error 
estimates that are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence. GCT-regression model resolves or at least mitigates several weakness of 
the calendar time portfolio methodology. By estimating the model with ordinary least 
squares (OLS), all observations are equally weighted. By describing firm 
characteristics with continuous and multivariate variables the GCT-model regression 
model also provides a potential solution to the misspecification issue in non-random 
sample. 
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2.3.3 Biases and solutions for testing long-run abnormal returns 
Although the magnitude of underperformance found in IPO literature is non-trivial, 
more recent long-term event-study empirical papers evaluate methodologies for 
evaluating long-run abnormal performance. Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and 
Warner (1997) and others doubt on the reliability of test statistics used in previous 
papers. Unbiased standard errors for the distribution of IPO long-term abnormal 
returns are not easy to estimate. Inferences on long-term abnormal returns are difficult 
to obtain. Lyon et al. (1999) summarize misspecification of test statistics to five 
sources: “(1) the new listing or survivor bias, inclusion of new firms in the reference 
portfolio subject to event month will make the benchmark not reliable adequate 
enough to compare to sample firms, (2) the rebalancing bias, caused by the fact that 
reference portfolio rebalancing periodically (generally monthly) while sample firms 
compounding without rebalancing, (3) the skewness bias, a result of positively 
skewed distribution of long-run abnormal returns, (4) cross-sectional dependence due 
to overlapping returns on sample firms in calculation, (5) a bad model of asset pricing. 
Additionally, there are another two causes. Firstly, long-horizon abnormal returns 
depart from the normality assumption that underlies conventional t statistical test. 
Secondly, volatility of the IPO offerings will exceed that of matched firms because of 
event-induced volatility. (Kothari and Warner, 2007) Therefore, remedy for 
misspecified test statistics is used to overcome the problems mentioned above.  
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2.3.3.1 Benchmark Portfolio bias 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that if benchmarks are used that contains many 
sample firms, the test is biased towards high explanatory power and no abnormal 
returns. The most powerful test should use a benchmark that is constructed to have 
none of the sample firms as part of benchmark. An unbiased reference portfolio is of 
great importance as sources of misspecification are mostly related to benchmark. To 
avoid or alleviate new listing bias and rebalancing biases, Lyon et al. (1999) not only 
choose correct method to calculate buy-and-hold returns, but also recommend 
carefully constructed reference portfolios. Their reference portfolios are formed based 
on firm size and book-to-market ratios in July of each year. This method could be 
extended to construction of reference portfolios based on other firm characteristics 
(e.g., prior return performance, sales growth, industry, earnings yields).  
2.3.3.2 Skewness bias 
For mean buy-and-hold abnormal return as measurement, concern arises from right 
skewness of individual-firm long-horizon returns (even after adjusting for the 
performance of a matched firm/portfolio) which restrains the use of standard 
statistical function. The source of skewness is not difficult to understand as the lower 
bound of abnormal returns is -100 percent and upper bound is unlimited. Papers 
documented by Brav et al. (2000) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find skewness 
distribution appears to be due to lack of independence by overlapping return 
observations. From this perspective, the right skewness abnormal return distribution is 
partly a byproduct of cross-section, not consequence of skewed individual firm’s 
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return. Fortunately, problems caused by skewness bias in test statistics decline with 
increase in sample size which often can be satisfied. The sample size in post-IPO 
long-horizon abnormal return is often several hundred or thousand. If BHAR 
observations are truly independent, the central limit theorem’s implication that “the 
sum of a large number of independent random variables has a distribution that is 
approximately normal” could apply. Even so, Ikenberry et al. (1995) introduced a 
bootstrapping procedure for addressing skewness problem. They generate empirical 
distribution of mean long-run abnormal stock returns by creating a pseudo-portfolio 
with similar event time, size and book-to-market characteristics and then calculate 
buy-and-hold abnormal return for one pseudo-portfolio. This randomly selecting 
procedure will be repeated many times (1000, 5000) and their average abnormal 
return will proxy empirical distribution of mean long-term abnormal return. That’s the 
solution for portfolio benchmark approach. If the benchmark is matching firm based 
on size and book-to-market, skewness can be eliminated (Barber and Lyon, 1997).  
2.3.3.3 Cross-correlation bias 
Lyon et al. (1999) evaluate various statistical tests for long-term performance. They 
recommend using either a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic or the 
empirically generated distribution of mean long abnormal returns from 
pseudo-portfolios. The former statistic adjusts the usual t-static by two terms that are a 
function of the skewness of the distribution of abnormal returns. Despite of skewness 
adjustment, the skewness-adjusted t-statistic still indicates over-rejection of null 
hypothesis. Both Sutton (1993) and Lyon et al. (1999) think they need bootstrapped 
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application of this skewness-adjusted test statistic. Bootstrapping the test statistic 
involves drawing voluminous resample from the original sample. The 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic is calculated from each of resamples and the critical 
value is obtained from empirical distribution of transformed t-statistic. Many recent 
papers on long-term stock performance follow their suggestions. The 
pseudo-portfolio-based statistical tests generate the empirical distribution of long-run 
abnormal stock returns. These abnormal returns are constructed using 
repeatedly-sampled pseudo-portfolios. Samples are based on characteristics thought to 
be correlated with the expected rate of return. Following Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model, matching on size and book-to-market as expected return 
determinants is quite common. For each matched-sample portfolio, an average 
buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as the raw return minus the benchmark 
portfolio returns. This distribution yields empirical 5 and 95 percent cur-off 
probabilities against which the event-firm sample’s performance is calibrated to infer 
whether or not the event-time portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal return is statistically 
significant. Paper by Lyon et al. (1999) is flawed by incompetent statistical inference 
in non-random samples and where cross-correlation is severe. This problem is put 
forward by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) who account for positive cross-correlations 
of event-firm abnormal return and produce little evidence of long-term abnormal 
return. Although their samples are restricted to SEO, mergers and share repurchases, 
the dependence of major corporate events, including IPOs, is prevalent. For example, 
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IPO offerings are concentrated on hot issue period when offerings are more likely to 
be overvalued.    
Bayeasian approach advocated by Brav (2000) does not suffer from the problems of 
non-normality and cross-correlation of abnormal returns among sample firms. This 
model begins with a subjective prior belief regarding model parameters. These beliefs 
reflect researchers’ knowledge about parameters of interest conditional on model and 
the data. The methodology takes as given an asset-pricing model and distribution for 
firm residual variation and uses these to simulate the predictive distribution of the 
long-horizon average abnormal return. Using a large sample of 1521 companies, the 
distribution of average abnormal returns is proved to be non-normal. Moreover, 
residual variability and cross-correlation make a great difference on the inference. 
This also indicates that methods which do not control for these statistical 
characteristics yield erroneous statistics. This method could be extended to allow for 
time variation in factor loadings (e.g., Shanken, 1990) and also for various forms of 
heteroskedasticity and time variation in the common correlation of the assets under 
study.  
Lyon et al.’s (1999) recommendation is misspecified in nonrandom samples. An 
important reason for misspecification is that approach by Lyon et al. (1999) assumes 
that sample returns are cross-sectional uncorrelated, which is violated in non-random 
samples such as IPOs. In fact, because of positive correlation, the variability of test 
statistics is larger than in random samples. Using critical value by simulation, the tests 
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will reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns too often (type I error). 
Furthermore, the replacement of original sample firms implies an assumption that two 
samples are similar in every dimension, but not limited to, expected returns. This is 
unlikely because if two samples have systematically different residual variations, 
resulting empirical distribution will be biased (Brav, 2000). Jegadeesh and Karceski 
(2004) propose t-statistics that are well-specified in nonrandom samples. Their 
nonrandom samples refer to industry-clustered observations or returns are overlapping. 
They make some adjustments based on Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard error, 
allowing for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and different weights across 
observations. They evaluate the performance of tests in both scenarios (samples with 
concentrated industry distribution and overlapping returns). Their empirical results 
demonstrate the level of misspecification is fairly small. The improved specification 
of the tests with less restrictive assumption comes at a cost – loss of power. One 
shortcoming is that the approach proposed is less powerful than the conventional 
t-statistic in nonrandom samples. Since many characteristics shared by different 
stocks are not readily observable, it is hard to assume major corporate events, such as 
IPOs, random selected. Therefore, in future work, they recommend their proposed test 
methodologies when assessing long-run performance.  
2.3.4 Weighting scheme 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the calendar time portfolio approach has low 
power to detect abnormal returns for events that occur because of behavioral timing 
(windows of opportunity). The power refers to the probability of rejecting null 
45 
 
hypothesis when the hypothesis is false. The inability of finding abnormal returns is 
more severe when value weighted portfolio return is used. Loughran and Ritter 
provide two reasons associated with weighting scheme to explain the pattern10.  
If there is time-varying misevaluation of going public, there would be more new 
issuing with larger misevaluation in some periods than others. Their evidences 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2000, table 5-7) display abnormal returns difference between 
periods of high activity and periods of low activity. The regression will average these 
and tend to less likely to find abnormal performance. The abnormal return in hot 
period is hardly to be detected by calendar time portfolio approach. In general, tests 
that weight firms equally should have more power than tests that weight each time 
period equally 11 . Also, we have a weight choice on portfolio return. If 
underperformance is more concentrated on small firms than big firms, tests that 
weight firms equally should find greater abnormal returns than tests that weight firms 
by market capitalization12. Value-weighted portfolios can also have larger variance of 
returns because in some periods a single firm is a large proportion of the portfolio and 
therefore the unique risk cannot be diversified away. The lower power of detecting 
                                                 
10 The third reason is related to benchmark contamination. 
11 For example, in Loughran and Ritter (1995, Table I and II), the five-year wealth relative for initial 
public offerings is 0.70 when each firm is weighted equally, but 0.79 when each of the 21 cohort years 
are weighted equally. For seasoned equity offerings, the five-year wealth relative is 0.69 weighting 
each firm equally, but 0.76 when each of the 21 cohort year is weighted equally. A wealth relative of 
1.00 represents no abnormal performance. 
 
12 See Grav and Gompers, 1997; Brav et al., 2000; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000 
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abnormal returns from value weight is also demonstrated in large standard errors and 
low t-statistics. 
However, the less likelihood underperformance from value weight does not indicate 
we should always adopt equal weight scheme. If one is trying to measure abnormal 
returns on a value-weighted portfolio with equal amount of money invested in each 
time period, it is appropriate to value weight returns and equally weight time periods. 
But if the purpose is to measure abnormal returns on the average firm undergoing 
some event, each firm should be weighted equally. In other words, the traditional 
event study approach in which all observations are equally weighted will produce 
exact estimate that are relevant from different perspectives. Fama (1998) points out 
that weighted scheme should be determined by the economic hypothesis of interest.  
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Chapter 3 Long-term UK IPOs performance test, evidence from two Databases 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter investigates the long-run performance of UK Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs). We use two databases to assess the performance over three- and five-years 
after listing. Although long-term underperformance of IPOs is prevalent in US (Ritter, 
1991; Loughran and Ritter), the international evidence is still controversial. Our paper 
aims to provide additional evidence using a recent UK sample. There is another 
reason motivating us to undertake the research. Access to both DataStream (DS) and 
London Share Price Data (LSPD) enables us to have alternative data source instead of 
one. Although most prior UK studies (Levis, 1993; Espenlaub et al., 2000) use the 
LSPD, DS also provides stock and market price information. There’s no previous UK 
study indicating which database tends to produce long-run underperformance results. 
We are also interested to test whether post-issue long-term underperformance is 
sample specific phenomenon since no evidence showing our sample is comprehensive 
in the study period.  
With the success of AIM introduced in 1995, more attention has been paid to the UK 
equity market again. More companies choose to be listed via AIM rather than official 
list (OL). The most influential papers in UK include Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al. 
(2000). However, their samples (IPOs) terminate at 1988 and 1992 respectively, by 
which time AIM has not set up yet. Whether the establishment of this fast growing 
listing market impacts the long-term performance in general is a question that has not 
yet been fully explored.  
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Both Levis13 (1993) and Espenlaub et al. (2000) use LSPD as their data sources in 
the analysis of long-term performance. The advantage of using LSPD over DS is that 
monthly equity returns include dividend going ex during certain month and are 
adjusted for rights and scrip issues. Additionally, monthly market value is readily 
available from LSPD. However, DS can also provide returns and market value 
information. The frequency could even be daily. This is of great importance for 
studies on short-term analysis. Use of DS information can provide us a new 
perspective of importance of dividend adjustment in calculating returns. 
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents more 
literature on the long-term IPO stock performance. Section 3.3 describes data and 
methodology. Section 3.4 presents the results and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Relevant literature and hypotheses 
Studies for the US such as Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), report that 
IPOs experience significant poor performance in the first three to five years after 
listing. They also illustrate that value-weighted event-time buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns are prone to produce underperformance. On the other hand, either 
equal-weighted buy-and-hold returns or cumulative abnormal returns tend to reduce 
the magnitude of underperformance. We are also interested in the international 
evidence of IPOs anomaly. The international evidence on the long-term post-issue 
IPO stock performance has mixed results. Lee et al. (1996) find that Australian IPOs 
                                                 
13 Levis collects the end of first trading day price and last first trading month price. However, it is not 
used in calculating long-term performance. 
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exhibit severe underperformance in the long run, while Da Silva Rosa et al. (2003) 
find no evidence of underperformance in the post-issue two years in Australia. 
Paudyal et al. (1998) also cannot find evidence of differential performance between 
IPOs and the market portfolio in Malaysia. Kiymaz (2000) even report Turkish IPOs 
outperform the market in the long-run during the 1990-1995. Therefore, the 
international evidence of long-run IPO performance is far from a consensus. 
On the other hand, various methods of measuring abnormal performance have been 
discussed in the literature (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; and 
Lyon et al., 1999). Parametric test statistics are found to be subject to misspecification 
because they do not satisfy the assumptions of zero mean and unit normality. They 
recommend nonparametric or bootstrapping procedures as a means of reducing 
misspecification. As noted by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Eckbo et al. (2000) and 
Gompers and Lerner (2003), among others, the results of long run performance 
studies may differ as a result of differences in the method used to measure abnormal 
returns. For example, Gompers and Lerner (2003) find underperformance when event 
time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used. The underperformance disappears when 
cumulative abnormal returns are used. The intercepts in CAPM and Fama-French 
three-factor regressions even suggest outperformance. 
Levis (1993) first reports UK IPOs from 1980 to 1988 underperform a number of 
relevant benchmarks in the 36 months following the first day of trading. Espenlaub et 
al. (2000) add further evidence on the of long run performance in UK. Using data on 
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588 IPO companies over the period 1985 to 1992, they document abnormal 
performance based on five alternative benchmarks using both an event-time approach 
and a calendar-time approach. They find substantial negative abnormal returns three 
years after the offerings irrespective of the benchmark employed in their event-time 
approach. However, over a five year period the underperformance is less dramatic and 
depends upon the benchmark applied; when returns are measured in calendar time 
there is even less evidence of underperformance. Goergen et al. (2007) also conduct 
research on long-run performance of UK IPOs. They also find IPOs underperform 
similar non-issuing firms. Additionally, quality of the firm is found to have 
significantly positive influence on its performance after the IPO. The cross-sectional 
and time-series pattern of long run IPO performance has been examined by several 
researchers. Loughran and Ritter (1995) report the degree of underperformance by 
issuing companies varies over time. They find that IPOs occurring in years when there 
are little issuing activities do not exhibit significant underperformance, while 
companies being listed during high volume periods of selling new issues severely 
underperform. In their analysis of Japanese IPOs, Hwang and Jayaraman (1995) 
observe no differences in abnormal returns across industries for their IPO and 
non-IPO groups. However, Cai and Wei (1997) find that Japanese issuing companies 
underperform size-matched non-issuing companies in most industries. Ritter (1991) 
finds that US IPOs display long run underperformance, with a tendency for the 
smaller offers to have the worst aftermarket performance. He also reports that 
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companies which have the highest mean initial returns also have the poorest long run 
returns, consistent with the “fad” hypothesis of Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) or the 
“over reaction” hypothesis from De Bondt and Thaler (1985).  
Thus, based on foregoing theoretical and empirical literature concerning long-term 
post-IPO stock performance, our study proposes three promising research ideas. First, 
there is need to add another empirical evidence on UK IPO market since the 
establishment and success of AIM. Second, determinants of long-term performance 
should be examined as well. We try to test different hypothesis in explaining the 
found pattern. Thirdly, two-stage strategy is fresh; especially its effect on long-term 
performance has not been examined before. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data description 
In this section, we outline our sample selection procedure and describe out data 
sources. Our sample consists of IPOs on the LSE between January 1981 and 
December 2000. The original IPO list is provided by my supervisor Professor Ranko 
Jelic. The other information including sample monthly returns, initial market 
capitalization are collected from both databases (DS and LSPD). LSPD is set up in 
October 1972 and has developed into the most comprehensive share price database for 
UK market. DS is more comprehensive in terms of geographical coverage, with 
covering over 64 markets. However, in terms of UK market, there’s no comparison 
about which provides more accurate and comprehensive information. Table 3-1 
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provides us more detailed information of variables which are used in this paper. 
Return file from LSPD includes dividend, which is adjusted to a month-end basis. The 
return data from DS is calculated from price data provided by DS. Additionally, both 
adjusted (dividend included) and unadjusted (dividend excluded) prices are available 
in DS. In terms of market value, the two datasets have same definition, representing 
the market value of ordinary shares. For the companies having more than one class of 
equity capital, the market value only includes ordinary shares.  
Before commencing sample description, it is important that we have a general picture 
about two datasets. Therefore, we compare the coverage and related information 
between LSPD and DS.  
[Insert table 3-1about here] 
Table 3-1 compares DS with LSPD in terms of coverage and key variables. LSPD is 
the most comprehensive database focusing on UK equity market. Before 1974, it 
covers a random of 33 percent of companies quoted in LSE. Since 1975, it includes 
complete history of all UK companies. On the other hand, DS includes 1832 
companies, with price history starting from 1965. Next, their data resources are 
different as well. LSPD obtains the information from stock exchange daily official list, 
the financial times, and Extel’s EXSHARE service. DS indicates that data is from 
exchanges, leading international and local supplies, and published reports. On the 
return information, DS appears to be more flexible, with both unadjusted and adjusted 
price available. LSPD provides the adjusted price and returns. The last key variable is 
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market value, with both dataset having ready information about ordinary shares’ 
capitalization. The advantage of DS over LSPD is that the return and market value 
information is available at daily frequency. The corresponding information is 
available at monthly frequency in LSPD. However, we use monthly return 
information which makes two datasets comparable in the aspect.  
[Insert table 3-2 about here] 
Table 3-2 displays the procedure from original population to the final sample. We 
hand collect the mnemonic from DS, based on which sample price and market value 
is collected. In this procedure, 25 firms have been excluded because issuance date is 
beyond the sample period. These firms are distributed either before 1981 or after 2000, 
with only one or two observations one year. Furthermore, 80 companies are removed 
since corresponding mnemonic could not be found. In addition, we try to find 
corresponding identification (G1). G1 is the company number in LSPD, a unique 
identification number, allocated in a sequence from 1, for all British registered 
companies quoted on London Stock Exchange since 1955. This number was allocated 
to overcome the problem of changing SEDOL numbers. 58 IPOs are eliminated due to 
either one IPO takes place at different months between DS and LSPD or the company 
names could not be found from LSPD. Furthermore, we require that market 
capitalisation data of issue month must be available in both databases which results in 
a further loss of 99 IPOs. The requirement for initial market value is for a comparable 
value weight scheme. We are left with a sample of 819 IPOs from 1981 to 2000. 
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We collect daily price and market value from DS. These data provides monthly 
returns and initial market value. DS provides adjusted (dividend included) and 
unadjusted (dividend excluded) price history, which enables us to assess the impact of 
dividend on IPO returns. Monthly returns are calculated as the difference of share 
price between two consecutive month ends divided by last month end price. Monthly 
return and market value information is readily available from LSPD at monthly 
frequency. Return file in LSPD provides natural logarithmic returns for each sample. 
However, discrete returns are used throughout the paper to avoid any downward bias 
in returns caused by Jensen’s inequality14. Furthermore, the conversion is to be 
consistent with counterparts in DS. 336 IPOs have 2578 missing monthly returns in 
LSPD due to short trading suspension or unavailable beginning trading data. We 
replace all these missing data with zero because there is no trading activity in 
suspension period. Also, investors could not be able to sell such stocks just before a 
suspension, which is likely to be unexpected. The return measurement starts from the 
beginning of the second post-issue month (first complete trading month). The first 
partial issuance month is excluded to allow for underpricing and possibility of price 
support in the first few trading days. Table 3-3 shows year distribution of sample 
IPOs, with mean and median initial market capitalisation attached as well. The 
p-value of the difference between two datasets is also displayed each year. The table 
reveals that there is a time varying pattern in the number of IPOs. The increase of 
numbers since 1995 coincides with the opening of the AIM market. There is small 
                                                 
14 The convex transformation of a mean is less than or equal to the mean after convex transformation. 
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discrepancy between two groups on mean and median initial market capitalisation. 
We conduct t-test to compare the mean and median of initial market value from two 
groups year by year and display p-value on the 5th and 8th columns. As we could see, 
mean and median difference in 1985 is significant at 95% and 99% confidence level. 
In general, the average initial market capitalisation of our sample IPOs is very close, 
with 125 million sterling from LSPD and 117 million sterling from DS.  
[Insert table 3-3 about here] 
We further find that two databases have various treatments on return histories. In DS, 
the price remains for the firm that has been delisted, reflected by monthly returns zero 
for last few consecutive event months. There are 356 IPOs with 8323 observations 
having zero returns in last consecutive months. The situation is much less severe in 
LSPD. The price usually terminate as long as the firm is delisted. There are only 240 
IPOs with 801 such observations in LSPD. We drop all these observations. Otherwise, 
there would be spurious returns since the benchmark return are not zero in periods 
which the firm has been delisted. After this treatment, the total monthly return 
observations difference between two databases is only 716, smaller than 1 percent of 
total monthly observations. 
From papers by Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Fama (1998), 
and Lyon et al. (1999), we learn that all methods calculating long-term abnormal 
return present some inconveniences. All methodologies are subject to different 
56 
 
biases15. Therefore, we intend to use both cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to evaluate the long-run 
performance in the event time framework. The cumulative abnormal return for a 
holding period of m month is computed by summing average monthly abnormal 
returns from the first complete trading month to the m month. The typical 
buy-and-hold strategy involves buying the stock in certain month, and holding for a 
time period. Therefore, returns will be compounded at regular intervals. In our case, 
abnormal buy-and-hold returns are buy-and-hold return difference between sample 
firms and benchmarks at monthly interval. If stocks are delisted before the post-issue 
60 month, returns of those companies are supposed to be the average monthly return 
of the remaining sample. Liu and Strong (2008) replace the returns on de-listed firms 
by either zero or the risk-free rate. They find similar results in both cases. Lyon et al. 
(1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) replace all de-listed firms returns with the 
benchmark returns, making their abnormal returns zero. In our paper, we adopt both 
replacements. For those firms which have been delisted but still remain in the 
databases, the return afterwards is calculated as zero since there is no price change. 
For those firms which have been delisted and removed from the sample, the company 
return is supposed to be the same as the benchmark return. It indicates investment 
strategy that allocates the proceeds average to the surviving firms.  
                                                 
15 New listing bias, rebalancing bias, skewness bias, cross-sectional correlation, and bad model 
problem 
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3.3.2 Methodology 
Three benchmarks will be used in this paper. These are the FTSE all share index 
(FTSE), the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and the Fama-French three factor 
model (FF). Levis (1993) use FTA16 as benchmark and Espenlaub et al. (2000) use 
the latter two models. The benchmark choice is restricted by limit of other 
information. FTSE all share index represents 98-99 percent of UK market 
capitalisation, and is the aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small 
Cap indices. 17  Therefore, FTSE all share index can generally indicate the 
performance of average stocks. However, Dimson and March (1986) state that if the 
composition of the sample firms differs from FTA in terms of company size, the 
adjusted returns based on market index will lead to misleading conclusion. That’s the 
reason why we supplement with additional benchmarks. The Capital Asset Pricing 
Model is used as a standard measurement to quantify adjusted returns. Fama and 
French (1992) add that not only beta has an effect in explaining expected returns, but 
also size and book-to-market ratios have a role. The Fama-French three factor model 
has been developed by them in 1996 to capture these additional effects and is applied 
in our research. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the abnormal return for company i at time t for each 
benchmarks. 
Model 1: FTSE All Share Index 
                                                 
16 Financial Times Actuaries All Share Index (FTA), capitalization weighted index, representing about 
650 stocks and embracing 90 percent of the UK stock market by value. 
17 The information is available from http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK_Indices/index.jsp .  
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𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸                                           (Equation 3-1) 
where Rit is the return on company i in event month t, RFTSE is the return on the FTSE 
All Share Index in corresponding month.  
Model 2: CAPM 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡)]                              (Equation 3-2) 
where Rit is the return on company i in event month t, Rmt is the return on the market 
in event month t, measured by FTSE All share index monthly return, Rft is the 
treasury bill return in event month t, iβ  is the beta of company i, estimated by an 
OLS regression up to 60 months after the IPO.  
Model 3: Fama-French three factor model 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡]           (Equation 3-3) 
where Rit is return on company i in event month t, Rmt is the return on the market in 
event month t measured by FTSE All Share Index monthly return, βi, γi, and δi are the 
coefficients of the factors (Rmt-Rft), SMB and HML respectively. Those three 
coefficients are estimated using OLS regressions from the first full trading month to 
the post-issue 60th month or the delisting date, which takes place first. Fama-French 
factor model allows companies without size and/or book-to-market ratio in the sample. 
The inclusion could not be realized if benchmark is a matching firm based on size 
and/or book-to-market ratio.  
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The average benchmark-adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for specified time 
intervals is the arithmetic average (depending on the weighting scheme) of 
benchmark-adjusted returns. 𝑒𝑖  is the weight of the company i and 𝑎𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the 
monthly abnormal returns for company i within t month: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖=1                                            (Equation 3-4) 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) from event month 1 to event month 
s is the summation of the average benchmark-adjusted returns: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑠𝑡=1                                           (Equation 3-5) 
When a firm in portfolio p is delisted before the 5th year anniversary, the portfolio 
return from the next month is an equally-weighted average of the remaining firms in 
the portfolio. For the month in which the IPO firm is delisted, the return for that 
individual firm is vacant. We employ the method by Ritter (1991) to test the statistical 
significance of the calculated CAAR. The t-statistic for the CAAR in month t, CAARt 
is computed as: 
𝑜(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 ∗ �𝑛𝑡/𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡                                (Equation 3-6) 
where nt is the number of companies trading in each month, and csdt is computed as: 
𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡 = [𝑜 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑒 + 2 ∗ (𝑜 − 1) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣]1/2                         (Equation 3-7) 
where t is the event month, var is the mean cross-sectional variance over 60 months, 
and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series. 
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One problem with CAAR is that they do not represent an ex ante applicable 
investment (trading) strategy. In other words, they do not accurately measure the 
return to an investor who holds a security for a long post–event period. Buy-and-hold 
abnormal return which can capture investor experience by compounding short-term 
returns is reported by most empirical studies.  
For the calculation of buy-and-hold average abnormal returns, the first step is to 
estimate the buy-and-hold abnormal return for individual IPO. A T-month 
buy-and-hold return (BHR) could be in the expression of: 
𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡) − 1𝑇𝑡=1                                    (Equation 3-8) 
where Rit denotes the monthly return of IPO i or benchmark over month t. The 
holding period for stock i is either five years or the time until delisting, whichever 
comes first. 
The abnormal or unexpected BHR (BHAR) is return difference between two: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂 − 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘                             (Equation 3-9) 
Where BHRIPO is buy-and-hold returns for individual company and BHRBenchmark is 
corresponding returns for its benchmark. 
Finally, the average BHAR over T-month for a sample of N IPOs could be expressed 
as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅��������𝑇 = 1𝑤𝑖 ∑ 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇𝑁𝑖=1                                    (Equation 3-10) 
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iw  is IPO i’s weight in forming the average holding-period return ( iw =1/N when 
equal-weighting). In short, our procedure to obtain average BHAR is first to estimate 
the individual BHAR and then average them at same time interval.  
Besides estimating the magnitude of mean BHARs, we also need to test the statistical 
significance of the abnormal returns. To test the null hypotheses that the mean 
abnormal return is equal to zero for the sample of IPO firms, we employ the 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic, which is computed as: 
𝑜𝑠𝑎 = √𝑛 �𝑆 + 13 𝛾�𝑆2 + 16𝑛 𝛾��                                 (Equation 3-11) 
Where 
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where γˆ  is the estimate of the coefficient of skewness and Sn is the conventional 
t-statistic. The critical values applied to conventional t-statistics are not appropriate 
when the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are used. We draw 1000 
resamples of size n (1/4 of original sample size), with replacement, from each return 
series and calculate a skewness-adjusted t –statistic for each sample. Critical values 
are rearranged and provide the cut offs at which a null hypothesis that average 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are zero can be rejected for a significance level. These 
critical values are obtained by solving: 
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Pr[𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏 ≤ 𝑥𝑙∗] = Pr[𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏 ≥ 𝑥𝑢∗ ] = 𝛼2                              (Equation 3-12) 
where xl is the critical lower value and xu is the critical upper value for the 
bootstrapped t-test at the α  percent significant level. The skewness-adjusted 
t-statistic calculated for each of the actual buy-and-hold return series is then compared 
to these bootstrapped critical values to determine whether any abnormal performance 
is found significant. The procedure for creating bootstrapped skewness-adjusted 
t-statistics is similar in the equal weight and value weight cases, with the exception 
that in the latter analysis, we employ the weighted average returns based on market 
value. 
Loughran and Ritter (1999) stipulate that the choice of weighting scheme is important 
for power consideration. Brav et al. (2000) illustrate this point by a simple example. 
Consider a sample consisting of 1000 firms, 999 of which have a capitalisation of 1 
million (the “small” firms) and the rest one has a market capitalisation of 1001 million 
(the “big” firm). Assume all small firms have underperformed an equal 50 percent 
relative to a benchmark while the large firm over performed by 50 percent. An equal 
weight measure will imply severe mispricing (-50 percent), while value weighting 
will lead to a conclusion of no abnormal return. The use of a weighting scheme is 
dependent on our research motivation. We are interested in impact of weighting 
scheme on the results as well as comparison between results from DataStream and 
LSPD. Therefore, we include results using both value and equal weighting to address 
it. 
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3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Performance using both measurements 
We compute the three- and five-year buy-and-hold returns of the IPOs and 
benchmarks respectively. The benchmarks include FTSE All Share Index (FASI), 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and Fama-French (1993) three factor model 
(FF). Our purpose is to first evaluate the long-term performance using buy-and-hold 
measure independently. Additionally, we are keen to assess the different results from 
two datasets. The results of evaluating long-term performance from two datasets are 
presented in table 3-4. 
[Insert table 3-4 about here] 
Panels A and C of table 3-4 demonstrates the equal and value weight results during 
post-IPOs 5-year periods. Panels B and D include corresponding information at 3-year 
interval. The layout of each panel is the same. The raw returns of IPOs from DS and 
LSPD are displayed in columns 2 and 3, while the adjusted returns relative to 
benchmarks are presented in columns 5 and 6. The differences between two datasets 
in terms of raw returns and BHAR are shown in columns 4 and 7. The t-statistics are 
presented below the BHAR and difference between two datasets, displayed in 
parentheses. We use the market value of firm at the end of issue month as weight in 
value weight scheme. We follow the procedure for handling zero returns in last 
consecutive months mentioned above. The results in panels A and C show that returns 
to IPOs outperform the market on equal weighted basis. In DS, equal weighted raw 
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return on sample IPOs is 38.5 percent over three years and 61.3 percent over five 
years. The corresponding figures in LSPD are 51.4 percent and 95 percent. However, 
none of differences (-12.9 percent and -33.7 percent) at two time intervals is 
significant. When performance measured based on benchmarks, there is 
outperformance of 11.1 percent over three years and 22.6 percent over five years. The 
magnitude of counterparts from LSPD is quite close, with 8.9 percent and 26.5 
percent respectively. The outperformance based on other two benchmarks (CAPM 
and FF) is larger in terms of magnitude, which holds in both datasets. For each 
benchmark at same time interval, none of the difference of BHAR between DS and 
LSPD is statistically significant. In our sample of IPOs, we find consistent evidence 
of outperformance based on equal weight either in three- or five-year holding period. 
Both DS and LSPD produce same qualitative conclusion, which is superior 
performance over benchmark. 
Panels C and D illustrate results from value weight scheme. Although weight 
allocation for the same company between DS and LSPD is different due to different 
initial market value, we cannot find significantly different performance from two 
datasets. In value weight scheme, IPOs are also found to outperform the 
corresponding benchmarks both at three-year and five-year intervals. However, 
compared to equal weight counterparts, we find small performance reduction both on 
raw and adjusted returns. At five-year horizon, there is nearly no performance 
difference between equal weight and value weight scheme. The raw performance 
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difference is 9.5 percent at three-year and 26.7 percent at five-year horizon, with later 
figure significant at 5% level. When measured with adjusted returns, the results from 
two datasets are even closer, with largest difference smaller than 6 percent. Therefore, 
panels C and D also present consistent conclusion as equal weight scheme. DS and 
LSPD are providing evidence arguging outperformance in the long-run post-IPO 
period. 
We also measure IPOs’ performance using the cumulative abnormal return. Fama and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) propose that CARs is possibly a better, less biased 
method to calculate long-term returns because they eliminate the compounding effect 
of single year’s poor performance. However, they are still subject to cross-sectional 
correlation. We calculate CARs by summing monthly average abnormal returns over 
three or five years. Due to this procedure, the standard deviation of CAR at specific 
time interval is zero and we cannot conduct t-test to compare the CAR difference 
between two samples as in buy-and-hold measure.  
[Insert table 3-5 about here] 
In panels A and B, returns are calculated for five years and three years respectively. 
IPO and benchmark returns terminate in month following a firm’s acquisition or 
delisting. The left hand side displays equal weight results while right hand side 
demonstrates value weight results. Once performance is measured using CARs, we 
get a different picture of long-run performance. The significant outperformance from 
BHAR cannot be detected from CAR. On the contrast, the significant 
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underperformance at three-year horizon relative to FASI is presented. Even at 
five-year horizon, the outperformance is not universal. When measured at three-year 
horizon, equal weighted CARs display negative performance from DS. While 
Espenlaub et al. (2000) show significant underperformance relative to CAPM and FF 
using CARs, we could only find the underperformance relative to FASI is significant. 
Impact of value weight on results cannot be detected, since results from equal weight 
and value weight quite close for both datasets. Similar to finding in table 3-4, we also 
find there is no significant difference in terms of performance between two datasets. 
In other words, both datasets produce close results in this measurement. The 
difference in the results between CARs and BHARs is due to the large positive 
skewness of the individual IPO firm return. 
Besides the adjusted price from DS used in tables above, we also collect the IPOs 
price without dividend. It is interesting to explore the impact of dividend in IPOs 
returns. We compare the IPOs performance using both prices with and without 
dividend. The result is presented in table 3-6. 
[Insert table 3-6 about here] 
The focus is the impact of dividend on IPOs raw and adjusted return. Therefore, we 
only calculate the equal weight returns. Panels A and B reveal results for five-year 
and three-year respectively. As expected, the raw and relative IPOs returns from 
unadjusted price are lower than counterparts with dividend included. The discrepancy 
between adjusted and unadjusted return is more prominent at five-year horizon. The 
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buy-and-hold abnormal returns difference is as large as 20 percent. When dividend is 
included in the price, we find significant outperformance both at five-year and 
three-year interval for every benchmark. If dividend is not included in the price, we 
cannot find evidence of outperformance from BHAR measure at five-year horizon. 
Therefore, it again confirms the importance of dividend in calculating performance of 
IPOs. 
3.4.2 Performance by size 
Ritter (1991) states that IPOs with poorest performance usually have small size 
measured by initial market value. We are interested to explore the relationship of 
performance with size in both datasets. Although we do not find buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns decrease when switching from equal weight scheme to value weight 
scheme, we find raw IPOs returns reduction. Our hypothesis is that performance will 
deteriorate as size decreases. To confirm the hypothesis, we divide the samples into 
five groups based on size, which is market value of ordinary shares at the end of first 
trading month. Our first attempt is that the range of group is constant. However, there 
is severe positive skewness in the initial market value distribution. The skewness is 
16.64 and 7.75 for DS and LSPD respectively. We try data transformation, including 
taking logarithms on different bases, box-cox transformation, and taking reciprocal. 
However, the observations are still be clustered in one or two group size. Therefore, 
the new rule is that we allocate observations in each quintile to make sure there is 
same number of IPOs. This is both applied to DS and LSPD. We term groups from 
smallest to biggest as small, 2, 3, 4, and Big. The composition of samples forming 
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same quintile is different between DS and LSPD, however. The results are presented 
in table 3-7. 
[Insert table 3-7 about here] 
We look at the pattern of performance across various sizes. Our goal in table 3-7 is to 
discover whether performance deteriorates as size increases. Using FASI as 
benchmark, Panel A calculates the three- and five-year equal weight BHARs and 
panel B produce the three- and five-year equal weight CARs. Espenlaub et al. (2000, 
table 2) find underperformance is concentrated in the low deciles. However, our result 
is inconsistent with that hypothesis. On the contrast, we find IPOs in the smallest size 
quintile performs best among all groups, except BHAR over post-issue five-years in 
DS. With size quintile increasing, there’s no predictable trend for performance 
variation. For example, the performance of IPOs in 4th quintile is better than other 
quintiles. Panel B yields the qualitative same results. With notable superior 
performance form smallest size quintile for both datasets, we could not detect other 
valuable information regarding performance change. 
3.4.3 Sub-period performance analysis 
We also test some of the hot market hypothesis proposed by Ljungqvist et al. (2006). 
They predict that firms issued in a hot market underperform in the long run while 
there is no long-run underperformance in a cold market. Hot IPO markets could be 
defined based on several criteria. These criteria include above-average number of 
IPOs, momentum in IPO issue numbers and abnormal initial returns. The most 
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commonly used criteria are periods of either high IPO volume or high level of initial 
returns. However, Lowry and Schwert (2002) find that periods of high initial returns 
are typically followed by high IPO volume. Our classification of hot markets follows 
Helwege and Liang (2004) and Coakley et al. (2008). They use the top quartile of a 
three-month centred moving average of the number of IPOs to define hot period. 
Apply the criterion to our sample, we find 63 out of total 240 months are treated as 
hot markets. 528 (65.7%) out of 819 IPOs are hot issues. The average number of IPOs 
per month over the full month was 3.4. IPO issue numbers peak from 1993 till 2000 
where hot markets cluster. Although Helwege and Liang (2004) differentiate between 
cold and normal markets, we follow Coakley et al. (2008) to combine these two 
markets into one called normal markets. On the one hand, there are only 819 
observations and we do not want to discard any useful information. On the other hand, 
the performance between hot markets and normal markets is more conservative than 
tests between hot markets and cold markets. The results are presented in table 3-8.  
 [Insert table 3-8 about here] 
We only present equal weight results because as shown in the previous, two databases 
have qualitative same and quantitative similar results if equal weight case is adopted. 
Additionally, the performance difference, if measured with cumulatiave average 
abnormal return, between hot and normal markets cannot be detected using t-stat. 
Therefore, only buy-and-hold abnormal returns are presented. The panel A displays 
the five-year results. We find that at five year horizon, performance from normal 
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markets is always superior to that from hot markets, with all markets in the middle. 
The trend remains at three year horizon, but with much less dramatic extent. However, 
all differences are insignificant reflected by the t-stat in the last row. The hot market 
hypothesis does not hold in our sample. 
3.5 Conclusion and limitation 
In this chapter, we study the long-run performance of 819 UK IPOs listed from 
1981-2000 using two data sources (DS and LSPD). We cannot find long-term 
underperformance up to 60 months after being public. On the contrast, we document 
the abnormal returns at five-year horizon vary from 22.6 percent to 49.7 percent, all 
of which are significant. The third anniversary also experience outperformance, 
ranging from 8.9 percent to 25.8 percent, some of which are not significant. We also 
confirm the importance of inclusion of dividend. This holds most prominent in value 
weight results. However, the returns difference won’t impact conclusions in equal 
weight results. The market value difference between DS and LSPD is insignificant. 
The delicate difference in market value does not cause the results of value weight 
various between DS and LSPD. Value weight results remains outperformance from 
both datasets if measured using BHAR. Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (1998) 
argue that measures such as cumulative abnormal returns are less likely to generate 
results against market efficiency compared to buy-and-hold abnormal return measures, 
indicating less abnormal returns. We find supporting evidence in this chapter. CAR 
measure yields performance closer to zero than BHAR. We also test whether the 
poorest performance comes from IPOs with small size. Our results show that IPOs in 
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smallest quintile perform best. We finally examine whether performance from heavy 
IPO activity will be better than that from light IPO activity. The evidence is not 
statistically significant. However, firms listed in 1999 and 2000 perform rather poorly. 
Nevertheless, the paper still has some limitations. Firstly, we have no information 
about the representativeness of our sample. The underperformance is probably due to 
the sample choice. Secondly, we have not included the calendar time approach in this 
paper, which could be a robustness check.  
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Table 3-1 Comparison between DS and LSPD 
The table displays the difference between LSPD and DS in various aspects, including coverage, data 
resources, returns, and market value. The compared items are listed in the first column. 
Items LSPD DS 
Coverage  A random sample of 33 percent of 
the companies quoted on the LSE 
between 1955 and 1974, complete 
history for all UK companies quoted 
in London since 1975 
1832 equities included, 
price starting from 1965 
Data Stock Exchange Daily Official List, 
the Financial Times, and Extel's 
EXSHARE service 
Exchanges, leading 
international and local 
supplies, and published 
reports  
Return dividend included, log return capital changes adjusted or 
not, simple returns 
Market value Market value of company's ordinary 
shares, readily available 
Market value of company's 
ordinary shares, readily 
available 
Return and market value 
frequency 
Monthly Daily 
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Table 3-2 Sample selection 
This table describes the filters we use to construct our sample for comparing results based on two 
different databases (DataStream and London Share Price Data). We begin with an original sample 
(1084) provided by Professor Ranko Jelic. We eliminate firms which go public before 1981 or after 
2000. We also exclude firms which could not be identified either by DS or LSPD. Furthermore, 
companies whose issuance months have discrepancies between the two databases are eliminated. 
Finally, companies which do not have market value information are excluded. We are left with a 
sample of 819 IPOs.  
Original Sample    1084 
  Less: Firms being listed before 1981 (from DataStream) 11 
 
  Less: Firms being listed after 2000 (from DataStream) 14 
 
  Less: Firms which could not be identified by DataStream 80 
 
Equals: IPOs identified from DataStream 
 
979 
  Less: Firms which could not be identified by LSPD 31 
 
  Less: Firms with different issue months (DataStream vs. LSPD) 27 
 
Equals: IPOs identified both by DataStream and LSPD 
 
921 
  Less: Firms which have missing market value information (DataStream) 4 
 
  Less: Firms which have missing market value information (LSPD) 4 
 
  Less: Firms without initial market value information 91 
 
Equals: Final Sample   819 
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Table 3-3 Univariate analysis of IPO size 
The table presents the mean and median initial market value of IPOs by calendar year, denoted by 
millions of pounds. Market value is measured as the market capitalization of stock’s ordinary shares’ at 
the end of their issue month. The p-values for two sample t-test (difference in mean =0 vs. difference in 
means ≠ 0) and two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (difference in medians =0 vs. 
difference in medians ≠ 0) are presented in the 5th and 8th columns. The number of observations by 
calendar year is presented in 2nd columns. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
    Mean     Median   
year Observations DS LSPD p-value   DS LSPD p-value 
1981 3 25.21  1.67  0.420  
 
2.09  2.00  0.268  
1982 1 8.14  7.00  
  
8.14  7.00  0.317  
1983 9 42.96  39.11  0.203  
 
20.80  20.00  0.691  
1984 10 13.67  13.80  0.401  
 
11.48  11.50  0.821  
1985 41 34.09  23.71  0.008***  
 
14.51  9.00  0.037**  
1986 19 426.76  378.00  0.234  
 
11.00  9.00  0.261  
1987 16 112.04  109.50  0.502  
 
20.10  13.50  0.327  
1988 37 21.20  107.43  0.182  
 
13.98  13.00  0.619  
1989 41 146.95  142.61  0.272  
 
10.57  11.00  0.945  
1990 11 393.21  394.36  0.403  
 
362.17  362.00  0.922  
1991 4 484.14  476.00  0.384  
 
156.25  140.00  0.773  
1992 13 254.60  247.92  0.303  
 
30.01  30.00  0.939  
1993 43 80.58  77.49  0.071  
 
59.47  54.00  0.672  
1994 80 81.34  85.44  0.156  
 
40.82  41.00  0.819  
1995 84 45.46  45.56  0.784  
 
17.59  16.00  0.980  
1996 131 72.27  70.76  0.253  
 
27.44  26.00  0.728  
1997 91 178.25  227.70  0.325  
 
24.43  24.00  0.984  
1998 40 124.46  132.70  0.416  
 
37.64  39.00  0.690  
1999 40 248.29  247.20  0.482  
 
33.88  34.00  0.943  
2000 105 128.76  125.34  0.243  
 
29.79  29.79  0.935  
Total 819 117.46  124.59  0.264    25.01  24.00  0.487  
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Table 3-4 Three- and Five-Year Post-IPO Buy-and-Hold Returns Versus Various Benchmarks 
The sample includes 819 identified IPOs from 1981 through 2000. Panels A and C display results at 
five-year horizon in equal and value weight scheme respectively. Panels B and D show results at 
three-year horizon in equal and value weight scheme correspondly. Three- and five-year buy-and-hold 
raw and abnormal returns (both equal-weighted and value-weighted) are presented. In the first row of 
each panel, we employ the FTSE All Share Index (FASI). Row 2 of each panel presents abnormal 
performance measured relative to Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Row 3 of each panel presents 
adjusted returns relative to Fama-French (1993) three factor model (FF). Columns 2 and 3 are 
buy-and-hold raw returns from DS and LSPD respectively. Column 4 displays the difference of raw 
returns between DS and LSPD. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are presented in column 5 and 6. 
Column 7 displays the difference between result from column 5 and 6. Buy-and-hold returns are 
generated by compounding monthly returns beginning from the first complete trading month that could 
be found either in DS or LSPD. In all panels, we drop the zero returns if occurring in last consecutive 
months. T-stats for the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are computed according the skewness-adjusted t 
by Lyon et al. (1999) and in parentheses ( ). T-stats for the difference are standard t and in parentheses 
( ). *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Five year equal weighted raw and buy-and-hold abnormal return  
  Raw IPO Return   BHAR 
Benchmarks DS LSPD Difference 
 
DS LSPD Difference 
FASI 0.613  0.950  -0.337  
 
0.226** 0.265**   -0.039 
(t-statistic) 
  
(-1.643) 
 
(2.082) (2.153) (-0.197) 
CAPM 0.613  0.950  -0.337  
 
0.277** 0.372*** -0.095 
(t-statistic) 
  
(-1.643) 
 
(2.633) (3.160) (-0.473) 
Fama-French 0.613  0.950  -0.337  
 
0.345*** 0.497*** -0.152 
(t-statistic)     (-1.643)   (3.150) (4.381) (-0.750) 
 
Panel B: Three year equal weighted raw and buy-and-hold abnormal return 
  Raw IPO Return   BHAR 
Benchmarks DS LSPD Difference 
 
DS LSPD Difference 
FASI 0.385  0.514  -0.129  
 
0.111* 0.089 0.022  
 (t-statistic) 
  
(-1.194) 
 
(1.748) (1.295) (0.212) 
CAPM 0.385  0.514  -0.129  
 
0.169*** 0.192*** -0.024  
 (t-statistic) 
  
(-1.194) 
 
(2.803) (3.019) (-0.178) 
Fama-French 0.385  0.514  -0.129  
 
0.252*** 0.258*** -0.006  
 (t-statistic)     (-1.194)   (4.413) (4.165) (-0.061) 
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Panel C: Five year value weighted raw and buy-and-hold abnormal return 
  Raw IPO Return   BHAR 
Benchmarks DS LSPD Difference 
 
DS LSPD Difference 
FASI 0.567 0.834 -0.267**  
 
0.266*** 0.274*** -0.008 
 (t-statistic) 
  
(-2.264)  
 
(5.888) (4.751) (0.073) 
CAPM 0.567 0.834 -0.267**  
 
0.323*** 0.365*** -0.042 
 (t-statistic) 
  
(-2.264)  
 
(7.980) (7.108) (0.374) 
Fama-French 0.567 0.834 -0.267**  
 
0.255*** 0.269*** -0.014 
 (t-statistic)     (-2.264)    (4.249) (4.324) (0.116) 
 
Panel D: Three year value weighted raw and buy-and-hold abnormal return 
  Raw IPO Return   BHAR 
Benchmarks DS LSPD Difference 
 
DS LSPD Difference 
FASI 0.274  0.369  -0.095  
 
0.060  0.016  0.044  
 (t-statistic) 
  
(-1.318)  
 
(1.545) (0.370) (0.656) 
CAPM 0.274  0.369  -0.095  
 
0.152***  0.123***  0.029  
 (t-statistic) 
  
(-1.318)  
 
(4.612) (3.003) (0.443) 
Fama-French 0.274  0.369  -0.095  
 
0.177***  0.120***  0.056  
 (t-statistic)     (-1.318)    (5.191) (2.782) (0.838) 
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Table 3-5 Three- and Five-Year Post-IPO Cumulative Abnormal Returns versus Various 
Benchmarks 
The sample includes 819 identified IPOs from 1981 through 2000. Panels A and B show results at 
five-year and three-year horizon. In each panel, equal weight results are presented on the left hand side 
and value weight results are presented on the right hand side. The measurement of performance in the 
table is cumulative average abnormal return. In the first row of each panel, we employ the FTSE All 
Share Index (FASI). Row 2 of each panel presents abnormal performance measured relative to Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Row 3 of each panel presents adjusted returns relative to Fama-French 
(1993) three factor model (FF). Columns 2 and 4 are results from DS. Columns 3 and 5 are results from 
LSPD. Cumulative abnormal returns are generated by cumulating monthly returns starting in the first 
complete trading month that could be found either in DS or LSPD. In all panels, we drop the zero 
returns if occurring in last consecutive months. The calculation of T-statistics follows Ritter (1991) and 
is in parentheses ( ). *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Five year CAR 
   EW CAR   VW CAR 
Benchmarks DS LSPD   DS LSPD 
FASI -0.047  0.016  
 
0.071  0.063  
(t-statistic) (-0.489)  (0.152)  
 
(1.057)  (0.958)  
CAPM 0.019  0.115  
 
0.185***  0.160**  
(t-statistic) (0.199)  (1.165)  
 
(3.007)  (2.607)  
Fama-French 0.089  0.194**  
 
0.104  0.056  
(t-statistic) (1.165)  (2.399)    (1.927)  (1.029)  
 
Panel B: Three year CAR 
   EW CAR   VW CAR 
Benchmarks DS LSPD   DS LSPD 
FASI -0.150**  -0.123*  
 
-0.108***  -0.126***  
(t-statistic) (-2.379)  (-1.879)  
 
(-2.460)  (-2.983)  
CAPM -0.074  -0.020  
 
0.050  0.014  
(t-statistic) (-1.217)  (-0.320)  
 
(1.255)  (0.353)  
Fama-French -0.001  0.040  
 
0.039  -0.036  
(t-statistic) (-0.021)  (0.780)    (1.106)  (-1.052)  
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Table 3-6 Three- and Five-Year Post-IPO Buy-and-Hold Returns with and without dividend 
The sample is 819 identified IPOs from 1981 through 2000. Three- and five-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(both equal-weighted and value-weighted) are compared with alternative benchmarks. In the first row of each 
panel, we employ the FTSE All Share Index (FASI). Row 2 of each panel presents abnormal performance 
measured relative to Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Row 3 of each panel presents adjusted returns 
relative to Fama-French (1993) three factor model (FF). All IPOs returns data are from DS. Column 2 and 3 is 
buy-and-hold returns from adjusted and unadjusted prices respectively. Column 4 displays the difference 
between result from column 2 and 3. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are presented in column 5 and 6. Column 7 
displays the difference between result from column 5 and 6. Buy-and-hold returns are generated by 
compounding monthly returns beginning from the first complete trading month. In all panels, we drop the zero 
returns if occurring in last consecutive months. T-stats for the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are computed 
according the skewness-adjusted t by Lyon et al. (1999) and in parentheses ( ). T-stats for the difference are 
standard t and in parentheses ( ). *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Five year equal weighted raw and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
  Raw IPO Return   BHAR 
Benchmarks 
Dividend 
included 
Dividend 
excluded 
Difference 
 
Dividend 
included 
Dividend 
excluded 
Difference 
FASI 0.613  0.351  0.262  
 
0.226** -0.037 0.262 
 (t-statistic) 
 
(1.458)  
 
(2.082) (-0.231) (1.489) 
CAPM 0.613  0.351  0.262  
 
0.277*** 0.010 0.267 
 (t-statistic) 
 
(1.458)  
 
(2.633) (0.165) (1.523) 
Fama-French 0.613  0.351  0.262  
 
0.345*** 0.130 0.215 
 (t-statistic)   (1.458)    (3.150) (1.308) (1.175) 
 
Panel B: Three year equal weighted raw and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
  Raw IPO Return   BHAR 
Benchmarks 
Dividend 
included 
Dividend 
excluded 
Difference 
 
Dividend 
included 
Dividend 
excluded 
Difference 
FASI 0.567  0.447  0.120  
 
0.266*** 0.146*** 0.120 
 (t-statistic) 
 
(1.262)  
 
(5.888) (3.510) (1.314) 
CAPM 0.567  0.447  0.120  
 
0.323*** 0.203*** 0.120 
 (t-statistic) 
 
(1.262)  
 
(7.980) (5.476) (1.339) 
Fama-French 0.567  0.447  0.120  
 
0.255*** 0.161*** 0.094 
 (t-statistic)   (1.262)    (4.249) (3.654) (0.951) 
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Table 3-7 Equal weight Three- and Five-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and cumulative abnormal 
returns by size  
The sample includes 819 identified IPOs from 1981 through 2000. Three- and five-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (both equal-weighted and value-weighted) are based on FASI. IPOs are divided into five groups based 
on its size, which is measured at the end of its first trading month. Size represents the market value of ordinary 
shares at that time. Panel A uses buy-and-hold abnormal returns measurement. Buy-and-hold returns are 
generated by compounding monthly returns beginning from the first complete trading month that could be found 
either in DS or LSPD. The buy-and-hold Size portfolios are generated by forming size quintile breakpoints so 
that the number of IPOs in each portfolio is same. Panel B adopts cumulative abnormal returns measurement. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are generated by cumulating monthly returns starting in the first complete trading 
month that could be found either in DS or LSPD. Rows 2 and 3 present post-issue performance from DS at 
three-year and five-year horizon respectively. Rows 4 and 5 provide counterparts from LSPD. In all panels, we 
drop the zero returns if occurring in last consecutive months. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Equally weight Three- and Five-year Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Size 
DS   LSPD 
3-Year 5-Year   3-Year 5-Year 
Small 0.219  0.320  
 
0.273  0.229  
2 0.021  0.435  
 
0.104  0.805  
3 0.139  0.161  
 
-0.075  -0.203  
4 0.277  0.233  
 
0.231  0.388  
Big -0.091  0.051    -0.104  0.133  
 
Panel B: Equal weight Three- and Five-year cumulative abnormal returns 
Size 
DS   LSPD 
3-Year 5-Year   3-Year 5-Year 
Small 0.002 0.197 
 
0.159 0.352 
2 -0.302 -0.109 
 
-0.268 -0.016 
3 -0.142 -0.189 
 
-0.243 -0.141 
4 -0.116 -0.142 
 
-0.105 -0.110 
Big -0.188 -0.002   -0.170 -0.001 
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Table 3-8 Sub-period return analysis 
The sample includes 819 identified IPOs from 1981 through 2000. Three- and five-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (equal-weighted) are based on different benchmarks. These benchmarks include FTSE All Share Index 
(FASI), capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. The hot periods are 
months within top quartile of three-month centered moving average of monthly IPOs number. The remaining 
periods are defined as normal markets. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is the simple difference between IPO 
three-year average return and the corresponding benchmark. Skewness-adjusted t-statistics from Lyon et al. 
(1999) are presented in parentheses below the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The last row shows the t-stat of 
difference between hot and normal markets. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Five-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Dataset DS   LSPD 
Benchmark FASI CAPM FF   FASI CAPM FF 
All markets 0.226*  0.277***  0.345*** 
 
0.265*  0.372***  0.497***  
(skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (2.082)  (2.633) (3.150) 
 
(2.153)  (3.160)  (4.381)  
Hot 0.126  0.182  0.257** 
 
0.208  0.321**  0.420***  
(skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (0.971)  (1.429)  (2.051) 
 
(1.400)  (2.261)  (3.009)  
Normal 0.403**  0.447**  0.502** 
 
0.351  0.450*  0.614***  
(skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (2.152)  (2.417)  (2.365) 
 
(1.699)  (2.229)  (3.193)  
t-stat for hot vs. normal 0.999  0.954  0.857   0.473  0.427  0.636  
 
Panel B: Three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Dataset DS   LSPD 
Benchmark FASI CAPM FF   FASI CAPM FF 
All markets 0.111  0.169***  0.252*** 
 
0.089  0.192***  0.258***  
(skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (1.748)  (2.803)  (4.413) 
 
(1.295)  (3.019)  (4.165)  
Hot 0.101  0.171**  0.253*** 
 
0.088  0.202***  0.264***  
(skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (1.229)  (2.220)  (3.452) 
 
(1.004)  (2.511)  (3.383)  
Normal 0.129  0.165  0.251*** 
 
0.091  0.175  0.248**  
(skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (1.363)  (1.767)  (2.811) 
 
(0.874)  (1.726)  (2.469)  
t-stat for hot vs. normal 0.190  0.039  0.012   -0.022  0.179  0.102  
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Chapter 4 Re-examination of long-term UK IPO performance 
4.1 Introduction 
The study of the long-run performance of firms after their flotation is of interest for issuers as 
well as for investors. Issuers wonder whether it is right time to issue stock by examining 
whether stock market is at peak. Investors wonder whether IPOs are attractive investments 
compared to other mature firms. Long-run horizon is often defined from one year to five 
years after the IPO. Numerous studies find that IPOs perform poorly in the long-run (Ritter, 
1991; and Loughran and Ritter, 1995 and 2000). However, the findings are not homogenous 
and depend on methodologies and benchmarks. A long-run underperformance after IPOs is 
also reported by several studies in UK capital market, including Levis (1993), Espenlaub et al. 
(2000), Goergen et al. (2007), and Gregory et al. (2010).  
There are several reasons motivating us to conduct another study evaluating long-term 
performance, despite the vast literature. First, most previous UK studies (Levis, 1993; 
Espenlaub et al., 2000; Gregory et al., 2010) present measurement based either on cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CARs) or buy-and-hold average abnormal returns (BHARs). None 
of the papers mentioned above adopts both measures. Second, the datasets used in most prior 
studies are dated. Except Gregory et al. (2010), the most recent concerning paper (Espenlaub 
et al., 2000) uses sample terminating at 1992. Ritter and Welch (2002) state that long-run 
performance of IPOs is not only sensitive to econometric methodology, but also to the choice 
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of sample period. The more recent data could be used to test the validity of underperformance 
in different time period. Even in Gregory et al. (2010), they do not adopt cumulative average 
abnormal returns. Third, some of the benchmarks such as Carhart four factor model and 
control portfolios based on firm’s certain characteristics have not been applied in UK 
literature. We could have a more comprehensive picture if those benchmarks are included.  
Our paper aims to provide updated evidence on long-run stock performance of IPOs in UK 
using extended time period and more benchmarks. Our sample period spans from 1982 until 
2004 and we adopt five different benchmarks to check our conclusion. The rest of paper is 
organized as follows. In section 4.2, we will review the international literature on long-term 
IPOs financial performance. In section 4.3, we will discuss our data set and methodology. 
Section 4.4 provides the empirical results. Section 4.5 presents the robustness check with 
calendar time work. Section 4.6 concludes with a summary of the major results.  
4.2 Literature Review 
Efficient market hypothesis indicates no abnormal return caused by firm-specific events as 
long as event-related activities are fully completed. However, beginning from Ritter (1991), 
numerous literature find negative adjusted returns from IPOs in the long post-issue period. 
The documented long-term underperformance not only takes place in USA, but also in many 
other capital markets. However, the underperformance found in European countries is 
generally lower than that discovered in US stock market. For example, Stehle et al. (2000) 
83 
 
study 187 IPOs from 1960-1992 in Germany using various benchmarks. They find IPOs only 
underperform a size control portfolio by 6 percent in the three-year post-issue horizon. 
Furthermore, Stehle et al. (2000) demonstrate that size portfolio adjusted return give a more 
accurate estimate of long-term abnormal returns because IPO stocks in Germany usually have 
a small or medium market capitalization and market portfolio used as a benchmark is not 
appropriate. Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005) provide additional evidence in Spanish market, 
confirming the negative long-run abnormal stock returns, in line with international literature. 
In some other European stock markets, the long-term underperformance is challenged 
(France, Switzerland). For example, Drobetz et al. (2005) estimate the long-run performance 
of Swiss Initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1983 to 2000. They do not find strong evidence 
of underperformance. They contribute the found underperformance in other markets to the 
fact that benchmarks have not taken size into account. Similarly, Nounis (2003) reports 
average over-performance of 14.68 percent during the first year of listing on a sample of 
Greek IPOs.  
Some similar studies have also been conducted in UK. Levis (1993) shows IPOs in UK from 
1980 to 1988 underperform three relevant benchmarks in the full 36 months of trading 
following the first day of trading. The cumulative average abnormal return, excluding first 
month returns, falls to -11.38 percent, -8.31 percent, and -22.96 percent relative to Financial 
Times Actuaries All Share Index (FTA), Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index (HGSC) 
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and All Share Equally Weighted Index (ASEW) respectively. The magnitude of 
underperformance is supposed to be conservative given the performance of small companies 
during the period 1984-1987 is especially superior to that of large firms. Espenlaub et al. 
(2000) re-examine the evidence from Levis (1993) by updating the sample and including 
calendar-time approach. Similar to Levis’ (1993) findings, the first three years after IPOs 
exhibit a dramatic underperformance regardless of benchmark choice. The subsequent two 
years, however, show different pattern depending on benchmarks. By the end of 5th 
anniversary, CAARs based on Capital Asset Pricing Model, simple size adjustment, 
multi-index model and Fama-French (1993) three-factor model yield -28.67 percent, -21.32 
percent, -4.3 percent, and -42.77 percent respectively. To control for cross-sectional 
correlation, they also include calendar time analysis in the paper. Intercepts of regressions 
indicate negative average monthly abnormal return, with less magnitude than that in event 
time framework. Goergen et al. (2007) study the long-run stock performance of UK IPOs by 
relating it to the pre-IPO financial performance of the firm as well as the managerial decision 
taken pre-IPO. They confirm the underperformance of UK IPOs and find that quality, 
pre-IPO accounting performance, and degree of multi-nationality are determinants of 
long-term IPOs performance. Gregory et al. (2010) analyse the long run stock returns of UK 
IPOs using a set of 2,499 UK IPOs between mid-1975 and the end of 2004. They show the 
compelling evidence of long run underperformance from size decile control portfolio and 
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control firm. Additionally, performance by listing market differs, with results in AIM and 
USM much worse than those from official list (OL). 
Methodology to measure abnormal returns, especially over long-term, always receives 
criticisms since none existing method can avoid all weaknesses. Lyon et al. (1999, p165) 
describe “even using the best methods, the analysis of long-run abnormal returns is 
treacherous”. Firstly, among a variety of expected returns, we cannot conclude which one is 
most accurate. Secondly, how to aggregate average abnormal returns over time is 
inconclusive as well. Both cumulative average abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns presents some conveniences and inconveniences. Thirdly, test statistic to determine 
the significance of abnormal return is not standard since the distribution of abnormal return is 
not normal. We have to make some adjustments to allow for the deviation from normal 
distribution. Therefore, measured performance to a large extent depends on benchmark and 
methodology selected (Brav et al. 2000, Gompers and Lerner, 2003; Drobetz et al. 2005, 
Alvarez and Gonzalez, 2005). Brav et al. (2000) state that underperformance from traditional 
index disappears when the benchmark matched on size and book-to-market ratios. Gompers 
and Lerner (2003) find that while IPOs underperform when event-time buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are used, they do not in cumulative abnormal returns. Additionally, 
intercepts in time series regression are insignificantly different from or even positive. The 
relative performance of an IPO sample depends on the method of examining performance.  
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Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) point out 
commonly used methods for testing long-run abnormal returns yield misspecified test 
statistics. These papers underline three main causes for the misspecifications. They solve the 
problem by calculating skewness-adjusted t-statistic or the empirically generally distribution 
of long-run abnormal returns in event time framework and using buy-and-hold abnormal 
return measurement. Gajewski and Gresse (2006) confirm positive skewness of long-term 
abnormal return by analysing long-term performance of IPOs across 15 European countries. 
The positive skewness of performance is reflected by the fact that median returns are lower 
than mean returns. Stehle et al. (2000) also mention the strongly skewed distribution of 
abnormal returns from all benchmarks. Their remedies include reporting skewness-adjusted 
t-statistics and bootstrapping procedure to evaluating the t-statistics.  
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Description 
The data in this paper is from London Share Price Database (LSPD). LSPD is a unique, 
comprehensive database of UK stock returns covering some 9,000 UK shares from 1955 to 
2007. In last chapter, we use DS as one source and compare the results with those from LSPD. 
In this paper, we expand our sample size and period. Our IPO sample is identified by four 
steps. First, birth date18 spans from 1982 to 2004, covering 23 years. Year 2004 is chosen as 
                                                 
18 The first date the security was offered for sale or for tender, introduced to the Stock Exchange, placed, issued, 
acquired in the case of a merger, or first quoted. 
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last sample year because 5 year subsequent to IPOs, excluding first trading month, is our 
analysis horizon and the latest available return data in LSPD terminates at December 2009. 
The first trading month is excluded from the study because of initial underpricing and 
possibility of price support in the first few trading days. Second, there’s type of birth 
information in LSPD and we pick all methods categorizing as IPOs, including placing, offers 
for sale, offers for sale by tender, subscription, and mixed of any two. Third, financial 
companies are excluded from our sample. Finance firms are different in that their accounting 
treatment on book value is different from firms in other industries. This filter follows 
Espenlaub et al. (2000), Goergen et al. (2007) and Gregory et al. (2010). Fourth, in order to 
compare the value effect on IPO performance, we drop all samples without first month 
market value information. We do this to make sure that the sample in equal weighted and 
value weight scheme is exactly same so that results from two schemes could be comparable. 
We are left with a sample size of 1,953 firms from 1982 to 2004. 
[Table 4-1 about here] 
Panel A of table 4-1 shows the distribution by listing method and calendar year respectively. 
The mean and median market value is presented in the last two rows of table. Market value 
refers to market capitalization of ordinary shares, measured at the end of first trading month. 
The volume in terms of IPOs number in each year is time varying. Time between 1985 and 
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1988 witness the first hot time period, with number of IPOs exceeding 100 in each year. 
Afterwards, there’s a temporary cold period before it boost again to 141 in 1996. The number 
culminates with 238 in 2004, which is a huge increase compared to figures in last three years. 
Although the number of IPOs in each calendar year is different from figures presented in 
Gregory et al. (2010) who also use LSPD, the time series trend of number is similar. Their 
first hot issue period also occurs between 1985 and 1988 and follows a cold period before 
jumping in 1996. In terms of listing method, placement dominates public offer through the 
entire sample period, with 84 percent IPOs choosing placement as their method of raising 
capital. The similar situation is also found in Gregory et al. (2010). They document that 
placements take 81.3 percent. Birth type such as introduction, re-introduction, IPO spinoff is 
not categorized into IPOs because they do not issue new stocks. We also find after 1986 that 
the number of public offer decrease gradually. We argue that choice of listing method 
depends mainly on the stock exchange’s listing rules. The big bang which refers to the 
deregulation of fixed brokerage commissions and the termination of restrictions on 
membership on LSE takes place on October 27, 1986. Before big bang iss introduced, public 
offer is the only choice for issues larger than 3 million pounds. On the date of big bang, LSE 
changes its rules to allow placements to be used for larger issues up to 15 million pounds in 
the listed market and up to 5 million pounds in the unlisted markets. We show that average 
market value IPOs choosing placing is much smaller than firms choosing offer for sale. This 
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finding supports Goergen et al. (2007) who suggest that UK public offers are mainly used by 
larger firms and placing are usually used by smaller firms. Within public offers, there are a 
number of variations. In an offer for sale, underwriter offers shares at a fixed price to 
individual and institutional investors. In an offer for sale by tender, the investors are invited 
to state a price at which they are willing to buy. An offer for subscription is similar to an offer 
for sale but it is only partially underwritten and is mainly used by investment trusts.  
Panel B displays distribution by industry19 and calendar year. In LSPD, each sample firm is 
given a digit code representing its specific industry. The industry classification code rules 
change three times during the sample period. We make some adjustments to match each firm 
to ICB industry code taking effect from 2006. The results show an industry clustering 
phenomenon. There are 648 and 471 companies in general industries and consumer services. 
On the other hand, telecommunications and utilities only bring about 37 and 34 public 
companies respectively. It seems there is negative relationship between the number of IPOs 
and market value if compared from industry level. IPOs in telecommunications, utilities, and 
oil & gas (with top 3 smallest observations, 37, 34, and 58) occupy the largest market value 
(1280 million, 651 million, and 154 million). 
                                                 
19 Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), which is used by FTSE group and Dow Jones Indexes in 2005 for 
identifying industry 
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Panel C displays the distribution by listing market and calendar time. Before 1996, UK firms 
going to public can be listed either in Official List (OL) or Unlisted Securities Market (USM). 
Since the establishment of Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in June 1996, private firms 
have choice between OL and AIM. AIM replaces the function of USM. We notice that 
although AIM is not established until 1996, the IPOs appearing in AIM begins from 1983. 
Those AIM securities with issuing year before 1996 are transferred from other markets (OL 
or USM). Before 1996, most IPOs choose OL as their listing market. However, IPOs listed in 
AIM dominates after 1996, which is consistent with establishment of AIM. In summary, 928 
firms choose OL, 804 companies pick AIM, and 223 stocks go to USM. The last two rows 
show the mean and median size of firms in each market. The average market value for IPOs 
in OL is 197 million; the corresponding figures for IPOs in AIM and USM are 30.4 and 10.4 
million. The difference of median figure is smaller, indicating the severe skewness of 
distribution of market value.  
4.3.2 Methodology 
Monthly returns, including both capital gains and dividend payments, are collected from 
return file of LSPD. We follow Levis (1993) to make some adjustments on returns, 
converting monthly log return provided to simple arithmetic returns. Some monthly data are 
missing due to short suspension of trading or unavailable early trading months data. We 
substitute all missing returns of this kind with zero because it is unlikely that investors could 
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be able to sell such stocks just before a suspension that is likely to be unexpected by investors. 
The treatment of missing returns has rarely been mentioned in other papers. Monthly returns 
of zero indicates no trading activities in the time period. The returns on the FTSE All Share 
Index (FASI) are measured as total returns including dividends and capital gains. The data of 
risk-free rate needs to be adjusted to be used since we refer this to monthly return of 90 day 
Treasury bill while LSPD provides the annual log return in each month. Therefore, we divide 
the annual figures by 12 and then convert to simple monthly return by taking exponential 
transformation. Our transformation is correct, confirmed by same figure from dataset from 
Gregory et al. (2010). 
Various benchmarks are utilized to calculate the abnormal returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
categorize three approaches for developing a benchmark for long-run stock returns. The first 
approach employs the reference portfolio to calculate abnormal returns. The second approach 
matches sample firms to control on specified firm characteristics. The third approach is an 
application of Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. We include both the first and third 
approach. The first two benchmarks use reference portfolios, which are FASI and size control 
portfolios. Fama and French (1992) document that not only beta effects expected return, but 
also size and book-to-market ratio make a difference on returns. Dimson and Marsh (1986) 
take the size effect into consideration by using size decile control portfolios as benchmarks. 
The latter three belong to asset pricing model, including capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
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Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Fama-French 
three factor model and Carhart model are recent popular benchmarks in calculating expected 
returns. IPOs without size and book-to-market information can also use Fama-French model 
to estimate the expected returns. We achieve this by using readily available three factors 
downloaded from Gregory et al. (2010). Therefore, IPOs do not need size and book value 
information to enter the sample. Additionally, three-factor model allows for the possibility for 
firms with large size or high book-to-market ratio mimicking return pattern of small firm or 
low book-to-market ratio. It is pattern of returns, not explicit measurement of size and 
book-to-market ratio, determines whether a firm’s common stock more closely mimic the 
returns of small firms and/or high book-to-market firms. The disadvantage of the three-factor 
model is that it equal weight each month in minimizing the sum of squares. If 
underperformance is correlated with the number of IPOs in certain period, three-factor model 
will impose a downward bias on the results. We address this by also estimating weighted 
least squares regressions in the calendar time framework. Furthermore, Fama and French 
(1996) find three-factor model cannot capture cross-sectional variation in momentum-sorted 
portfolio returns. Chan et al. (1996) suggest that momentum anomaly is market inefficiency 
due to slow reaction to information. Therefore, Carhart (1997) add momentum factor based 
on three-factor model to make it a four-factor model. The momentum factor is calculated as 
equal weight average of firms with the highest thirty percent eleven-month returns lagged one 
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month minus the equal-weight average of firms with the lowest thirty percent eleven-month 
returns lagged one month. Data source of three-factor and four-factor model is from Gregory 
et al. (2010)20. Michou et al. (2007) observe that there’s no timely basis data for Fama-French 
and momentum factors in UK. Gregory et al. (2010) fill this gap by constructing monthly 
data for this information from October 1980 to December 2008. There are several reasons to 
use their factor results rather than constructing ourselves. First, the monthly return and 
market capitalization data for their analysis is from LSPD which is same with our database. 
The use of same return has been confirmed by finding that risk free rate and market return is 
exactly same between our analysis and their data. Second, they have relatively 
comprehensive database, including Hemscott, Datastream and Gregory et al. (2009) data, for 
calculating book value of the firm which is not available for me. Our only access to 
Datastream will cause survivorship bias. Third, they choose beginning of each October as the 
portfolio formation time which is different from beginning of July as convention because 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) find the year-ends of public firms in UK is more diffuse than that 
in US, with only 37 percent of firms having December year ends and similar number of firms 
ending year between January and April and 22 percent of UK firms having March year ends. 
Fourth, they follow the standard methodology described on Ken French’s website to 
                                                 
20 The website address is http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/files.php  
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construct SMB, HML and UMD factor. The calculation of abnormal return based on each of 
five benchmarks is as follows: 
Model 1: FTSE All Share Index (FASI) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝐴𝑆𝐼                                                  (Equation 4-1) 
where Rit is the return on company i in event month t, RFASI is the return on the market index 
(FTSE all share index) in event month t. 
Model 2: Size control portfolio (SD) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑠𝑡                                                   (Equation 4-2) 
where Rst is the return on the size control portfolio in event month t. The reference portfolios 
are ten size-based portfolios that are constructed in January of each year. In December of 
each year, all firms in LSE are ranked on the basis of market value of equity. Size deciles are 
created based on these rankings. In each decile, the number of firms is the same. We calculate 
the monthly return for each of the ten size control portfolios by equal averaging the monthly 
returns across all securities in a particular size decile. IPO sample is allocated to appropriate 
size decile once each year. The calculation of size-decile returns is equivalent to a strategy of 
investing in an equally weighted size decile portfolio with annual rebalancing.  
Model 3: Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
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𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡�]                                    (Equation 4-3) 
where Rit is the return on company i in event month t, Rmt is the return on the market in event 
month t as measured by the return on the FTSE All Share Index, Rft is the treasury bill return 
in event month t, iβ is the CAPM beta of company i, estimated by an OLS regression up to 
60 months after the IPO.  
Model 4: Fama-French three-factor model 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡]                 (Equation 4-4) 
where Rit is return on company i in event month t, Rmt is the return on the market in event 
month t measured by the return on the FTSE All Share Index, iβ , iγ , iδ  is the coefficient 
of factors (Rmt-Rft), SMB and HML respectively. Those three coefficients are estimated by 
OLS regression from first full trading month to the 60th month or delisting time which took 
place first.  
Model 5: Carhart four-factor model 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ∅𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡]       (Equation 4-5) 
all parameters are similar with interpretation in three-factor model except having extra factor 
UMD. 
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We will focus on the performance of sample IPOs from the first complete trading month until 
the post-issue 5 year (60 months) anniversary in the aftermarket period. The first partial 
trading month is excluded from our event window for adjusting the effect of under-pricing 
and most return information is missing as well. Each trading month actually is consistent with 
calendar month return. The last transaction price in each calendar month was extracted and 
dividends, rights and scrip issues during each month will be taken into account as well. 
Return file in LSPD provides logarithmic returns for each sample. However, discrete returns 
are used throughout the paper to avoid any downward bias in returns caused by Jensen’s 
inequality. FTSE All Share Index proxy for market portfolio in that it is a value-weighted 
index comprising approximate 90 percent of UK stocks by value (Levis, 1993).   
From papers by Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Fama (1998), and Lyon 
et al. (1999), we learn that all methods calculating long-term abnormal return present some 
inconveniences. Because investor experience is important, most empirical studies report 
long-run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs). However, the problem with BHARs is that by 
compounding monthly returns, long-run BHARs are severely skewed. Lyon et al. (1999) 
alleviate this problem by developing skewness-adjusted t-statistic. Furthermore, the 
cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns should be corrected for as well. That problem 
exaggerates with the measurement horizon. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
can solve the cross-sectional correlation. However, CAARs require monthly rebalancing, 
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which may lead to an inflated long-horizon return on the reference portfolio. We intend to use 
both BHARs and CAARs to evaluate the long-run performance of IPOs.  
The average benchmark-adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for specified time interval 
is the equally weighted or value weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark-adjusted 
returns, 𝑒𝑖 is the weight of average returns (1 𝑁�  for the equal weight, 𝑒𝑖 ∑ 𝑒𝑖�  where 𝑒𝑖 
refers to initial market value of firm i): 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖=1                                                  (Equation 4-6) 
The cumulative average abnormal return from event month 1 to event month s is the 
summation of the average benchmark-adjusted returns: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑠𝑡=1                                                 (Equation 4-7) 
When a firm in portfolio p is delisted before the 5th year anniversary, the portfolio return from 
the next month is an equally-weighted average of the remaining firms in the portfolio. For the 
month in which IPO is delisted, the return for that individual firm is vacant. We employ the 
method by Ritter (1991) to test the statistical significance of the calculated CAAR. The 
t-statistic for the CAAR in month t, CAARt is computed as: 
𝑜(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 ∗ �𝑛𝑡/𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡                                      (Equation 4-8) 
where nt is the number of companies trading in each month, and csdt is computed as: 
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𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡 = [𝑜 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑒 + 2 ∗ (𝑜 − 1) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣]1/2                               (Equation 4-9) 
where t is the event month, var is the mean cross-sectional variance over 60 months, and cov 
is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series. 
One problem with CAAR is that they do not represent an ex ante applicable investment 
(trading) strategy. In other words, they do not accurately measure the return to an investor 
who holds a security for a long post–event period. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns which can 
capture investor experience by compounding short-term returns are reported by most 
empirical studies.  
A T-month BHAR for new issuing firm i looks like: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)𝑇𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐵𝑡)𝑇𝑡=1                            (Equation 4-10) 
Where RBt is the expected return and Rit indicates the return on company i at month t. For the 
sample of event firms, the mean BHAR is calculated as the average of the individual firm 
BHARs. 
We test whether the mean abnormal returns are significantly different from zero by 
estimating the skewness-adjusted t. The statistic is computed as: 
𝑜𝑠𝑎 = √𝑛(𝑆 + 13 𝛾�𝑆2 + 16𝑛 𝛾�)                                        (Equation 4-11) 
Where 
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where γˆ  is the estimate of the coefficient of skewness and Sn is the conventional 
t-statistic. The critical values applied to conventional t-statistics are not appropriate when the 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are used. The procedure for obtaining an 
appropriate critical value when using the bootstrapping approach, as suggested by Lyon et al. 
(1999) is used here.  
Loughran and Ritter (1999) stipulate that choice of weighting scheme is important for power 
consideration. Brav et al. (2000) illustrate this point by a simple example. Consider a sample 
consists of 1000 firms, 999 of which have a 1 million market capitalization (the “small” firm) 
and the rest one with 1001 million market capitalization (the “big” firm). Assume all small 
firms underperform an equal 50 percent relative to a benchmark while the large firm 
outperforms by 50 percent. An equal weight measure will imply severe mispricing (-50 
percent), while value weighting will lead to a conclusion of no abnormal return. The use of 
weighting scheme is dependent on our research motivation. If we believe that small stocks 
likely to underperform than large stocks, power consideration alone indicates the use of equal 
weight. If we are more concerned about the wealth effect of investors subsequent to IPO, 
value weighting is more appropriate. Since we need a full picture of UK long-term IPOs 
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performance, we present results using both value and equal weighting to highlight 
cross-sectional differences in abnormal performance. 
We have to address the problem of firms delisting within the fifth anniversary. Liu and 
Strong (2008) replace de-listed firm returns by either zero or the risk-free rate and obtain 
similar results. Lyon et al. (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) use benchmark returns as 
substitution for missing returns on delisted firms. Gompers and Lerner (2003) categorize the 
firms into three scenario: being acquired, going bankruptcy or low stock price (less than one 
dollar), and firms not belonging to any of two situations above. The delisting month return 
has different treatment21. In the subsequent months, they are either set to zero or replaced by 
the matched size and book-to-market portfolio returns. Gregory et al. (2010) replace the 
return with benchmark if a de-listed firm preserves its value (such as a merger or acquisition). 
They assume it to be -100 percent if a de-listing firm lose its value (bankruptcy). We follow 
Gregory et al. (2010). Specifically, treatment on returns on delisting month replicate Gregory 
et al. since we use the same database (LSPD) as them. G10 could be identified as a criterion 
to test whether a de-listed firm preserve or loses its value. If codes are 7, 16, 20, and 21, the 
missing returns on de-listed firms are replaced by -100 percent. Otherwise, they are replaced 
                                                 
21 When a firm is acquired, exit price is used to compute delisting return. When a firm goes bankrupt or 
disappears with a very low price (less than one dollar), -100 percent delisting return is assumed for the last year. 
When one firm is priced above one dollar, or cannot be confirmed to be acquired, the return is computed until 
the last price. 
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by FTSE All Share Index returns. In periods subsequent to delisting, our sample size will 
decrease which indicates investment strategy focusing on surviving stocks. We identify 
delisting as returns terminating before 5th anniversary.  
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Buy-and-hold average abnormal returns 
We report the buy-and-hold abnormal returns relative to various benchmarks at one-, three-, 
and five-year horizon. The benchmarks are FTSE All Share Index (FASI), size decile 
matching portfolio (SD), Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model (F-F), and Carhart (1997) four-factor model (CARHART). There are some 
companies without full return (60 months) history, which we assume to be delisted. We 
follow Gregory et al. (2010) to add a delisting (terminating) return. As long as these 
companies lose their values, we replace the corresponding returns with -1 at their delisting 
month. Otherwise, they have the same returns as FASI at that month. In subsequent months, 
the delisted firms vanish from the IPO samples. The number of IPOs for calculating abnormal 
returns based on first three benchmarks (FASI, SD, and CAPM) is full (1953), while there are 
less IPOs for last two benchmarks (F-F and CARHART) since the monthly factor 
information for these benchmarks is only available till December, 2008. The IPOs taking 
place in 2004 do not enter the analysis. Each IPO monthly return is compounded till the 5th 
anniversary or delisting month, whichever takes place first. The corresponding benchmark 
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returns is calculated in the same manner. The difference of two buy-and-hold returns at 
certain time interval is termed as BHAR. The average of individual BHARs at one-, three-, 
and five-year horizon is what we see in panel A of table 4-2. If value weight average is used, 
panel B of table 4-2 is produced. Value is measured as market capitalization of ordinary 
shares at the end of first trading month. 
[Insert table 4-2 about here] 
Panel A of table 4-2 shows that there is a consistent underperformance if measured at 
five-year horizon. The magnitude of underperformance (-44.1 percent) at that time from 
size-control benchmark is largest. Additionally, this is quite close (-47.6 percent) to results in 
Gregory et al. (2010). Buy-and-hold abnormal returns over post-IPOs five year periods based 
on CAPM is smallest, with statistically insignificant -2.4 percent. Nevertheless, that’s the 
only insignificant underperformance found among five benchmarks. When turning to 
three-year interval, at which point we notice the underperformance is not significant. Based 
on this, we find the evidence that underperformance accelerates beyond three years. From 
panel B, we get different picture as from panel A. IPOs yield outperformance relative to all 
five benchmarks, among which two measurments are significant. Actually, the 
outperformance could be found as early as three year horizon. The improvement from value 
weight scheme supports the view that the size of IPOs with worst performance is smaller. 
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4.4.2 Cumulative average abnormal Returns 
As supplement, we also produce results from cumulative abnormal returns measure. The 
average abnormal returns are calculated monthly, and then cumulate depending on holding 
horizon. The number of observations, replacement of delisting returns, and value weight 
determination follow table 4-2.  
[Insert table 4-3 about here] 
Panel A of table 4-3 presents equal weighted results and panel B displays value weighted 
results. Columns 2, 3, and 4 of each panel demonstrate the abnormal returns at one-, three-, 
and five-year horizon. Consistent with results from panel A of table 4-2, we still find 
underperformance at five year horizon. FASI, SD, and CAPM based CAARs produce 
significant underperformance while F-F and CARHART yield insignificant outperformance. 
Compared with figures at three-year horizon, we cannot find many deviations. As long as 
value weight is applied, we again find the performance improvement, causing no 
underperformance finding. While three benchmarks witness the improvement when weight is 
changed from equal to value, F-F and CARHART experience abnormal returns deterioration. 
Given the concern mentioned by Espenlaub et al. (2000), we would also prefer not to place 
too much emphasis on Fama-French model because Michou et al. (2007) warn that we should 
be cautions in explaining results from Fama-French factor models since different ways of 
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estimating the factors can result in quite different characteristics for the factor time series. For 
the same reason, Carhart (1997) model cannot be placed too heavily as well. 
[Figure 4-1 about here] 
Figure 4-1 displays the time series of equal weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
cumulative average abnormal returns versus various benchmarks during the post-IPOs 60 
months. Two measurements show different time series. From buy-and-hold measure, the 
deterioration of performance mainly occurs between three and five years. However, the 
cumulative average abnormal returns drop sharply during the second year. Additionally, we 
find in the buy-and-hold abnormal returns measurement, the adjusted return experiences the 
large variation during month 36 to month 44 if based on F-F and Carhart model. It drops from 
around -10 percent at month 36 to almost -60 percent by the end of 43 month, and then 
rockets to the -10 percent in next few months. We find the extreme values cause the variation. 
Among the sample, Geriden group plc has extreme positive benchmark returns which 
terminate till month 43. In the F-F model, the buy-and-hold abnormal return is -50711.98 
percent while it is -66738.53 percent at month 43 for the company. If the sample is excluded 
from the sample, the F-F and Carhart based number will present much smoother line. 
4.5 Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
Besides the analysis based on event time framework, we also include work based on calendar 
time framework in order to confirm the robustness of the results. Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
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mention that t-statistics is overvalued because of assumption that contemporary returns are 
independent which is not valid here. Lyon et al. (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
support use of average abnormal returns on calendar-time portfolios. The composition of 
sample portfolio changes each month. Our selected portfolio constitutes rolling windows 
which pick firms for each portfolio being public during the last certain time period (13, 37, 61 
months) in each calendar month. The 13, 37, and 61 months correspond to the one-year, 
three-year, and five-year horizon. The reason that they are one month longer than designated 
numbers (12, 36, 60) is because the first partial month (issue month) return is not included in 
the analysis. To ensure the return history is one-year (three-year, five-year), we have to add 
one month. The monthly returns on those portfolios are estimated by equal averaging 
monthly returns of firms forming the portfolios. February, 1982 is the first calendar month for 
all three portfolio and the termination month of the portfolios depends on the fact whether it 
belongs to 12-month portfolio, 36-month portfolio or 60-month portfolio. 60-month portfolio 
ends till December, 2009 while 36-month portfolio finishes at January, 2008.  
We choose capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Fama-French three-factor model and Carhart 
four-factor model as benchmarks. Their detailed use will be illustrated in the following:  
CAPM is used as the first benchmark to calculate average monthly abnormal return. It could 
be expressed as follows: 
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𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                               (Equation 4-12) 
Where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the monthly return on the rolling portfolio in calendar month t, 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the 
monthly return of the 3-month treasury bill in the corresponding month, 𝛽𝑖 is the CAPM 
beta of portfolio, estimated by an OLS regression up to 60 months after the IPO.  
Fama-French three-factor model is often used as another asset pricing base for the long-run 
performance of IPOs (Barber and Lyon 1997, Brav and Gompers 1997, Espenlaub et al. 
2000). The calendar-time equal weighted return of the portfolio is used to estimate the 
following regression: 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝑒𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (Equation 4-13) 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio, the other parameters being 
the same interpreted as in event time framework. The regression yields parameter estimates 
of 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, 𝑒𝑖, and ℎ𝑖. The error term in the regression is denoted by 𝜖𝑖𝑡. The estimate of the 
intercept term (𝛼𝑖) provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return 
on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. 
Carhart four factor model is the third benchmark in calendar time framework, with an 
additional factor added to capture the risk related to momentum factor 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝑒𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑙𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (Equation 4-14) 
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 [Table 4-4 about here] 
Table 4-4 provides evidence of abnormal return in calendar time framework. The t statistics 
is presented below each coefficient. *, **, and *** represent coefficient significant at 10 
percent, 5 percent, 1 percent level. Alphas in the table represent the intercepts of each 
regression, with 0.0001 indicating 0.01 percent on average each month, or about 0.12 percent 
per year. In 12 months portfolio, FF yields outperformance of 0.6 percent on average per 
month, significant at 5 percent level. Carhart model yields similar results except 
outperformance is not as significant as those from FF. CAPM never produces significant 
outperformance in all holding period. 
Unlike the insignificant underperformance discovered by Espenlaub et al. (2000), none of the 
benchmark provides the evidence of underperformance in calendar time framework. Market 
effects, small firm effect, and book to market ratio effect are significant in all models and in 
all portfolios. However, we find the coefficients capturing momentum effect is insignificant 
in all portfolios and adjusted R2 don’t increase compared to FF factor. The insignificance of 
coefficients before momentum factor may indicate the risk related to momentum won’t be 
compensated properly in our sample. 
In the calendar time framework, the portfolio variance is time varying and depends on the 
number of IPOs included in rolling portfolio. The assumption of using ordinary least square 
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(OLS) is not valid. We switch to general least square (GLS) to estimate the coefficients, 
which is used in Gregory et al. (2010). Variance is designed to be a linear function of the 
number of firms entering the portfolio. The variance is assumed to be form of 0 1ˆˆ tnδ δ+ . To 
ensure the variance is positive, we set 0 1ˆˆ( ) exp( )t tVar u nδ δ= + . We first obtain the 
unrestricted residuals ˆtu  from: 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑏𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                             (Equation 4-15) 
Where btR  is the benchmark return in event month t. 
Then we estimate the regression in the form of: 
log(𝑢�𝑡2) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 log(𝑛𝑡) + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑡                                 (Equation 4-16) 
Finally, we set 0 1ˆˆ( ) exp( log( ))t tVar u nδ δ= + .  
[Table 4-5 about here] 
Table 4-5 presents results from GLS. GLS formulation seems to provide better fit in terms of 
R-squared statistics. The results from both GLS and OLS are same in the intercept sign. The 
magnitude of outperformance from GLS is smaller than that from OLS. Only FF produces 
significant outperformance in 12 month portfolio at 10 percent significance level. In 
summary, our results from GLS are consistent with those from OLS.  
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4.6 Performance by listing market and method 
G13 in LSPD provides us listing market information of sample IPOs. We analyse 
performance through their listing markets into Official list (OL), Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), and Unlisted Securities Market (USM). Due to less strict listing requirement, 
firms in AIM or USM are generally smaller than their counterparts in OL. Goergen et al. 
(2007) show that smaller firms have different long run performance characteristics. Greogry 
et al. (2010) also find the discrepancies in the performance among three markets. They show 
that long-run performance of IPOs in OL is hard to conclude, while firms in AIM and USM 
perform poorly which contribute to the overall underperformance. We conduct a similar 
analysis but based on size control portfolio only. 
[Insert table 4-6 about here] 
Panel A of table 4-6 provides us the equal weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns for IPOs 
listed in OL, AIM, and USM. The observations of IPOs in each market are also reported. Our 
results are consistent with Gregory et al. (2010). With size control portfolio as benchmark, 
we find significant outperformance (28.5 percent) from OL by the end of 5th anniversary, 
significant underperformance (-94.8 percent and -394.3 percent) from AIM and USM at the 
same time. Their outperformance or underperformance is prevalent across time series, since 
their abnormal returns sign do not change ever. The rows including observation information 
also indicate there’s much higher survivor possibility (72.4 percent) from OL. This figure is 
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only 31.4 percent and 59.6 percent for firms listed in USM and AIM by the end of 5th year. 
Additionally, those three figures are conservative estimate of survivor proportion since we 
add one extra month returns as delisting returns for firms without full returns history. For 
companies delisted on 59th month, it cannot be detected from observations reduction. Panel B 
of table 4-6 provides us with more detailed information about delisted firms. We measure the 
delisting percentage (delisting IPO number/total IPO number), losing value percentage 
(losing value IPO number/total IPO number), losing value among delisting (lose value IPO 
number/delisting IPO number). All three measurements show that IPOs listed in OL has 
longer history and lower liquidation possibility. IPOs listed in USM tend to be delisted more 
frequently, which could be expected since there is no firm listed in USM since 1993. Gregory 
et al. add that the mainly delisting reasons for firms in USM could be either liquidation or 
administrative receivership. 
Panel C lists the IPOs performance excluding delisted samples. It provides us a clue that 
whether poor or superior performance in different market is influenced by delisted firms or 
remains the same after excluding those firms. Row 3 (observations) of each sub-section 
displaying the number of observations remains the same, which confirms excluding delisted 
firms. The performance for each market improves to small extent compared to results from 
panel A. However, the conclusion that better performance from OL, and poorer performance 
form AIM and USM still holds. We could conclude it is not due to the higher delisting or 
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liquidation percentage that causes poor performance from AIM or USM. It is the listing 
market that determines the long-run performance. We suspect that IPOs with better quality 
will choose to be listed in OL, while the other firms are more capable of using market 
overreaction to timing the IPOs.  
Besides the information provided by listing market, we are also interested in the performance 
of IPOs categorized by listing method. Although there are seven listing methods listed in 
table 4-1, only two (placing and offer for sale) are main, occupying 93.7 percent. Between 
these two, number of IPOs choosing placing dominate the other (1642 vs. 187). We notice the 
market value between two methods has significant difference. Therefore, we adopt size 
control portfolio as benchmark.  
[Insert table 4-7 about here] 
Table 4-7 presents the results, with panel A reporting buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
panel B documenting cumulative abnormal returns. We can find significant 
underperformance of IPOs with placing at all three time intervals (one-, three-, and five-year) 
from both panel A and B. For IPOs choosing offers, their performances differ between panel 
A and B. Given the high volatility of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, skewness, and small 
size of sample (187), we interpret the offer IPOs from panel B, which we cannot find 
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significant underperformance or outperformance. It appears to us that long-run 
underperformance is concentrated among IPOs with placing method. 
4.7 Comparison with chapter 3 
The found underperformance, although not significant, is in contrast with results found in 
chapter 3. The abnormal returns in chapter 3 are positive. We are trying to find whether the 
discrepancy would vanish if the samples in chapter 3 and 4 are in the same period, or 
financial firms are excluded from chapter 3. Therefore, we divide the sample in chapter 3 into 
non-financial firms and financial firms. Also, sample in the chapter 4 are divided into two 
periods, 1981-2000 and 2001-2004, the first of which is same with sample period of chapter 3. 
We calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns at five-year horizon for these four 
sub-samples. The results among different samples are comparable. Firstly, since both 
chapters use LSPD as data sources, same returns are used for the same firms. Secondly, the 
benchmarks for the analysis include FASI, CAPM, and FF, which are both adopted in chapter 
3 and 4. The reason for not using CAR as abnormal returns in table 4-8 is that the difference 
between two samples cannot not be detected using normal t test. The 5-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for four sub-samples are presented in table 4-8.  
[Table 4-8 about here] 
As shown from the table, the first two rows display the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for 
non-financial firms and financial firms respectively. The sample is from chapter 3 and sample 
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period is between 1981 and 2000. The rows 3 and 4 are results from chapter 4, two periods 
1981-2000 and 2001-2004. We find the results between row 1 and 2 or between row 3 and 4 
are quite similar. In other words, the partition of sample (chapter 3) into non-financial and 
financial and partition of sample (chapter 4) into two periods cannot cause discrepancy in 
sub-samples. The t-statistics in the last two rows confirm the finding. The t in the fifth row 
shows there is significant difference between non-financial firms in chapter 3 and 4 during 
1981-2000. After controlling for effect from industry and sample period, we still find 
significant difference between chapter 3 and 4. 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we re-examine the evidence of long-term stock performance of IPOs in UK 
using a new data set of firms over the period 1982-2004. We adopt a number of alternative 
benchmarks to assess the validity of our results. These benchmarks allow for size and growth 
expectation effect. Also, to my best knowledge, Carhart four-factor model is applied on 
similar analysis for the first time in UK. In line with conclusion from Espenlaub et al. (2000), 
the results on long-run underperformance over 60-months after IPO depend on the choice of 
techniques. When measured with cumulative average abnormal returns metrics, only results 
based on size control portfolio show significant underperformance. All remaining CAARs 
from other benchmarks either display insignificant underperformance or even significant 
outperformance. On the contrast, the conclusion from BHAR measure is unanimous, with all 
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five negative abnormal returns and four among five significantly different from zero. For 
each measure, we add value weight scheme to explore whether there is performance 
difference among different size IPOs. Nearly all benchmarks show dramatic performance 
improvement if switched to value weight scheme except Fama-French and Carhart model in 
CAAR measure. The superior performance confirms the literature (Ritter, 1991; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995) that worst performances come from small IPOs. Our finding of 
underperformance in event time is opposite to the evidence found in last chapter. The main 
reason is that the sample in the last chapter is not comprehensive, only more than 50 percent 
of sample size in the same period in this chapter. Therefore, conclusion of outperformance 
from UK IPOs does not hold here. 
We also conduct robustness check via calendar-time work and find that across all 
calendar-time portfolios, there is no underperformance. Besides the conventional OLS, to 
allow for the changing portfolio variance, we include GLS in the calendar time framework. 
Results from two methods yield qualitative same results. The significant outperformance is 
found in 60-month portfolio. 12-month and 36-month portfolios only produce insignificant 
outperformance if measured from Jensen-alpha approach. This is consistent with Fama (1998) 
that apparent anomalies can be due to methodology and most long-term return anomalies tend 
to disappear with reasonable changes in technique.    
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Table 4-1 Summary statistics of Initial Public Offerings in UK, 1982-2004 
Our identified sample (IPOs) includes 1953 non-financial firms from 1982-2004. Panel A displays the 
distribution by listing methods and calendar year. Panel B shows the distribution by industry and calendar year. 
Panel C document the distribution by listing market and calendar year. The last two rows of each panel report 
the mean and median market value of the sample by listing methods, industry, or listing market. The market 
value is measured at the end of first trading month, market capitalization of ordinary shares. Listing method is 
based upon the G8 codes; industry is based upon adjustment of G17; and listing market is based on G13. Their 
listing methods include placement, offers for sale at fixed price, offers for sale by tenders, subscription, and 
combination of any two. The confirmation and partition of industry is through Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB). Any companies not belonging to AIM or USM listed will be categorized into OL listed. Due 
to missing information of industry for 16 stocks, the observation for panel B is 1937. 
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Panel A: Listing method distribution by calendar year 
LSPD Class 
& G8 Year 
Placing 
(53) 
Offers 
for Sale 
(54) 
Tenders 
(55) 
Subscription 
(56) 
Placing 
& Open 
Offer 
(71) 
Placing & 
Intermediaries 
Offer (72) 
Placing 
& Offer 
for Sale 
(73) 
Total 
1982 33 3 2 1 
 
      
 
39 
1983 49 11 14 2 
 
      
 
76 
1984 65 17 4 
  
      
 
86 
1985 67 29 8 1 
 
      
 
105 
1986 72 31 3 1 
 
      
 
107 
1987 81 14 
 
1 
 
      
 
96 
1988 84 13 
 
1 
  
1 99 
1989 67 14 
   
      
 
81 
1990 19 13 
   
      
 
32 
1991 3 6 
 
1 
 
      
 
10 
1992 25 
  
1 
 
      
 
26 
1993 57 1 
 
1 
 
1 1 61 
1994 85 1 1 
  
4 3 94 
1995 48 4 
   
      
 
52 
1996 129 4 
  
1 4 3 141 
1997 95 5 
  
1 
 
8 109 
1998 54 
     
2 56 
1999 57 2 
  
3 
 
1 63 
2000 154 9 
  
3 
 
19 185 
2001 67 5 
  
1 
 
7 80 
2002 45 2 
  
1 
 
9 57 
2003 55 1 
  
1 
 
3 60 
2004 231 2 
  
1 
 
4 238 
Total 1642 187 32 10 12 9 61 1953 
Mean MV 
(£m) 
57.6 499 190 34.2 124 144 203 107 
Median MV 
(£m) 
15 29 20.5 13.5 30.6 128 36.4 16 
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Panel B: Industry distribution by calendar year 
LSPD 
Industry 
& G8 
year 
Oil & 
Gas 
Basic 
Industrie
s 
Industrie
s 
Consume
r Goods 
Health 
Care 
Consume
r 
Services 
Telecom
municati
ons 
Utilities 
Technolo
gy 
1982 3 
 
19 7 2 7 
  
      
1983 
 
6 39 5 2 15 
 
1 8 
1984 3 4 42 12 
 
19 1 
 
5 
1985 2 3 47 15 3 30 
  
3 
1986 2 3 50 12 2 32 
  
5 
1987 1 2 45 10 6 22 
  
10 
1988 2 6 54 9 6 16 
  
4 
1989 1 2 29 6 
 
23 1 11 4 
1990 2 1 4 2 2 7 1 12       
1991 1 
  
1 
 
4 
 
4       
1992 
  
10 4 3 7 
  
2 
1993 2 6 18 5 9 13 
 
1 6 
1994 
 
3 34 13 7 20 1 
 
16 
1995 1 3 19 8 5 15 
  
1 
1996 1 4 44 13 9 37 8 2 23 
1997 1 3 32 12 7 31 4 
 
19 
1998 1 2 17 1 5 17 
  
13 
1999 1 3 17 3 1 16 1 
 
21 
2000 3 9 20 5 19 56 5 
 
66 
2001 2 7 22 5 10 18 3 
 
13 
2002 5 9 16 3 8 10 
  
6 
2003 3 12 14 3 9 13 1 1 4 
2004 21 32 56 15 22 43 11 2 34 
Total 58 120 648 169 137 471 37 34 263 
Mean 
MV 
(£m) 
154 119 50.3 57.5 53.2 68.3 1280 651 132 
Median 
MV 
(£m) 
24.4 15 13 14 26.7 15 36.4 526 30 
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Panel C: Listing market distribution by calendar year 
Year OL AIM USM Total 
1982 13 
 
26 39 
1983 37 1 38 76 
1984 43 11 32 86 
1985 55 4 46 105 
1986 64 12 31 107 
1987 67 13 16 96 
1988 65 16 18 99 
1989 61 10 10 81 
1990 25 2 5 32 
1991 9 1       10 
1992 25 1       26 
1993 56 4 1 61 
1994 86 8       94 
1995 44 8       52 
1996 76 65       141 
1997 54 55       109 
1998 23 33       56 
1999 20 43       63 
2000 42 143       185 
2001 11 69       80 
2002 13 44       57 
2003 12 48       60 
2004 27 211       238 
Total 928 802 223 1953 
Mean MV  (£m) 197 30.4 10.4 107 
Median MV  (£m) 28 14 6 16 
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Table 4-2 One-, three- and five-year post-IPO buy-and-hold abnormal returns versus various benchmarks 
The sample is 1953 identified IPOs from 1982 through 2004. One-, three-, and five-year buy-and-hold returns 
(both equal weight and value weight) are compared to alternative benchmarks. In the first row of each panel, we 
employ the FTSE All Share Index (FASI) as the benchmark. Row 2 of each panel presents abnormal 
performance relative to size-dicile matching portfolios. Rows 3, 4, and 5 are abnormal returns adjusted to 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-French (1993) Three-factor model (FF), and Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model (CARHART). Number of observations relative to FF and CARHART is 238 less than that in 
other benchmarks since benchmark factor information is not available in 2009. Columns 2, 3, and 4 document 
abnormal returns at one-, three-, and five-year horizon. In panel A, we report equal weight results, and we report 
value weigh results in panel B. Value is based on the market value of ordinary shares at the end of first trading 
month for each IPO. The returns in delisting months will be replaced by either -1 or FASI returns at that month, 
depending whether firms preserve their values. The skewness-adjusted t-statistic follows Lyon et al. (1999) to 
correct for the negative bias of abnormal returns and in parentheses ( ). *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Equal weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Benchmarks One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
FASI -0.027  -0.008  -0.122  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-1.625)  (-0.123)  (-1.535)  
SD -0.045***  -0.151**  -0.441***  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-2.695)  (-2.335)  (-4.481)  
CAPM -0.014  0.020  -0.024  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-0.867)  (0.445)  (-0.313)  
FF -0.039  -0.070  -0.259**  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-1.941)  (-0.949)  (-2.029)  
CARHART -0.041  -0.110  -0.326**  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-1.891)  (-1.322)  (-2.170)  
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Panel B: Value weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
  One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
FASI -0.075*** 0.151*** 0.096** 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-5.312) (4.474) (2.204) 
SD -0.061*** 0.149 0.082 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-4.523) (4.370) (1.796) 
CAPM -0.041*** 0.214 0.218*** 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-3.218) (7.343) (5.768) 
FF -0.153*** -0.001 0.070 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-13.537) (0.011) (0.801) 
CARHART -0.123*** 0.043 0.043 
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-13.420) (0.810) (0.357) 
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Table 4-3 One-, three- and five-year post-IPO cumulative abnormal returns versus various benchmarks 
The sample is 1953 identified IPOs from 1982 through 2004. Monthly abnormal returns (both equal weight and 
value weight) compared to alternative benchmarks are cumulated over one-, three, and five-year horizon. In the 
first row of each panel, we employ the FTSE All Share Index (FASI) as the benchmark. Row 2 of each panel 
presents abnormal performance relative to size-dicile matching portfolios. Rows 3, 4, and 5 are abnormal returns 
adjusted to Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-French (1993) Three-factor model (FF), and Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model (CARHART). Number of observations relative to FF and CARHART is 238 less than 
that in other benchmarks since benchmark factor information is not available in 2009. Columns 2, 3, and 4 
document abnormal returns at one-, three-, and five-year horizon respectively. In panel A, we report equal 
weight results, and we report value weigh results in panel B. Value is based on the market value of ordinary 
shares at the end of first trading month for each IPO. The returns in delisting months will be replaced by either 
-1 or FASI returns at that month, depending whether firms preserve their values. The t-statistic follows Ritter 
(1991) and in parentheses ( ). *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Equal weight cumulative abnormal returns 
Benchmarks One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
FASI -0.058***  -0.149***  -0.180***  
(t-statistic) (-2.542)  (-3.410)  (-2.715)  
SD -0.065***  -0.203***  -0.277***  
(t-statistic) (-2.992)  (-4.932)  (-4.422)  
CAPM -0.043**  -0.090**  -0.104**  
(t-statistic) (-1.920)  (-2.116)  (-1.611)  
FF -0.034*  -0.027  0.043  
(t-statistic) (-1.495)  (-0.640)  (0.667)  
CARHART -0.026  -0.021  0.062  
(t-statistic) (-1.157)  (-0.485)  (0.963)  
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Panel B: Value weight cumulative abnormal returns 
Benchmarks One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
FASI -0.109***  -0.052**  0.039  
(t-statistic) (-8.375)  (-2.100)  (1.030)  
SD -0.097***  -0.067**  -0.001  
(t-statistic) (-7.891)  (-2.856)  (-0.020)  
CAPM -0.073***  0.056**  0.119***  
(t-statistic) (-5.814)  (2.367)  (3.295)  
FF -0.169***  -0.112***  -0.108**  
(t-statistic) (-12.232)  (-4.282)  (-2.766)  
CARHART -0.154***  -0.091***  -0.069  
(t-statistic) (-11.321)  (-3.507)  (-1.797)  
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Figure 4-1 Equal weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal 
returns versus various benchmarks  
FASI, SD, CAPM, F-F, and CARHART represents adjusted returns based on FTSE All Share Index, size 
control portfolio, capital asset pricing model, Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor 
model from month 0 to month 60 
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Table 4-4 Calendar time regression results for alternative benchmark models (OLS) 
Benchmarks are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French (FF) (1993) three-factor 
model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Figures below the coefficients in the parentheses are the 
t-statistics. The estimated regressions use 288 (312, 323) monthly observations with the dependent 
variable being the equal weighted return on rolling IPO portfolio which goes public during the last 12 
(36, 60) months over the risk free return, and the independent variables being the benchmark factors 
implied by expressions in the test. RMF is the sensitivity of the excess returns on the company to the 
excess returns on the market (FASI); SMB is the sensitivity of the excess returns on the company to the 
“small firms premium”, and HML is the sensitivity to the HML factor in the FF and Carhart model, 
UMD is coefficient for momentum factor in Carhart model. *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: 12 Months 
  CAPM FF Carhart    
Alpha 0.002 0.006** 0.004 
 
(0.77) (2.13) (1.44) 
RMF 0.786*** 0.747*** 0.775*** 
 
(10.03) (14.96) (15.43) 
SMB 
 
0.925*** 0.922*** 
  
(9.25) (9.48) 
HML 
 
-0.659*** -0.555*** 
  
(-3.86) (-3.50)    
UMD 
  
0.196**  
   
(2.21) 
R-squared 0.295 0.609 0.618 
N 288 288 288 
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Panel B: 36 Months 
  CAPM FF Carhart    
Alpha 0.001 0.004* 0.004*   
 
(0.42) (1.76) (1.88) 
RMF 0.785*** 0.764*** 0.758*** 
 
(10.94) (15.83) (15.52) 
SMB 
 
0.975*** 0.975*** 
  
(12.00) (12.04) 
HML 
 
-0.414*** -0.440*** 
  
(-5.21) (-5.15)    
UMD 
  
-0.049 
   
(-0.61)    
R-squared 0.351 0.662 0.661 
N 312 312 312 
 
Panel C: 60 Months 
  CAPM FF Carhart    
Alpha 0 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.18) (1.54) (1.27) 
Beta 0.864*** 0.840*** 0.843*** 
 
(12.27) (18.40) (18.30) 
Gamma 
 
1.025*** 1.026*** 
  
(13.53) (13.40) 
Delta 
 
-0.360*** -0.344*** 
  
(-4.60) (-3.96)    
UMD 
  
0.03 
   
(0.41) 
R-squared 0.407 0.708 0.707 
N 323 323 323 
 
 126 
 
Table 4-5 Calendar time regression results for alternative benchmark models (GLS) 
Benchmark models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French (FF) (1993) 
three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Figures below the coefficients are the 
t-statistics. The estimated regressions use 288 (312, 323) monthly observations with the dependent 
variable being the equally weighted return on rolling IPO portfolio which goes public during the last 12 
(36, 60) months over the risk free return, and the independent variables being the benchmark factors 
implied by expressions in the test. RMF is the sensitivity of the excess returns on the company to the 
excess returns on the market (FTSE All Share Index); SMB is the sensitivity of the excess returns on 
the company to the “small firms premium”, and HML is the sensitivity to the HML factor in the FF and 
Carhart model, UMD is coefficient for momentum factor in Carhart model. *,**, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: 12 Months 
  CAPM FF Carhart    
Alpha 0.002 0.005* 0.004 
 
(0.64) (1.87) (1.37) 
RMF 0.790*** 0.749*** 0.775*** 
 
(10.18) (16.04) (15.71) 
SMB 
 
0.922*** 0.921*** 
  
(9.54) (9.57) 
HML 
 
-0.648*** -0.554*** 
  
(-3.93) (-3.53)    
UMD 
  
0.194**  
   
(2.20) 
R-squared 0.3 0.625 0.622 
N 288 288 288 
Panel B: 36 Months 
  CAPM FF Carhart    
Alpha 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.31) (1.31) (1.49) 
RMF 0.789*** 0.772*** 0.766*** 
 
(11.08) (16.58) (16.24) 
SMB 
 
0.976*** 0.976*** 
  
(12.06) (12.09) 
HML 
 
-0.403*** -0.429*** 
  
(-5.01) (-5.06)    
UMD 
  
-0.05 
   
(-0.63)    
R-squared 0.356 0.683 0.683 
N 312 312 312 
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Panel C: 60 Months 
  CAPM FF Carhart    
Alpha 0.000 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.02) (1.15) (0.96) 
RMF 0.867*** 0.840*** 0.843*** 
 
(12.45) (19.19) (18.96) 
SMB 
 
1.024*** 1.025*** 
  
(13.72) (13.61) 
HML 
 
-0.352*** -0.339*** 
  
(-4.45) (-3.96)    
UMD 
  
0.024 
   
(0.35) 
R-squared 0.414 0.728 0.727 
N 323 323 323 
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Table 4-6 One-, three, and five-year post-IPO buy-and-hold abnormal returns by listing market 
This table measures the one-, three-, and five-year post issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns compared 
to size control benchmarks. Panel A and Panel C are similar in the format except the sample in panel C 
excludes all delisted firms. Sample used in panel A is 1953 identified IPOs from 1982 to 2004. In each 
market (OL, AIM, and USM), the skewness-adjusted t-statistic (Lyon et al., 1999) and observations at 
certain time horizon are reported below the returns. Panel B documents the number and percentage of 
delisting and losing value. Delisting percentage is obtained by using delisted IPO number deflated by 
total IPO number. Losing value percentage is obtained by using losing value IPO number deflated by 
total IPO number. Losing value among delisting is calculated as losing value IPO number dividing 
delisted IPO numbers. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Equal weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns by listing markets 
Markets One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
OL 0.068***  0.334***  0.264**  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (3.431)  (5.333)  (2.608)  
Observations 923 814 672 
AIM -0.146***  -0.504***  -0.971***  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-4.663)  (-3.800)  (-8.339)  
Observations 787 673 478 
USM -0.158***  -1.294***  -3.928***  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-3.007)  (-11.889)  (-12.718)  
Observations 214 135 70 
 
Panel B: Delisting IPOs analysis 
  OL AIM USM 
Total Number 928 802 223 
Delisting Number 290 391 163 
Losing Value Number 44 101 32 
Delisting percentage 0.313  0.488  0.731  
Losing Value Percentage 0.047  0.126  0.143  
Losing Value among delisting 0.152  0.258  0.196  
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Panel C: Equal weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns by listing markets 
Markets One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
OL 0.092***  0.448***  0.336***  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (4.262)  (6.313)  (3.296)  
Observations 638 638 638 
AIM -0.095**  -0.292**  -0.897***  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-2.206)  (-2.183)  (-7.200)  
Observations 410 410 410 
USM -0.225***  -1.329***  -3.247***  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-2.769)  (-5.792)  (-11.821)  
Observations 60 60 60 
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Table 4-7 One-, three-, and five-year post-IPO buy-and-hold abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns by listing method 
This table measures the one-, three-, and five-year post issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns compared 
to size control benchmarks. G8 is used to identify the listing method. The corresponding G8 for 
samples with placing is 53 and for samples with offer is 54. Panel A uses buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns and panel B adopts cumulative abnormal returns. Skewness-adjusted t-statistic follows Lyon et 
la. (1999) The t-stat in panel B follows Ritter (1991). T-statistics are presented in parentheses ( ). *,**, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Equal weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Listing Method One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
Placing -0.042**  -0.164**  -0.434***  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (-2.272)  (-2.730)  (-3.939)  
Offer 0.004  0.235  -0.243  
(Skewness-adjusted t-statistic) (0.113)  (1.098)  (-1.081)  
 
Panel B: Equal weight cumulative abnormal returns 
Listing Method One-Year Three-Year Five-Year 
Placing -0.062**  -0.210***  -0.284***  
(t-statistic) (-2.446)  (-4.336)  (-3.897)  
Offer -0.007  0.012  0.019  
(t-statistic) (-0.194)  (0.179)  (0.197)  
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Table 4-8 Five-year post-IPO buy-and-hold returns by industry and sample period 
This table measures the five-year post issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns compared to FASI, CAPM, 
and FF. We divide the sample in chapter 3 into financial and non-financial firms to be compared with 
samples in chapter 4. Similarly, we divide the sample in chapter 4 into between 1981-2000 and 
2001-2004. All the figures are five-year equally weighted results. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses ( ). *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Chapter 
Sample 
Size 
Industry Time period Benchmark 
        FASI CAPM FF 
3 715 non-financial 1981-2000 0.265  0.373  0.511  
3 104 financial 1981-2000 0.262  0.363  0.386  
4 1518 non-financial 1981-2000 -0.064  0.033  -0.136  
4 435 non-financial 2001-2004 -0.062  0.025  -0.360  
t-stat for non-financial firms between 1981-2000 in chapter 3 
vs. chapter 4 
(1.910**)  (1.989**)  (1.791**)  
t-stat for non-financial firms between 1981-2000 vs. 
2001-2004 
(-0.007)  (0.068)  (0.451)  
t-stat for firms in chapter 3 between non-financial and 
financial 
(0.006)  (0.020)  (0.264)  
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Chapter 5 Underpricing and long-term performance of two-stage IPOs in UK 
5.1 Introduction 
Existing numerous literatures document significant high market-adjusted returns at the 
first day of trading (IPO underpricing) and low long-term wealth loss compared to 
comparable benchmarks (IPO long-term underperformance). Therefore, a two-part 
puzzle exists, including IPO underpricing and long-run underperformance.  
One consensus of IPO underpricing is that uncertainty is costly for IPOs and that’s 
why IPOs have to leave money in the table. To solve the pricing uncertainty, some 
firms wishing to raise capital adopt a two-stage strategy. They first list and develop a 
public market for existing shares and then sell new shares to public in the second 
stage. Derrien and Kecskes (2007) (D&K thereafter) confirm the strategy adopted in 
UK market can reduce the initial returns by 10 percent to 30 percent than comparable 
IPOs. This is ideal scenario for examining the first puzzle, IPO underpricing. D&K 
define these companies as two-stage firms. As comparison, they define another two 
types of public firms (pure introductions and regular IPOs). Pure introductions are 
firms that list but do not issue equity to the public within 5 years of listing. Two-stage 
firms differ from pure introductions in that they issue equity within 5 years of listing. 
Regular IPOs lists and issues equity simultaneously. UK is chosen as the target 
market since firms have to list and concurrently issue equity in other countries and the 
two-stage strategy could not be applied.  
 134 
 
D&K analyze the short-term benefits of two-stage strategy. First, introduction reduces 
value uncertainty and displays lower initial returns than comparable IPOs. Extent of 
underpricing determines the direct cost of an IPO. The two-stage strategy is less 
costly than an IPO. Second, firms adopting two-stage strategy have stronger market 
timing ability than comparable IPOs. In cold market, they substitute introductions for 
IPOs. When market improves, they issue equity faster than IPOs. Using limited data 
we have access to, we will test whether underpricing for two-stage firms is less than 
regular IPOs. However, D&K do not mention about long-term wealth effect of these 
two-stage firms, whether they will display a distinct performance pattern compared to 
benchmarks or regular IPOs. We try to fill in this gap by tracking the long-term stock 
performance after these firms’ (two-stage firms) offering.  
Our results find that two-stage firms experience lower initial returns than regular IPOs 
and comparable long-term performance relative to regular IPOs. Due to data 
limitation, we are unable to test the market timing ability hypothesis concerning 
underpricing. 
Chapter 5 is organized as follows. In section 5.2, we provide literature review on 
underpricing and long-term performance of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We 
also develop our hypotheses here. Section 5.3 describes our samples and methodology 
used. Section 5.4 presents the empirical results. In section 5.5 we discuss results and 
provide conclusions. 
 
 135 
 
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
Our focus of the paper is on the underpricing and long-term stock performance of 
two-stage IPOs. Since SEO is more similar to two-stage firm relative to IPO, we 
provide literature on long-term performance of SEO.  
Five years is the maximum time period that could be identified as two-stage IPOs if 
they don’t raise capital originally but do so later. The time interval is given by D&K 
without further explanation. We need some references to measure the appropriateness 
of the threshold. The two-stage firm offering is similar to SEO in that they both raise 
capital a while after being listed. Although D&K emphasize that two-stage firms are 
distinct from SEO, we could only find some clues from SEO to assure the accuracy of 
five year being a maximum time interval. Eckbo and Norli (2006) provide a table 
showing descriptive statistics for follow-on security offerings made by 6,092 firms 
that went public during the period 1980-2000. The average number of years between 
the IPO offer date and SEO date is 2.31 years, with standard deviation of 2.5. These 
two figures show that around 68.2 percent of SEO occur within 4.81 years after their 
IPO offer date if the distribution is normal. Bear in mind, only after burning through 
the IPO proceeds, would SEO take place. Eckbo and Norli (2006) find that it appears 
that it takes 2.35 years on average running out IPO proceeds. After adding another 
one standard deviation (2.5) and minus of 2.35, we estimate that around 95.4 percent 
two-stage IPOs occur within 4.96 years since introduction date. However, we could 
not find any literatures concerning UK firms. The estimate is based on normal 
distribution assumption, and we do not find any evidence against this assumption. 
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The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is well documented. Current 
research use initial returns to proxy for unobservable underpricing. Ibbotson et al. 
(1988) find average first-day return is 16.3 percent in the years 1960-1987 in USA. 
According to Ljungqvist (2007), there are four group theories explaining the 
phenomenon, asymmetric information, institutional, control, and behavioral. The 
empirical evidence broadly supports the view that information frictions contribute to 
IPO underpricing. There are three parties involving IPO transaction, issuing firm, the 
bank underwriting and marketing the deal, and the investors buying the stock. 
Asymmetric information models assume some parties know better than other parties. 
The best known asymmetric information model is Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse, 
which is an application of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem. Rock constructs a model 
where investors are either informed or uninformed. Informed investors end up with 
purchasing more successful IPOs while uninformed investors often buy less 
successful IPOs. This imposes a winner’s curse on uninformed investors. In order to 
retain uninformed investors in the market, the new issuers have to provide additional 
premium – underpricing. An underpricing is a voluntary cost to the issuer to attract 
uninformed investors still in the IPO market. The implication is that underpricing 
could be reduced via reducing information asymmetry problem. The traditional way 
to reduce information asymmetry is to hire prestigious underwriter (Booth and Smith, 
1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Michaely and Shaw, 1994) or a reputable auditor 
(Titman and Trueman, 1986). The choice of underwriter and auditor is viewed as 
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certificate of quality of the firm because banks avoid underwriting low-quality issuers 
if more reputable capital available. D&K propose another method to reduce 
information asymmetry, two-stage strategy. Another implication from asymmetric 
information model is that the greater is ex ante uncertainty, the higher is expected 
underpricing. This implication is also confirmed in D&K. They find lower valuation 
uncertainty at offering announcement is associated with lower underpricing. Based on 
the previous literature and empirical support from D&K, we can develop our first 
hypothesis  
H1: Two-stage IPOs have lower underpricing than regular IPOs  
Poor stock performance of firms after raising capital through seasoned equity 
offerings in one anomaly in financial markets. Recent studies by Loughran and Ritter 
(1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), Eckbo 
et al. (2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Jegadeesh (2000), and Clarke, Dunbar, 
and Kahle (2001) etc document significant negative abnormal returns for issuing firms 
up to five year after the offering date. For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
demonstrate that average annual stock returns of issuing firms is about 8 percent less 
than size-matched non-issuing firms over the five-year period after the offering. 
The interpretation of low SEO post-offering returns is mixed. Three alternative 
explanations for this pattern appear in the literature. The behavioral view is that 
managers choose to issue equity when firms are overvalued and investors excessively 
extrapolate from positive pre-announcement experience and underreact to bad news of 
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an SEO announcement. The slow recognition and correction result in low long-run 
returns. Additionally, Jain and Kini (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) propose managers time the market and take advantage of 
windows of opportunity. Investors’ overreaction to SEO announcement allows 
managers to sell overvalued equity, again leading to long-run underperformance. 
Alternative explanation comes from Fama (1998) and others who argue low returns 
come from the characteristics of SEOs, such as low market-to-book ratio and high 
past returns, and not related to issuing seasoned equity per se. Brav and Gompers 
(1997) and Brav et al. (2000) document that SEO firms are concentrated among 
small-growth firms, and suggest that their underperformance reflects Fama-French 
(1993) size and book-to-market factors. The third investment-based explanation states 
that public firm is expected to earn lower returns after issuance since required return 
is lower or risk of the firm decrease. Furthermore, Carlson et al. (2006) propose a 
comprehensive explanation for 22  pre-issuance run-up, announcement effect and 
long-term underperformance. According to them, they can all be attributed to a 
growth option exercise. Zhang (2005) argues that firms raising capital are likely to 
invest more and earn lower expected returns. The NPVs of new projects are inversely 
related to their cost of capital or expected returns, controlling for their expected cash 
flows. If cost of capital is low, then NPVs are high, leading to high investment. 
Lyandres et al. (2007) support real investment is an important driving force behind 
                                                 
22 Ritter (2003) reports average stock returns of 72 percent prior to a SEO, an announcement effect of 
-2 percent, and five-year post-issuance abnormal returns of -30 percent relative to seemingly reasonable 
benchmarks. 
 139 
 
long-term SEO underperformance and therefore use investment-to-assets as a key 
matching characteristic. Adding investment factor into standard factor regressions 
explains 75 percent of SEO underperformance. 
We propose the two-stage IPO would experience poorer performance compared to 
different benchmarks. We develop our second hypothesis about the long-term 
performance of two-stage firms: 
H2: Two-stage IPOs underperform the benchmark in the long-run after the offering 
Behavioral view proposes that mangers have market timing ability to issue equity. 
D&K also confirm their timing ability in two-stage strategy. Two-stage IPOs go 
public in the form of introduction substituting IPO at cold periods, and raise capital in 
the form of offerings taking place at the beginning of IPO waves. An offering is fast 
for a listed firm, faster than an IPO is for a private firm. Manager timing will lead 
investors to develop optimistic expectations regarding future stock performance of 
issuing firm during the post-offering period. The stage of listing until offering gives 
managers an extended period to time their issues and build up investor expectations, 
and thus the poorer long-term performance compared to regular IPOs is expected. 
However, this is only based on D&K. We are not sure about the performance of 
two-stage IPOs relative to regular IPOs. 
5.3 Sample and Methodology 
5.3.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
In this section, we outline the data resources and sample selection procedure. Our 
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sample spans from June 1996 to July 2004, inclusive, which is the same with D&K. 
Also, introductions are divided into pure introductions (firms that are listed but do not 
issue any new shares within five years of listing) and two-stage IPOs (firms that are 
listed and issue new shares within five years of listing). D&K use the same criterion 
to define pure introductions and two-stage IPOs. 
[Insert table 5-1 about here] 
We obtain the list of new issue and IPO summary file from the website of London 
Stock Exchange23. Table 5-1 describes the filters used to construct our sample of pure 
introductions and two-stage IPOs. We first pick up the firms with issue type 
“introduction” and “introduction from 4.2” and birth date between June 1996 and July 
2004. Then we identify firms that are cross-listed (listed in capital market other than 
London Stock Exchange), firms that have been listed before (traded in Unlisted 
Securities Market), investment funds and trusts, and misclassified as introductions. 
Those companies are excluded. Also, the companies that cannot be matched with 
LSPD are excluded as well since the return data is from LSPD. The results presented 
in column 2 have some discrepancy with sample size of D&K presented in column 5. 
Therefore, we have two further filters and present the results in columns 3 and 4. 
Since D&K do not explicitly mention whether their sample includes the firms to be 
introduced from 4.2, we exclude this kind of companies besides the filters above. Also, 
there are few two-stage IPOs introduced from main market, we exclude those and 
                                                 
23 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/new-issues-further-issues/new-issues-further-issues.ht
m  
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only keep firms introduced in AIM. The other filters keep valid. After eliminating 
firms that do not satisfy one of the filters, we browse the press releases from Factiva 
for each company for five years since the introduction date. We deem the first release 
date of primary shares sale news as announcement date and first trading date of new 
shares as offering date. Therefore, introduction firms are either pure introductions or 
two-stage IPOs. However, only some news provides the full information on offering 
date, offer price, gross proceeds, and purposes. We find that less than 40 two-stage 
IPOs are left if we apply the extra two filters. Given data availability which implies 
even less companies can process to following analysis, we choose 84 two-stage IPOs 
resulted from the 2nd column as our final sample. Compared to sample from D&K, we 
have more original sample size (257 vs. 203). This difference (153 vs. 101) remains 
nearly the same after we apply all filters. Correspondingly, this results in a size of 
two-stage IPOs and pure introductions, both around 20 more than that in D&K’s 
sample. We will also compare more information of our sample with counterparts in 
D&K’s. 
There is some missing information in D&K’s paper which is quite important for 
further research. First, D&K do not explicitly state which market their sample is listed. 
We could only infer from the fact that they use the regular IPOs in AIM to assume the 
most companies in their sample is from AIM as well. In our sample sized with 84 
companies, only 4 firms choose official market as their listing market. Therefore, we 
also choose regular IPOs on AIM as comparison group. However, with change of 
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sample period, it isn’t necessarily the case always. Second, the filters do not mention 
about companies with issue type listed as “introduction from 4.2”. We include these 
companies in our introduction list (including pure introduction and two-stage IPOs). 
We do this for two reasons; one the one hand, there is no issue price for these 
companies before their introduction dates. On the other hand, the email reply from 
statistics of London Stock Exchange confirms that those companies could not be 
categorized as officially listed.  
[Insert table 5-2 about here] 
We then collect the further information about these two-stage IPOs. The further 
information including the purposes for the first primary share sale after the 
introduction date, issue price, announcement date, first trading date of the new shares, 
and proceeds are again hand collected from Factiva. The table 5-2 presents the results. 
In this table, we also compare both available information between our sample and 
D&K’s. Panel A of table 5-2 shows that two-stage IPOs introduction is predominately 
distributed in 1995, with 44 among 84. However, in D&K’s sample, only 6 two-stage 
IPOs choose to be listed in this year. Additionally, 28 two-stage IPOs choose to issue 
new shares in 1995 and 1996, while this number is only 6 in D&K’s sample. There is 
significant discrepancy in terms of sample distribution, even if we use almost the 
same criterion as D&K. We further find that among 44 two-stage IPOs taking place in 
1995, only 1 is labeled as introduction, while the remaining 43 is labeled as 
introduction from 4.2. We propose the different distribution, especially in 1995 and 
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1996, is due to the fact that we include some companies with introduction from 4.2 as 
two-stage IPOs while this sub-group is not included in D&K’s sample. Panel B of 
table 5-2 shows the purposes of new issues. If the new offering is for exercise of 
options (warrants), the offer price cannot be found in the news in most case. 
Furthermore, the size of offering is usually limited to less than ten thousand. We 
therefore exclude new offering for exercise of options (warrants). The two-stage IPOs 
conduct new offerings either for acquisition or increasing working capital. 40 
companies issue for acquisition and 37 firms conduct offerings for increasing working 
capital. Press does not disclose the offerings purpose for 7 companies. Panel C of 
table 5-2 compares the gross proceeds of two-stage IPOs and regular IPOs. Although 
our sample size and distribution is different from that of D&K, the gross proceeds 
from new offerings are comparable. We both find that money raised from first new 
offerings is slightly smaller than that from regular IPOs listing. Panel D of table 5-2 
compares the extent of underpricing and initial returns for our sample and D&K’s. We 
follow D&K in calculating underpricing and initial returns. Underpricing is defined as 
market price on the day before the offering announcement day divided by the offering 
price, minus one. Initial return is the market price on the offering ay divided by the 
offering price, minus. The price here refers to the unadjusted price, meaning history 
closing price that has not been adjusted for bonus and right issues. The figure 
represents actual or raw prices as recorded on the day. Our price choice for calculating 
underpricing and initial return is also consistent with D&K’s. In our sample, the mean 
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underpricing is 20.4 percent and initial returns only 11.2 percent, which indicates that 
offerings have a significant effect on the price fluctuation. While in D&K, the 
underpricing and initial return is 13.9 percent and 11.9 percent on average respectively, 
with no significant difference. We also find that initial return distribution for 
comparable IPOs (regular IPOs in AIM) is quite similar with D&K’s. We achieve this 
by deleting 22 observations with absolute value of initial return larger than 3. Besides, 
26 regular IPOs cannot be matched with DataStream. Therefore, we are left a size of 
682 observations in calculating initial returns. Another interesting finding is that the 
days between announcement and trading is around one month for D&K’s sample, 
while the figure is only around two weeks in our sample. Our interpretation for this is 
that most of the offerings in D&K’s need’s shareholders’ approval in EGM 
(Extraordinary general meeting) or AGM (Annual general meeting). However, in our 
sample, we have some new offerings with very brief introduction from press, with 
only 2 or 3 days from announcement to trading. This finding is consistent with Barnes 
and Walker (2006), which discuss the issuance method choice of seasoned equity 
issues. Some security issuance mechanisms obtain the approval of existing 
shareholders before issuing new shares. Therefore, the time between announcement 
date and trading date is only couple of days. 
D&K state that IPOs on AIM are the most suitable comparison group for the 
two-stage IPOs. The comparison group includes 786 IPOs virtually all IPOs on AIM 
during the sample period. We concur and therefore choose the same comparison group. 
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However, we could only find 730 IPOs between June 1995 and July 2004. From 
London Stock Exchange, we obtain the statistics on offering date, offering price, 
market capitalization, gross proceeds, broker, and industry. Additionally, we hand 
collected the closing price of first trading day from DataStream. With this procedure, 
only 704 companies are left with available market price on the offering day. The 
remaining 26 regular IPOs could not be found in DataStream. The DataStream only 
recorded updated name of the companies, we find 167 companies change name for 
one time, 56 companies for two times, 8 companies for three times, and 4 companies 
for four times. Another interesting phenomenon found is that base date in DataStream 
is usually one day earlier than that from LSE. Therefore, we have another closing 
price on the previous day before the birth day of LSE. Usually, the price is same with 
offer price, with exception sometimes.  
5.3.2 Methodology 
D&K states that two-stage strategy is less costly than an IPO because it can reduce the 
uncertainty, which is a part of cost of going public. Since both two-stage strategy and 
initial return are endogenous variable, a treatment effects model is appropriate if we 
are interested in the effect of two-stage strategy on the initial returns after controlling 
the endogenity. The treatment effects model estimates the effect of an endogenous 
binary treatment (two-stage strategy), zj, on a continuous, fully observed variable 
initial return yi, conditional on the independent variable xj and wj. The primary 
interest is in the regression function 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗𝛽 + 𝛿𝑧𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗                                         (Equation 5-1) 
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where zj is an endogenous dummy variable indicating whether the company use the 
two-stage strategy. The binary decision to obtain the treatment zj is modeled as the 
outcome of an observed latent variable, zj*. It is assumed that zj* is a linear function of 
the exogenous covariates Wj and a random component uj. It is in the form of  
𝑧𝑗
∗ = 𝑊𝑗𝛾 + 𝑢𝑗                                             (Equation 5-2) 
and the observed decision is 
𝑧𝑗 = {1,0, 𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑗∗ > 0𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑒 
where 𝜖 and 𝑢 are bivariate normal with mean zero and covariance matrix 
�
𝜎2 𝜌𝜎
𝜌𝜎 1 � 
The treatment effects model estimates the two models. The first stage model estimates 
the probability of choosing a two-stage strategy over a regular IPO, conditional on a 
set of exogenous variables. The second-stage model finds the effect of two-stage 
strategy on initial returns. We use maximum likelihood (ML) to estimate two models. 
In the second stage model, we also present the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
for comparison. The choice of exogenous variables is quite similar to D&K.  
For the first-stage model, we use the following variables: 
 Ln(Market capitalization at introduction/IPO) 
 Market level at introduction/IPO: The closing price of HGSC excluding 
investment trust index is used to proxy for the market condition on the day of 
introduction/IPO. 
 Descending market dummy: This is a dummy variable. It equals to one if the 
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month of introduction/IPO falls between July 1998 and December 1998 or 
between January 2001 and March 2003 inclusive. These two periods are reported 
to have substantial and sustained market decline. The dummy variable is designed 
to control for unfavorable market conditions. 
 Prestigious broker at introduction/IPO dummy: The variable proxies for the 
quality of the firm, assuming that high quality firms employ high quality broker. It 
equals to one if the firm’s nominated broker at introduction/IPO is prestigious, and 
zero otherwise. D&K construct a list of broker name, which is from 1997 to 2003 
editions of Thomson’s Extel Survey.24 
We do not include the health dummy and spin-off dummy in our model. Firstly, we 
have no access to Worldscope, which provides the annual sales, operating income, and 
net income in D&K’s paper. Secondly, the number of observations of spin-off is very 
limited, only 4 in our two-stage IPOs. 
For the second-stage model, we use the following variables: 
 Ln(Gross proceeds of offering/IPO) 
 Market return at offering/IPO: Loughran and Ritter (2003) use this variable to 
proxy for market conditions. It is the return on the HGSC excluding investment 
trusts index over the 3 months ending the day before the offering/IPO day. If the 
                                                 
24 We only consider the following brokers are prestigious. They are ABN AMRO (including Hoare 
Govett), Cazenove & Co., Credit Lyonnais Securities, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, HSBC 
Securities (including James Capel), ING Financial Markets (including Charterhouse Securities), 
Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities, KBC Securities (including Peel Hunt), Lazard, Lehman 
Brothers, Nomura International, Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, SG Securities, UBS, and WestLB 
(including Pannmure Gordon).  
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day of 3 months ago is not trading day, we make it the next available trading day. 
 Prestigious broker at offering/IPO dummy: This is variable with value 1 if the 
nominated broker at offering/IPO is prestigious, otherwise zero. The standard for 
defining prestige is same as that in the first-stage model. 
We also include the industry dummies in the second-stage model. The classification of 
industry is based on industry classification benchmark, which is standard industry 
benchmark developed by Dow Jones and FTSE. We add two-stage IPO probability, 
the probability of choosing the two-stage strategy estimated from the first-stage model. 
The independent variables of OLS models in the second stage is just two-stage IPO 
dummy, plus the other exogenous variables.  
In terms of long-term, it is five years after the offering or issuing month. The event 
month is excluded from the analysis. The benchmark for calculating abnormal returns 
is HGSC (Hoare Govett Smaller Companies) index, which is chosen by D&K. HGSC 
index is Britain’s longest established small-company index, constructed on a 
consistent basis since 1955. Because of its long history, it is widely used as a 
benchmark for evaluating performance of UK equity portfolio. We adopt both mean 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns and mean cumulative abnormal returns to evaluate the 
performance. However, the procedure to obtain average is different. Mean 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are firstly compounded individually for each sample 
firm and then calculated average based on weight scheme. Mean cumulative abnormal 
returns are obtained by cumulating average abnormal returns monthly. Also, value 
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weight in addition to equal weight is also used to provide more information 
concerning the size effect on performance. The value is based on initial market 
capitalization, which is from London stock exchange. The monthly abnormal return is 
the difference between actual individual IPO returns and expected returns from certain 
benchmarks, which could be expressed as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑅𝐵𝑡                                          (Equation 5-3) 
A T-month BHAR for new issuing firm i is in the form of: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡) −∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐵𝑡)𝑇𝑡=1𝑇𝑡=1                       (Equation 5-4) 
where RBT is the expected return and Rit indicates the return of company i. For the 
sample of event firms, the mean BHAR is calculated as the average of the individual 
firm BHARs. The returns are compounded monthly first and then average is obtained. 
The calculation of mean CAAR is different. First, the average abnormal returns on a 
portfolio of n stocks for specified time interval is the equally weighted or value 
weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark-adjusted returns: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖=1                                            (Equation 5-5) 
The mean CAAR from event month 1 to event month s is the summation of the 
average abnormal returns: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑠𝑡=1                                          (Equation 5-6) 
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When a firm in portfolio p is delisted before the 5th year anniversary, the portfolio 
return from the next month is an equally-weighted average of the remaining firms in 
the portfolio. For the month in which IPO is delisted, the return for that individual 
firm is vacant. 
We also evaluate the sensitivity of performance to the choice of benchmarks. Since 
Fama (1998) and others state that low returns for these firms are not related to issuing 
seasoned equity per se, but to cross-sectional relationships between characteristics of 
SEOs, such as low book-to-market ratios, past returns, future returns, we choose 
different benchmarks to correct for the possible biases. The benchmarks include 
market index (HGSC index) and factor-model (CAPM and FF). 
5.4 Empirical Results 
[Insert table 5-3 about here] 
Table 5-3 presents the results (excluding results for our industry dummies) of 
underpricing of two-stage IPOs compared to regular IPOs after controlling for firm 
characteristic and endogeneity. In the first-stage regression, the market level is 
statistically significant determinants of the choice of the two-stage strategy. That 
possibly can explain that firms choosing two-stage strategy possess marketing time 
ability. Since the coefficient of market level is negative, it could be interpreted that 
when market level is low, there is higher possibility of using two-stage strategy. 
Besides market level, we find prestige of the broker also has negative effect on 
probability of two-stage strategy. Firms adopting two-stage strategy tend to employ 
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less prestigious broker. The pseudo R square for the probit model is 0.148, higher than 
0.0686 found in D&K. The results from second stage ML model are that if the size of 
offering is larger and the market return of the prior 3 months is lower, the initial 
returns will be lower. This is consistent with literature prediction that initial returns 
are negatively related to gross proceeds of offing and positively related to the market 
return at the offering. Also, the prestige of nominated broker is found not to be 
significantly related to observed initial returns. The sign and significance of 
coefficients in comparable OLS also confirm our findings. The size of offering and 
market condition are found to play an important role in extent of underpricing. The 
coefficient of two-stage IPOs dummy is around 0.1, indicating that two-stage IPOs 
have around 10 percent initial return lower than comparable regular IPOs. After 
accounting for endogeneity, the initial return advantage of two-stage firms grows to 
about 34.3 percent. The result is quite similar to D&K, who find that benefit of a 
two-stage strategy on underpricing is around 30 percent. In most specifications, the 
coefficient on the two-stage IPO probability/two-stage IPO dummy is statistically 
significant. The initial returns for two-stage IPOs are lower than comparable regular 
IPOs, as we expect. Our first hypothesis holds. 
Next, we explore the long-term stock performance of two-stage IPOs and regular 
IPOs. Our purpose is to evaluate the long-term performance of two-stage IPOs 
relative to benchmarks and regular IPOs. Therefore, in tables containing buy-and-hold 
measure results, we include the difference of returns between two-stage IPOs and 
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regular IPOs. The number of regular IPOs in the analysis of long-run performance is 
661, 24 smaller than size in analysis of underpricing since those regular IPOs cannot 
be found from LSPD. The sample of two-stage IPOs in underpricing and long-term 
performance is exactly the same, with 38 companies.  
[Insert table 5-4 about here] 
Table 5-4 displays the buy-and-hold raw and abnormal returns for two-stage IPOs and 
regular IPOs. The benchmark in this table is HGSC index. Additionally, we evaluate 
the performance of two-stage IPOs relative to regular IPOs. Panels A and B show the 
results at five-year and three-year horizon respectively. Both equal weight and value 
weight results are presented in the table. Weight is determined by the initial market 
value of IPOs, which is from London Stock Exchange. We choose the regular IPOs 
from the AIM since all 38 two-stage IPOs are initially listed on the AIM as well. In 
columns 2 and 3, we calculate the buy-and-hold returns for two-stage IPOs and 
regular IPOs respectively. The difference is displayed in column 4, which is an 
indication of performance from two-stage IPOs relative to regular IPOs. We mainly 
focus on equal weight results since value weight results are additionally dependent on 
size of the company. At five-year horizon, there is no performance difference, while 
the difference is also limited to 8.3 percent at three-year horizon. The columns 5 and 6 
display the adjusted performance of two-stage IPOs and regular IPOs based on HGSC 
index. Two-stage IPOs underperform HGSC index by 5.1 percent and 1.7 percent by 
the end of 5th and 3rd year. The corresponding figures for regular IPOs are 2 percent 
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and -8 percent. In short, those two groups do not produce abnormal returns in 
long-run measured from BHAR. The similar methodology has been used in Brav and 
Gompers (1997), which compares the performance difference between venture backed 
IPO and non-venture backed IPO. The difference is that they adopt wealth relative as 
performance measure while we use buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The difference in 
value weight scheme is larger. However, none of the difference is significantly 
different from zero. Therefore, both equal and value weight scheme indicates that 
two-stage IPOs perform similarly to HGSC index and regular IPOs. 
We also evaluate the performance in terms of cumulative average abnormal returns. 
Previous literatures state that BHARs tend to magnify the underperformance due to 
the compounding properties from BHAR. It indicates the cumulative abnormal returns 
will have better results than from BHARs. Our evidence is consistent with this 
statement.  
[Insert table 5-5 about here] 
Table 5-5 shows results based on cumulative average abnormal returns. Generally, we 
find superior performance from two-stage IPOs and regular IPOs expect at three-year 
horizon for regular IPOs. Specifically, by the end of 5th year, the CARs for the 
two-stage IPOs based on HGSC index are 10.4 percent and 3.5 percent for equal 
weight and value weight respectively. The counterparts for regular IPOs are 8.6 
percent and -5.5 percent. None of these abnormal returns is statistically significant. 
Again, there is small performance difference between two-stage IPOs and regular 
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IPOs. By the end of 3rd year, two-stage IPOs remain the positive performance pattern, 
with 24.9 percent and 9.2 percent for equal and value weight. The situation is different 
for regular IPOs at three year horizon. Equal weight and value weight cumulative 
average abnormal returns of regular IPOs are -12.6 percent and -29.8 percent, with the 
latter figure significant at 1 percent level.  
To check the robustness of our conclusion that two-stage IPOs have similar 
performance with benchmarks and regular IPOs, we adopt three additional 
benchmarks besides HGSC index. These benchmarks are Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model.  
[Insert table 5-6 about here] 
Table 5-6 presents the additional evidence. In this table, we only present the equal 
weight scheme. The focus in this table is to evaluate performance of two-stage IPOs 
and regular IPOs relative to alternative benchmarks. We already find that two-stage 
IPOs have similar performance to regular IPOs in table 5-4. By the end of 5th year, 
two-stage IPOs underperform different benchmarks by various magnitudes. 
Specifically, the underperformance relative to CAPM is -18.6 percent; the adjusted 
return relative to three-factor model is -3.3 percent; the abnormal return compared to 
four-factor model is -16.2 percent. None of these abnormal returns is significantly 
different from zero. At the same event time interval, regular IPOs present similar 
results. While BHAR based on CAPM is 0.5 percent, the corresponding figure based 
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on FF and CARHART model is -7.4 percent and -18.9 percent. When we check the 
difference of adjusted returns between two groups, it is very limited, with largest 
magnitude less than 20 percent. Additionally, none of the difference is significantly 
difference from zero. Similar pattern is also found at the three-year horizon. The 
evidence confirms there is no significant abnormal return for two-stage IPOs and 
regular IPOs in terms of long-term performance. 
Also, we are interested in the performance of two-stage IPOs before the offering date. 
Due to the limit of sample, we only have 24 two-stage IPOs which have at least one 
year price history. We analyze the performance of two-stage IPOs 12 months before 
and after the offering. The month in which offering takes place is treated as event 
month and excluded from analysis.  
[Insert table 5-7 about here] 
Panel A of table 5-7 displays the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 12 months before and 
after the offering month. The HGSC index is used as benchmark since all 24 
two-stage IPOs are from AIM. The mean and median buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are -2.1 and -9.6 percent in one year before offering. The counterparts during the 
post-offering one year are -8 and -7.8 percent respectively. Basically, these companies 
both underperform the benchmark before and after the new offering in terms of one 
year. However, it is not statistically significant. Panel B of table 5-7 shows z value of 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. It measures the adjusted performance difference in median 
values. We could find the performance improvement both in raw and adjusted returns. 
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Nevertheless, the change is statistically insignificant. Unlike the price behavior in 
SEO, which shows a superior performance before and inferior afterwards, our 
two-stage IPOs both shows an insignificant underperformance. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter studies the underpricing and the long-term performance of 38 two-stage 
IPOs in UK between 1996 and 2004. Consistent with results from previous studies, 
we find that there is less underpricing of two-stage firms. Without controlling for 
endogeneity, there is 10 percent less underpricing for two-stage IPOs. After 
controlling for endogeneity of two-stage strategy, the benefits increase to around 34 
percent compared to regular IPOs. This underpricing confirms the results found in 
D&K. We also document the long-term performance of two-stage IPOs and regular 
IPOs. They do not underperform various benchmarks. Additionally, the IPOs with 
worst performance come from small companies could not apply to two-stage IPOs 
because the value weighted scheme decrease rather than increase the adjusted 
performance of sample. Furthermore, the regular IPOs listed in AIM from June 1996 
to July 2004 do not underperform the benchmark on the long-run.  
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Table 5-1 Sample selection from June 1995 to July 2004, inclusive 
This table describes the filters we use to construct our sample of pure introductions and two-stage firms. 
An introduction is a public firm that lists without issuing new equity within five years of listing. A 
two-stage IPO is a public firm that lists and issue new equity within five years of listing. Our sample 
firms span from June 1996 to July 2004, inclusive. We have three different versions to define original 
introduction firms. The first one is firms from LSE with issue type as “Introduction” and “Introduction 
from 4.2”. The second one is firms from LSE with issue type as “Introduction” only. The third one is 
firms from LSE with issue type as “Introduction” and listed in AIM only. The fourth column is the 
relevant information from D&K (2007). We use the same criterion and period as theirs. We eliminate 
cross-listings, firms that have already been listed before, investment funds and trusts, firms that cannot 
be matched to LSPD, combination of two classes of shares, and IPOs misclassification. We also 
eliminate irregular introductions, which are spin-offs from large companies and re-introduced. 
Original Sample 
Firms from LSE 
data for which 
issue type is 
"introduction" 
and "introduction 
from 4.2" 
(AIM+OL) 
Firms from 
LSE data for 
which issue 
type is 
"introduction" 
(AIM+OL) 
Firms form 
LSE data 
for which 
issue type is 
introduction 
and listed 
on AIM 
only (AIM) 
D&K 
Sample  
 
257 179 129 203 
Less: cross-listings from other exchanges 18 16 6 35 
Less: Firms already traded before 
introduction somewhere in the world 
18 18 17 17 
Less: Investment funds and trusts 21 18 9 16 
Less: Firms that cannot be matched to 
LSPD 
14 9 9 3 
Less: Combinations of two classes of 
shares into one    
1 
Less: IPOs misclassified as introductions 8 7 4 12 
Less: IPOs classified as introduction but 
actually introduction from 4.2 
  8 8   
Equals: Introductions  178 103 76 119 
Less: Irregular introductions 25 25 5 18 
Equals: Sample introductions (pure 
introductions and two-stage IPOs) 
153 78 71 101 
Less: Sample pure introductions 69 40 36 35 
Equals: Sample two-stage IPOs 84 38 35 66 
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Table 5-2 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for two-stage IPOs and regular IPOs. The sample comprises 84 
two-stage IPOs and 730 regular IPOs on the Alternative Investment Market in the United Kingdom 
between June 1995 and July 2004. A two-stage IPO is a public firm that lists and issue new equity 
within five years of listing. Panel A presents statistics on year distribution. Panel B presents purposes of 
new issues for those two-stage IPOs. Panel C presents statistics on gross proceeds. Panel D displays 
statistics on underpricing and initial return, years between introduction and offering announcement, 
days between offering announcement and trading. We define underpricing as the market price on the 
day before the offering announcement day divided by the offering price, minus one. Initial return is the 
market price on the offering day divided by the offering price, minus one. In each panel, we provide the 
corresponding figure from D&K, if possible. 
Panel A: Two-stage IPOs at introduction and offering 
  
Pure Introductions 
Two-stage IPOs at 
introduction 
Two-stage IPOs at 
Offering 
IPOs 
Year 
Our 
Sample D&K 
Our 
Sample D&K 
Our 
Sample D&K 
Our 
Sample D&K 
1995 30 5 44 6 9 1 15 17 
1996 11 7 7 11 19 5 85 95 
1997 1 2 5 7 11 10 60 70 
1998 3 0 4 7 9 7 34 35 
1999 2 2 5 3 6 4 54 58 
2000 9 9 6 10 8 7 169 176 
2001 3 1 4 10 4 10 88 90 
2002 4 3 3 6 6 9 53 60 
2003 1 4 5 5 3 8 61 63 
2004 5 2 1 1 5 5 111 122 
2005 
    
2 
   2006 
    
2 
     69 35 84 66 84 66 730 786 
 
Panel B: Two-stage IPOs at offering 
Number and % stating that reason for issues is 
Acquisition 40 47.62% 
Increasing working capital 37 44.05% 
No available information 7 8.33% 
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Panel C: Two-stage IPOs and IPOs 
  Two-stage Firms at offering IPOs from AIM 
Gross proceeds (million pounds) Our sample D&K our sample D&K 
Mean 4.832 5.882 7.592 6.579 
Standard deviation 9.961 12.655 20.780 11.751 
First quartile 0.472 0.477 1.477 1.45 
Median  1.172 1.747 3.100 3 
Third quartile 3.96 3.64 7.000 6.83 
Obs 66   730   
 
Panel D: Two-stage IPOs and IPOs 
  Our Sample D&K Our Sample D&K 
Underpricing 
    Mean 0.204 0.139 
  Standard deviation 0.568 0.167 
  First quartile 0.012 0.013 
  Median 0.071 0.1 
  Third quartile 0.22 0.2 
  Obs 54 
   
 
Two-stage IPOs at Offering IPOs 
Initial return 
    Mean 0.112 0.119 0.221 0.247 
Standard deviation 0.296 0.208 0.417 0.463 
First quartile 0 0.03 0.038 0.042 
Median 0.063 0.113 0.12 0.124 
Third quartile 0.21 0.216 0.25 0.25 
Obs 40 
 
685 
 
     Years between introduction and offering announcement 
 Mean 1.44 1.1 
  Median 0.87 0.9 
  Obs 82 
   
     Days between offering announcement and offering 
 Mean 16.2 32.4 
  Median 11 29.4 
  Obs 58 
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Table 5-3 Initial return for the two-stage IPOs versus regular IPOs 
This table presents the difference in initial returns between two-stage IPOs and regular IPOs after 
controlling for the firm characteristics and accounting for endogeneity. The sample comprises 38 
two-stage IPOs and 685 regular IPOs on the Alternative Investment Market in the United Kingdom 
between June 1995 and July 2004. We exclude all spin-off firms. A two-stage IPO is a public firm that 
lists without issuing equity and then issues primary equity within 5 years of listing. We estimate two 
models. In the first stage, we use probit model to estimate the probability of a firm adopting two-stage 
strategy. In the second stage, with probability obtained from first stage and some exogenous 
independent variables, we also use ML to estimate the coefficients. Initial return is the market price on 
the offering day divided by the offering price, minus one. Ln(Market capitalization at introduction/IPO) 
is measure in million pounds. Market level at introduction/IPO is the level of the HGSC excluding 
investment trusts index on the introduction/IPO day. Descending market dummy equals one if the 
introduction/IPO day falls between July 1998 and December 1998 or between January 2001 and March 
2003, inclusive. Prestigious broker at introduction/IPO dummy equals one if the firm’s nominated 
broker at introduction/IPO is prestigious, and zero otherwise. Ln(Gross proceeds of offering/IPO) is 
measured in million pounds. Market return at offering/IPO is the return on the market index over the 3 
months ending the day before the offering/IPO day. Prestigious broker at offering/IPO dummy equals 
one if the firm’s nominated broker at offering/IPO is prestigious, and zero otherwise. All models 
include our industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. Below each 
coefficient is its corresponding p-value. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
        Model 
    
ML 
Stage 1: Dependent variable is two-stage IPO dummy 
Independent variables 
    
ln(Market capitalization at introduction/IPO) 
   
0.088 
    
0.260 
Market level at introduction/IPO 
   
-0.002*** 
    
0.000  
Descending market dummy 
   
-0.114 
    
0.610 
Prestigious broker at introduction/IPO dummy 
   
-0.893* 
    
0.069 
Constant 
   
1.830***  
    
0.008 
N 
   
723 
Pseudo-R2       0.148 
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  Models 
  OLS OLS OLS ML 
Stage 2: Dependent variable is initial return 
Independent variables 
    
Two-stage IPO dummy -0.117* -0.119* -0.102 
 
 
0.082 0.078 0.139 
 
Two-stage firm probability 
   
-0.343*** 
    
0.000  
ln(Gross proceeds of offering/IPO) -0.0454*** -0.0438*** -0.0421*** -0.047*** 
 
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  
Market return at offering/IPO 1.012*** 1.014*** 
 
0.9997*** 
 
0.000  0.000  
 
0.000  
Prestigious broker at offering/IPO dummy 0.048 
 
0.0508 0.039 
 
0.424 
 
0.408 0.511 
Constant 0.100  0.109 0.141 0.129*** 
 
0.483 0.441 0.332 0.000 
N 723 723 723 723 
Adjusted-R2 0.095 0.094 0.054 
 
p-value of Wald chi-square 
   
0.000  
p-value of test of rho=0       0.003  
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Table 5-4 Three- and five-year post-offering buy-and-hold returns versus HGSC index 
The sample includes 38 two-stage IPOs and 661 regular IPOs from June 1996 through July 2004, 
inclusive. Three- and five-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (both equal-weighted and 
value-weighted) are presented based on HGSC index. Initial market value from LSE determines the 
weight. Columns 2 and 3 present raw buy-and-hold returns of two-stage IPOs and regular IPOs. 
Column 4 displays the difference. Columns 5 and 6 present buy-and-hold abnormal returns of 
two-stage IPOs and regular IPOs, with difference showing in column 6. The t-statistic is presented 
below corresponding return figure in parentheses ( ) respectively. All return information is from LSPD. 
If the sample firm delists before the fifth anniversary, we compound the return up until the delisting. 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Five-year post-offer raw and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
  Raw Return   BHAR 
Weight scheme 
Two-stage 
IPOs 
Regular 
IPOs 
Difference 
 
Two-stage 
IPOs 
Regular 
IPOs 
Difference 
Equal Weight 0.213 0.213 0.000   -0.051 0.002 -0.053 
(t-statistic) (0.000) 
 
(-0.036)  (-0.042) (-0.040) 
Value Weight -0.047 0.189 -0.236 
 
-0.252 -0.023 -0.229 
(t-statistic) (-1.254)   (-0.480)  (-0.243)  (-0.464) 
 
Panel B: Three-year post-offer raw and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
  Raw Return   BHAR 
Weight scheme 
Two-stage 
IPOs 
Regular 
IPOs 
Difference 
 
Two-stage 
IPOs 
Regular 
IPOs 
Difference 
Equal Weight 0.193 0.110 0.083   -0.017 -0.080 0.063 
(t-statistic) 
  
(0.091) 
 
(-0.076)  (-0.804)  (0.473) 
Value Weight 0.027 0.041 -0.014 
 
-0.212 -0.161 -0.051 
(t-statistic) (-0.025)   (-1.095)  (-1.608)  (-0.383) 
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Table 5-5 Three- and five-year post-offering cumulative abnormal returns  
The sample includes 38 two-stage IPOs and 661 regular IPOs from June 1996 through July 2004, 
inclusive. Three- and five-year cumulative abnormal returns (both equal-weighted and value-weighted) 
are presented based on HGSC index. The t-statistics are computed according to the Crude Dependence 
Adjustment method of Brown and Warner (1980). The t-statistic is presented below corresponding 
CARs in parentheses ( ) respectively. All return information is from LSPD. If IPO delists before the 
fifth anniversary, we cumulate (sum) the portfolio abnormal returns of remaining IPOs. *,**, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Five-year   Three-year 
Weight scheme 
Two-stage 
IPOs CAR 
Regular 
IPOs CAR 
  
Two-stage 
IPOs CAR 
Regular 
IPOs CAR 
Equal weight 0.104  0.086  
 
0.249  -0.126  
(t-statistic) (1.101)  (0.500)  
 
(1.182)  (-1.230)  
Value weight 0.035  -0.055  
 
0.092  -0.298***  
(t-statistic) (0.012)  (-0.384)    (0.541)  (-3.500)  
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Table 5-6 Three- and five-year post-offering buy-and-hold returns versus alternative benchmarks 
The sample includes 38 two-stage IPOs and 661 regular IPOs from June 1996 through July 2004, 
inclusive. Three- and five-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (both equal-weighted and 
value-weighted) are compared to different benchmarks. The benchmarks from top to bottom are Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model, respectively. Columns 2 and 3 present buy-and-hold abnormal returns of two-stage IPOs and 
regular IPOs at five-year horizon. Column 4 displays the difference. Results from column 5 to 7 are 
counterparts at three-year horizon. The t-statistic is presented below corresponding BHARs in 
parentheses ( ) respectively. All return information is from LSPD. If the sample firm delists before the 
fifth anniversary, we compound the return up until the delisting. *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Benchmarks 
Five-year   Three-year 
Two-stage 
IPOs 
Regular 
IPOs 
Difference   
Two-stage 
IPOs 
Regular 
IPOs 
Difference 
CAPM -0.186 0.005 -0.191   -0.115 -0.125 0.010 
(t-statistic) (-0.332)  (0.077) (-1.322) 
 
(-0.615)  (-1.233)  (0.076) 
FF -0.033 -0.074 0.041 
 
-0.164 -0.153 -0.011 
(t-statistic) (-0.021)  (-0.811)  (0.225) 
 
(-0.882)  (-1.395)  (-0.079) 
CARHART -0.162 -0.189 0.027 
 
-0.116 -0.165 0.049 
(t-statistic) (-0.296)  (-1.184)  (0.135)   (-0.674)  (-1.433)  (0.355) 
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Table 5-7 One year before and after offering performance analysis 
The sample includes 24 two-stage IPOs from June 1996 through July 2004, inclusive. Panel A shows 
the performance one year before and after offering. Panel B shows the performance difference changes 
in median between one-year before and one-year after offering. A Wilcoxon singed rank test is 
employed to test for differences in median The benchmark used in this table is HGSC index. The 
skewness adjusted t-statistic is presented on the 6th column. The calculation of t follows Lyon et al. 
(1999). All return information is from LSPD. If the sample firm delists before the fifth anniversary, we 
compound the return up until the delisting. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: One year prior and post offering buy-and-hold performance 
Event 
month 
Buy-and-hold returns BHAR 
Skewness-adjusted t 
IPOs HGSC Mean Median 
-12 0.022  0.013  0.009  -0.017  0.375  
-9 -0.082  0.046  -0.128  -0.066  -2.585**  
-6 0.010  0.069  -0.060  -0.107  -0.661  
-3 0.034  0.093  -0.059  -0.124  -0.630  
-1 0.089  0.110  -0.021  -0.096  -0.169  
      
1 0.049  0.005  0.045  -0.006  0.963  
3 0.064  -0.001  0.065  0.039  0.926  
6 -0.018  0.026  -0.044  -0.063  -0.451  
9 -0.005  0.021  -0.026  -0.164  -0.163  
12 -0.022  0.057  -0.080  -0.078  -0.596  
 
Panel B: median change in BHAR 
Measurement N Change 
Raw buy-and-hold returns 24 0.743 
Buy-and-hold abnormal return 24 0.314 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
The purpose of the thesis is to empirically examine the long-term post-IPO stock 
performance. Specially, we provide empirical answers to the following questions in 
UK. First, does the choice of dataset result in different conclusion on long-term 
post-IPO performance? Second, whether UK IPOs underperform the market in the 
post-IPO three- to five-year period? Third, do two-stage IPOs have less underpricing 
and worse long-term performance than regular IPOs? 
We empirically test those hypotheses in three empirical studies. The first relates to the 
impact of choice of dataset on long-term post-IPO performance. We use both LSPD 
and DS to test the performance based on the same sample, and try to shed some light 
on the possible results discrepancy. The second empirical study re-examine the 
conclusion made by last empirical work using more comprehensive dataset. The study 
considers several important characteristics that influence the performance and test 
them in cross-section scenario. The third empirical study focuses on underpricing and 
long-term post-offering performance of IPOs which adopt two-stage strategy. We test 
whether this strategy will make a difference on the well-documented puzzle. 
In chapter 3, we examine the performance of UK IPOs using both DS and LSPD as 
datasets. We investigate both the size and market timing effect on the found abnormal 
returns. Our results reveal that the used sample does not show long-run post-IPO 
underperformance. On the contrary, outperformance is found at five-year horizon. DS 
and LSPD produce same qualitative results in equal weight case. However, due to 
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significant difference in terms of size, their value weighted results are significantly 
different as well. Additionally, we test hot market hypothesis by analyzing the 
sub-period abnormal returns. We find the evidence on the issue is mixed. On the one 
hand, the periods with higher IPO activity display better performance. On the other 
hand, the performance in the period with most frequent IPO activity (1998-2000) is 
worst. 
In chapter 4, we investigate the five-year post-IPO stock performance for all 
non-financial firms in UK from 1992 to 2004. The findings reveal underperformance 
when event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used, and this result is nearly 
statistically significant. The underperformance is not so consistent when we use 
cumulative abnormal returns. At least, Fama-French three factor and Carhart 
four-factor model displays insignificant outperformance in CAR scenario. A calendar 
time portfolio approach shows that IPOs return at least as much as benchmarks. In 
summary, the relative performance of an IPO sample is contingent on the methods of 
examining performance.  
Our analysis of UK IPOs serves to underscore the additional questions about IPO 
performance in different markets and/or different listing methods. We find IPOs listed 
in AIM and USM perform consistently poorer than counterparts in main market. 
Additionally, firms choosing placement methods perform not as good as firms 
choosing offer.  
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In chapter 5, we investigate underpricing and long-term performance of two-stage 
firms. Two-stage IPOs refer to special IPOs which list first and then issue new equity 
within subsequent five years. Previous literature shows the two-stage strategy can 
reduce the underpricing relative to regular IPOs by 10 percent to 30 percent. Our 
sample confirms the lower underpricing of two-stage firms relative to regular IPOs. 
Additionally, we analyze the long-term performance for these IPOs after their offering. 
The results from standard methodology shows there is no significant 
underperformance relative to various benchmarks. Furthermore, the performance of 
two-stage IPOs is similar to that found in regular IPOs. Therefore, two-stage IPOs do 
not show underperformance relative to benchmarks or regular IPOs.  
The main limitations of the study are three-fold. First, it does not consider all potential 
determinants of long-term post-IPO performance. Due to data availability, there is 
limited information about book value25 and some other firm characteristics at the IPO 
time. Secondly, we stress the importance of misspecification of statistics by using 
solution provided from Lyon et al. (1999). However, a more comprehensive valuation 
of different statistics is needed to assess the statistical significance. Thirdly, due to 
data availability, we do not report the accounting performance after the IPOs. It is 
interesting to assess the relationship of stock performance and accounting 
performance change. Fourthly, we are interested in the potential difference of 
                                                 
25 For example, Espenlaub et al. (2000) report that over 50 percent of firms on LSPD for which market 
value is available for January 1980, do not have book-to-market ratio available. Gregory et al. (2010) 
also mention the lack of book value information. 
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long-term post-IPO performance between venture-backed and nonventure-backed 
IPOs since Brav and Gompers (1997) document nonveture-backed IPOs significantly 
underperform venture-backed IPOs. We are not sure whether this difference could be 
applied to UK IPOs.  
Accordingly, we provide some potential ways to extend our work from the aspects of 
dataset, empirical methods, and research topic. Firstly, we can collect more firm 
characteristics to shed more light on the determinants of long-term post-IPO stock 
performance. Secondly, some new statistics need to be developed to address the 
problem that Lyon et al. (1999) cannot. For example, in non-random sample, the 
methodology proposed by Lyon et al. (1999) still produces misspecified statistics. 
Thirdly, as long as annual accounting information is available, we can conduct the 
long-term post-IPO accounting performance analysis.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A1: Summary of international empirical evidence of long-term IPO performance 
Author(s) Year Country 
Number of 
observations 
Time 
period 
covered 
Average abnormal returns 
after 
Measurement Benchmark 
36 months 
( percent) 
60 
months 
( percent) 
Ritter 1991 US 1,991 1975-1984 -27.4   BHAR Matched firm (industry, size) 
          -29.1   CAR Matched firm (industry, size) 
          -26.9 -50.7 BHAR Matched firm (size only) 
Levis 1993 UK 712 1980-1988 -11.38   CAR FTA 
          -8.31   CAR HGSC 
          -22.96   CAR Equally weighted all shares index 
Loughran and Ritter  1995 US 4,753 1970-1990   -41.6 CAR Value weighted market portfolio 
            -33.1 CAR Equally weighed market portolio 
          -5.04   BHAR Equally weighed market portolio 
Stehle, Ehrhardt, and 
Przyborosky 
2000 Germany 187 1960-1992 1.54   BHAR Value weighted market portfolio 
          -6.64   BHAR Equally weighed size portolio 
          -6.61   BHAR Value weighted size portfolio 
          -11.59 percent   BHAR Control firm with similar size 
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Espenlaub, Gregory, and 
Tonks 
2000 UK 588 1985-1992 -15.9 -28.67 CAR Capital Asset Pricing Model 
          -16.24 -21.32 CAR Size decile porfolio 
          -8.12 -4.3 CAR Value weighted multi-index model 
          -28.15 -42.77 CAR Fama-French three factor model 
Drobetz, Kammermann, and 
Walchli 
2005 Switzerland 109 1983-2000   -26.17 BHAR Swiss Performance Index (SPI) 
            11.56 BHAR Vontobel Small companies Index (VSCI) 
Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell, and 
Goodacre 
2007 Malaysia 454 1990-2000 32.63   CAR KL Composite Index 
          31.15   CAR  EMAS/SB Index 
          17.86   BHAR KL Composite Index 
          14.86   BHAR EMAS/SB Index 
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Appendix A2: Summary of main empirical studies and our work in UK market 
Study Sample Data Benchmarks Measurements Results 
Levis (1993) 
712 IPOs 
1980-1988 
LSPD   Cumulative average abnormal returns 
UK IPOs underperform many 
benchmarks in the full 36 months since 
the first day of trading. 
Espenlaub et al. 
(2000) 
588 
non-financial 
IPOs 
1985-1992 
LSPD 
Capital Asset Prcing Model 
(CAPM), size control 
portfolio, multi-index model 
using Hoare-Govett index, 
Fama-French three factor 
model, RATS 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
and calendar time regression 
Long-run IPOs performance depend on 
the choice of technique. Four among 
five except Hoare-Govett model 
produce significant negative abnormal 
returns 
Goergen et al. 
(2007) 
240 IPOs 
excluding 
investment 
trusts January 
1991- June 
1995 
LSPD 
Financal Times Actuaries All 
Share Index (FTA) and Hoare 
Govett Smaller Companies 
Index (HGSC) 
Buy-and-hold average abnormal 
returns,  cumulative average 
abnormal returns, and Fama-French 
three-factor model 
UK IPOs underperform similar 
non-issuing firms. Quality of firm has 
significantly positive influence on its 
performance after the IPO 
Gregory et al. 
(2010) 
2499 
non-financial 
IPOs 
1975-2004 
LSPD 
Size-control (Decile) portfolio, 
size matching firm 
Buy-and-hold average abnormal 
returns and calendar time regression 
In both event time and calendar time, 
IPOs underperform significantly. 
Underperformance is more prounced in 
AIM and USM markets. 
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Chapter3 
824 IPOs 
1981-2000 
DS and LSPD 
FTSE All Share Index (FASI), 
Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), and Fama-French 
three-factor Model 
Buy-and-hold average abnormal 
returns and cumulative average 
abnormal returns 
There is outperformance found at 
post-IPO three- and five-year horizon. 
Value weihgts have opposite impact on 
results. 
Chapter4 
1953 
Non-financial 
IPOs 
1981-2004 
LSPD 
FTSE All Share Index (FASI), 
Size control portfolio, Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
Fama-French three-factor 
Model, and Carhart four-factor 
Model 
Buy-and-hold average abnormal 
returns, cumulative average 
abnormal returns, and calendar time 
regression 
Four among five benchmarks except 
CAPM produce significant 
underperformance by the end of 5th 
anniversary. 
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